Morrison, Alan and White, Lucy (2009) Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation. The Journal of Finance, 64 (3). pp. 1099-1142.
We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best-regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry-picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better-regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry-picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better-regulated economy.
|Centre:||Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation|
|Date Deposited:||12 Dec 2011 11:55|
|Last Modified:||01 Mar 2017 10:31|
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