Tsomocos, Dimitrios and Voliotis, Dimitris (2009) A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games. International Game Theory Review, 11 (4). pp. 479-489.
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.
|Keywords:||Market games; Bounded rationality; Rational learning|
|Centre:||Faculty of Finance|
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2012 18:43|
|Last Modified:||23 Oct 2015 14:06|
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