Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets

Neeman, Zvika and Vulkan, Nir (2010) Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10 (1).

Abstract

The paper considers the consequences of competition between two widely used exchange mechanisms, a "decentralized bargaining" market, and a "centralized" market. In every period, members of a large heterogenous group of privately-informed traders who each wish to buy or sell one unit of some homogenous good may opt for trading through one exchange mechanism. Traders may also postpone their trade to a future period. It is shown that trade outside the centralized market completely unravels. In every strong Nash equilibrium, all trade takes place in the centralized market. No trade ever occurs through direct negotiations.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Centralized markets; Decentralized markets; Decentralized bargaining; Market microstructure; Competition;
Subject(s): Complexity
Entrepreneurship
Finance
Centre: CABDyN Complexity Centre
Entrepreneurship Centre
Faculty of Finance
Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2012 20:14
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2015 14:07
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/2972

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