Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

Giraud, Gaël and Rochon, Céline (2002) Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38 (4). pp. 441-463.


We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Coalition-proofness; Correlation; Semi-strong equilibrium; Implementation; finance
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2012 20:02
Last Modified: 27 Feb 2017 10:06
Funders: N/A

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