Noe, Thomas (1998) Creditor rights and multinational capital structure. In: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Annual Conference, 11 December, 1998, Cleveland, Ohio.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper models the capital structure of a multinational firm. The analysis shows that differences between legal systems in the enforcement of creditor rights, (recently documented by empirical research) can explain the complex mix of parent and subsidiary financing observed in most multinational firms, even in the absence of both tax differentials and private information. Optimal capital structures minimize the default premia associated with the multinational's overall financing package by equating the marginal enforcability of debt contracts in the host and home countries. The implications of this model are consistent with the extant empirical research and suggest a number of new testable implications for the financing of multinational firms.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Keywords:||Multinational firm; Capital firm; Legal systems; Creditor rights; finance|
|Date Deposited:||07 Jun 2012 08:56|
|Last Modified:||01 Mar 2017 10:52|
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