Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim (2011) Wages and International Tax Competition. In: ZEW Seminar, November 2011, Mannheim.Full text not available from this repository.
Firms generating larger surpluses on average pay higher wages. We study the effect of this rent-sharing between firms and workers on international tax competition. In our model, firms in a large country can shift surplus to a tax haven. In the benchmark case firms only have a tax incentive for profit shifting as shifted surplus is fully taken into account in the wage bargaining. In this case rent-sharing decreases the competitive pressure on the large country and leads to higher equilibrium tax rates. When workers do not observe the full surplus shifted, a wage incentive arises. Profit shifting then becomes more attractive as it reduces the surplus bargained over with workers. If this effect is sufficiently strong, rent-sharing increases the competitive pressure on the large country, which implies a lower equilibrium tax rate.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Keywords:||wages, tax competition, rent-sharing, profit shifting, tax havens|
|Centre:||Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation|
|Date Deposited:||21 Aug 2012 14:10|
|Last Modified:||23 Oct 2015 14:07|
Actions (login required)