Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, nancing, and payout polices

Noe, Thomas and Rebello, Michael (1996) Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, nancing, and payout polices. The Journal of Finance, 51 (2). pp. 637-660.

Abstract

The authors examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Their results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. Shareholder's most preferred signaling mechanism is restricting dividends, followed by equity financing and, finally, underpricing securities. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: stocks; securities; investment analysis
Subject(s): Finance
Centre: Faculty of Finance
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 15:42
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2015 14:06
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/1134

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