Incentives and Hypocrisy: When Compensation Makes Signals Cheap

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Denrell, Jerker (1999) Incentives and Hypocrisy: When Compensation Makes Signals Cheap. In: The Roots and Branches of Organizational Economics, Scandinavian Consortium for Organizational Research (SCANCOR), September 1999, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Californina. (Unpublished)

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Keywords:	incentives; compensation; remuneration; employee relations
Subject(s):	Strategy; Entrepreneurship & Global business
Centre:	Faculty of Strategy, Entrepreneurship and International Business
Date Deposited:	28 Mar 2012 12:23
Last Modified:	23 Oct 2015 14:06
URI:	http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/2439

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