Fuest, Clemens and Kolmar, Martin (2007) A theory of user fee competition. Journal of Public Economics, 91 (3-4). pp. 497-509.
We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. If the regional spillover goods are substitutes, user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements.
|Keywords:||Public goods; Club goods; User fees; Fiscal federalism|
|Centre:||Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation|
|Date Deposited:||26 Apr 2012 08:10|
|Last Modified:||23 Oct 2015 14:07|
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