An Extended Social Grid Model for the Study of Marginalization Processes and Social Innovation

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Introduction

Social innovation is not a new phenomenon, but it does appear to be entering a new phase – a phase in which it is seen by a range of actors as potentially offering solutions not just to localized problems but to more systemic and structural issues. Policy makers, particularly, have been engaging with the idea (if not always the practice) of social innovation in the context of intractable policy problems. This is true of the European Union too, as testified by the provision of considerable funding from Brussels for social innovation research within the Framework 7 and Horizon 2020 protocols, including the project CRESSI (Creating Economic Space for Social Innovation), which focuses specifically on social innovation for the marginalised.

The growing set of examples and attendant discourses of social innovation have not coalesced around a common definition, a set of standard performance measures, or an established policy agenda. There is no established paradigm of social innovation (Nicholls 2010). Rather, there seems to be a diversity of uses, and some malleability in terms of conceptualization. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it may also be that this fluidity and diversity of meaning and interpretation in the use of social innovation, is a strength of the concept in terms of addressing complex social problems and challenges – providing ‘clumsy solutions’ to so-called ‘wicked’ problems, characterized by multiple and contradictory analyses and diagnoses (Rittel and Webber 1973), and leaving space for a diversity of inter- and transdisciplinary collaborations (Ziegler 2015). At any rate, theorizing social innovation remains an open challenge (Grimm et al. 2013). In the following sections, we introduce our theoretical approach drawing mainly from economic and historical sociology as well as ethics.

But first some further remarks on ‘social innovation’. The rise of social innovation indicates a collapse in trust in the status quo – as established models and social relations have increasingly failed to deliver wellbeing for many. ‘Intractable problems’ highlight the failure of conventional solutions and established paradigms, entrenched in institutional settings across government, business and civil society. This is evident through private sector market failures, public sector ‘silofed-thinking’ and a lack of scale in and fragmentation across civil society. Frank Moulaert and his colleagues (2013, 2) noted,

*Socially innovative actions, strategies, practices and processes arise whenever problems of poverty, exclusion, segregation and deprivation or opportunities for improving living conditions cannot find satisfactory solutions in the ‘institutionalized field’ of public or private action.*

As such the growth of interest in social innovation reflects the failure of established institutional arrangements (reflected in technology, markets, policy agendas, governance structures and so on) to deliver wellbeing and economic prosperity to all parts of society. Fundamentally this interest points to structural, distribution and equity problems. Social innovation can be seen, therefore, as a response to patterns of modernity that have marginalised certain populations by representing the individual citizen as essentially an economic/consuming actor and/or as a welfare recipient, but not as an active
participant in collective decision-making. Therefore, social innovation seeks to respond both to inequalities produced in the capitalist markets of late modern states, and to limitations and unintended consequences of the ‘social’ or ‘welfare’ state in carrying out large-scale change. ‘Civic’ or ‘democratic experimentalism’ (Sabel 2010) are terms to highlight this political as well as contextual aspect of social innovation as a process in late modern societies (Unger 2015, Evers and Brandsen 2016, 178) – a point we will return to below.

**Defining Social Innovation**

In the light of our focus on economic space for social innovation, we might want to approach social innovation from entrepreneurship studies, and especially in the context of the more institutionalized fields of social entrepreneurship (Dees 1998, Nicholls 2006) and social enterprise (Alter 2006, Nyssens 2006). In this setting, social innovation can be seen as the macro-level field of action encompassing any new idea, discourse, inspiration, frame of reference or model that aims to address a complex, structural, social (or environmental) need. ‘Social entrepreneurship’ can, then, be seen as a subset of social innovation – as the organizational enactment of social innovation ideas and models. However, social entrepreneurship itself also represents a spectrum of organizational types and models from charities and voluntary or community-based not-for-profits to co-operatives and mutually owned ventures to fully commercial ‘profit with purpose’ businesses and, even, corporate collaborations or joint ventures. In this wide spectrum, ‘social enterprises’ represent the subset of social entrepreneurship that are for-profit or, at least, break-even businesses.

