Hellmann, Thomas, Murdock, Kevin and Stiglitz, Joseph (2000) Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? American Economic Review, 90 (1). pp. 147-165.
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path.
|Keywords:||bank regulation, finance|
|Date Deposited:||01 May 2015 11:15|
|Last Modified:||27 Feb 2017 10:45|
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