Internal Reporting Systems, Compensation Contracts, and Bank Regulation.

Gyongyi, Loranth and Morrison, Alan (2009) Internal Reporting Systems, Compensation Contracts, and Bank Regulation. CEPR Discussion Paper. (Unpublished)

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We examine the interdependency between loan officer compensation contracts and commercial bank internal reporting systems (IRSs). The optimal incentive contract for bank loan officers may require the bank headquarters to commit not to act on certain types of information. The headquarters can achieve this by running a basic reporting system that restricts information flow within the bank. Origination fees for loan officers emerge naturally as part of the optimal contract in our set-up. We examine the likely effect of the new Basel Accord upon IRS choice, loan officer compensation, and bank investment strategies. We argue that the new Accord reduces the value of commitment, and hence that it may reduce the number of projects financed by banks.

Item Type: Other Working Paper
Keywords: compensation, internal reporting systes, capital regulation, finance
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 15:45
Last Modified: 27 Feb 2017 10:23
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/4975

Actions (login required)

Edit View Edit View