Yet, whilst this set of inter-relationships helps to locate social innovation in terms of two important connected fields of action, it does not serve to deliver a clear definition or boundaries. An analysis of the existing social innovation literature provides some better guidance. Drawing from a bibliometric analysis of the ‘coming to be’ of social innovation (Ayob, Teasdale and Fagan 2016, see also Nicholls, Simon and Gabriel 2015, 2ff, Nicholls and Murdock 2012), two, initial streams of social innovation research can be distinguished. The first has a focus on outcomes and social value production. For example, Geoff Mulgan and colleagues described social innovation as ‘new ideas that address unmet social needs – and that work’ (Mulgan et al. 2007, 2). The second has a focus on changes in power relation that emphasized new social processes and relations aiming at rebalancing power disparities and economic inequalities in society (see Moulairt et al. 2013). However, Noorseha Ayob’s and her colleagues’ (2016) analysis also suggests that in the second decade of the new millennium, there appears to be some ‘decontestation’ in the sense that both the outcome and process dimensions now tend to be accepted as common elements of social innovation definitions.

Within the European Union, an influential report by the Bureau of European Policy advisors defines social innovation as: ‘innovations that are social in both their ends and their means. Specifically, we define social innovations as new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social relationships or collaborations’ (BEPA 2010, 9). It is an example of a social innovation definition that acknowledges process and change in social relations, and not just welfarist outcome objectives.
In a related manner, the working definition of this project is:

*The development and delivery of new ideas and solutions (products, services, models, modes of provision, processes) at different socio-structural levels that intentionally seek to change power relations and improve human capabilities, as well as the processes via which these solutions are carried out.*

This definition, with its emphasis on change in power relations and human capabilities, is situated in a socio-structural conceptualization of social innovation and its economic underpinnings that we will introduce in the next section. It acknowledges the political aspect of social innovation, and the challenges of change rather than reproduction of the status quo, especially if issues of marginalisation are addressed.

Even if there is a need to better ‘theorize’ social innovation, much can be learnt from prior social innovation research. A review of the social innovation literature (van der Have and Rubalcaba 2016, 1928f) points to four scholarly communities:

- Community psychology focused on experimental social innovation (Fairweather 1967) for social and behavioural change;
- Creativity research examining the process of social innovation and its changes to or creation of social relationships and organizations (Mumford 2002);
- Sustainability transitions and grassroots innovation research concerned with socio-technical challenges of dealing with climate change, energy provision and further sustainability challenges (Seyfang and Smith 2007);
- Local development focused on communities, cities and regions frequently with a focus on governance, power and participation (Moulaert et al. 2005).

Our approach seeks to learn from all of these communities, and especially the last two. But as we will see below, is located at the intersection of economic sociology and ethics due to our specific focus on social innovation and marginalisation.

In addition to these social innovation research streams, the ‘older’ tradition of innovation studies with their primary focus on business innovation and capitalist markets are also relevant, in particular for the analysis of the more transformative or disruptive claims associated with social innovation as change not just in civil society but across society. In a review of business innovation literature, Attila Havas (Havas 2016) distinguishes the subject of change (goods, processes, organizations, markets, technological systems and techno-economic paradigms) and the degree of change (incremental, radical). Further to a focus on goods, processes and organizations, social innovation research extends the foci beyond markets to civil society and government, and especially to the reconfiguration of these different modes for the provision of goods and services. Likewise, a focus on technological systems and techno-economic paradigms will be complemented by a focus on social movements and their ‘social technologies’ for change. Thus, there is overlap and difference with traditional business innovation studies.

Conspicuous is the importance of social goal and process specifications in social innovation, which in business innovation tends to be more indirect (i.e. innovation is ‘good for’ economic performance,
which is ‘good for’ society). Accordingly, politics and ethics are more upfront in social innovation, and this necessarily also changes the ‘scaling’, ‘spreading’ or ‘diffusion’ of social innovations. If marginalised groups are not only the ‘object’ but also the ‘subject’ of change, non-economic conditions as regards public discussion and democratic procedures become important.

Once we have noted the differences in the ‘subject of change’ in social innovation, we can also apply the ‘degree of novelty’ distinction. There seems to be much incremental innovation in goods and services that address social need more effectively or efficiently. This is the focus of many successful charities and not-for-profits, as well as some so-called ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ (Prahalad 2006) commercial markets. Then there are innovations that harness or retool existing social and economic structures to generate new social value and outcomes. Examples such as Fair Trade (Nicholls and Opal 2005) or mobile banking typically exploit or modify existing market structures in order to deliver new or additional social value. This points to a type of institutional innovation located between’ incremental and radical degrees of change. Beyond efficiency and effectiveness considerations, it also includes social goal and process aspects – for example, not only the ‘extension’ of a micro-credit market for ‘the poor’ but also a rethinking of ‘the poor’ as equal participants in production, distribution and consumption (as made famous by the work of Muhammad Yunus). Finally, there is a place for radical innovation in social innovation, be it entirely new products and services or social movements and self-consciously political actors, groups and networks aiming to change power-relations, alter social hierarchies and reframe issues to the benefit of otherwise disenfranchised groups. With such change in view, Moulaert and his co-authors speak of the importance of focusing ‘on the role of SI [social innovation] in developing alternative socio-political discourses and on its potential for change in particular contexts’ (2013, 13). We would like to underline this importance, specifically for social innovation for the marginalised, as marginalisation is reproduced by power relations. Accordingly, it is an important analytical question, what space there is, if any, for ‘incremental’ change in social innovations tackling marginalisation.

