Noisy juries and choice of trial mode in a sequential signaling model: theory and evidence

Noe, Thomas, Gay, Gerald, Kale, Jayant R and Grace, Martin (1989) Noisy juries and choice of trial mode in a sequential signaling model: theory and evidence. RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (2). pp. 196-213.

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Abstract

In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode on the judicial process. In a sequential signalling game setting, we model a criminal trial using varying assumptions regarding the sophistication of the agents, while maintaining the assumption that the information processing of juries is noisier than that of judges. We demonstrate that under certain sets of assumptions, more defendants may choose a jury trial, even though the equilibrium conviction rate is higher. This and other hypotheses suggested by our analysis are tested on a sample of actual trial results.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Trials; Judicial process; Jury; Judges; Procedure; finance
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 26 Feb 2012 11:48
Last Modified: 02 Mar 2017 10:44
Funders: N/A
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/1162

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