Incentives and Hypocrisy: When Compensation Makes Signals Cheap

Denrell, Jerker (1999) Incentives and Hypocrisy: When Compensation Makes Signals Cheap. In: The Roots and Branches of Organizational Economics, Scandinavian Consortium for Organizational Research (SCANCOR), September 1999, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Californina. (Unpublished)

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Keywords: incentives; compensation; remuneration; employee relations
Subject(s): Strategy; Entrepreneurship & Global business
Centre: Faculty of Strategy, Entrepreneurship and International Business
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2012 12:23
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2015 14:06
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/2439

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