Private Equity Fund Compensation Contracts and Their Incentive Effects

Phalippou, Ludovic (2009) Private Equity Fund Compensation Contracts and Their Incentive Effects. European Business Organization Law Review, 10. pp. 465-472.

Abstract

This article describes compensation contracts in private equity. It shows that they may not align interest between the investors and fund managers as much as commonly thought. Certain clauses appear as potentially hazardous for investors and others exacerbate conflicts of interest.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Private equity; Compensation contracts; finance
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 31 May 2012 17:13
Last Modified: 02 Mar 2017 11:32
Funders: N/A
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/3813

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