The social movements’ literature suggests that truly systemic change only comes about through struggle and changing the dominant cognitive frames that frame social issues. Such activity typically comes up against strong vested interests and can encounter (sometimes violent) resistance. As a consequence, recognizing the political dimension of social innovation is a research opportunity, and raises significant practical questions and challenges. First, political action often prompts a reaction and can lead to institutional confrontation or even danger. Second, when social innovation addresses public welfare issues or aims to drive political change, it often does so as private action that lacks formal democratic legitimacy. This is particularly problematic in cases where social innovation acts as a ‘shadow state’ substituting for what would otherwise be the welfare responsibilities of the elected state. Such a democratic deficit challenges rights-based models of citizens’ relationship to their government. Third, there is the more general issue of who is included in, and who is excluded from, social innovation impacts. This issue is particularly relevant for a focus on marginalisation:

(a) Social innovation can have negative social effects by excluding some groups from the focus of its provision of social goods and services or its campaigns for social change; importantly, within a marginalised group, the most marginalised might be again excluded or marginalised (as ‘improvements’ might be more easily achieved with the least marginalised within this group).
(b) Another set of consequences can arise from different framings or perceptions of social innovation. A well-known example is the hybrid nature of those social innovations that blend social and financial objectives. From one point of view such activities are seen as inherently exploitative and represent the ‘privatization’ of the social, as critiques of the high interest rates offered by many micro-finance organizations have pointed out. Likewise priority given to financial return and break-even points, can tip the balance to saving costs rather than dealing with the most marginalised. More generally, it is important to distinguish the self-understanding of the marginalised group of itself (including personal and collective self-esteem, learned helplessness, further differences within the group) from the image(s) of this group in the eyes of other groups in its environment, as well as resulting differences in perception of the ‘social innovation’.

(c) There is no determinism or guaranteed telos of social innovations: social innovation could be hijacked for socially divisive or destructive objectives and intentions, for example by secret societies or extreme political parties; or simply by mainstream parties that feel little responsibility to address the marginalisation of groups outside of their constituency.

(d) Social innovation can achieve perverse effects in cases of operational failure (e.g. Tracey and Jarvis 2006). Since social innovation is often expressed organizationally in the form of innovative initiatives in weak institutional spaces, or across established institutional responsibilities, it is inherently risky. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that much social innovation will fail with potentially damaging effects for vulnerable populations.

A further critical issue concerns the public legitimacy of social innovation. Alternative solutions developed by social innovation intended to address socio-structural problems lack legitimacy for many stakeholders since they often take the form of interventions that combine otherwise distinct institutional logics and models of action in innovative forms and that challenge normative notions of the roles and responsibilities of government, business and civil society. Such hybrid forms of action typically blend the logics and rationales of two or more established sectors to build new organizational structures (i.e. ‘social’ business), processes (i.e. work integration models), or goods and services (i.e. user-led welfare models) that seek to meet complex sets of needs and demands in late modern societies better than conventional interventions do. However, crossing normative boundaries can generate public legitimacy issues, too, since the logics and rationales of action of each conventional sector are quite different and even contradictory at the normative level. As a consequence, the public legitimacy of social innovation (at both normative and cognitive levels, see Suchman 1995) can often be compromised (Nicholls and Cho 2006). The reaction to the social enterprise/social business hybrid model within social innovation has been particularly hostile since this challenges many fundamental principles of the state and civil society as not-for-profit sectors in many countries. Such loss of public legitimacy can have serious consequences in terms of access to resources, market competitiveness, policy support, and staff recruitment. Prima facie, a focus on marginalisation reinforces the challenge: the groups at issue are likely to be stigmatized or subject to prejudices, and these in turn can be used to question the legitimacy or even need for interventions.
The Extended Social Grid Model

This section outlines the Extended Social Grid Model (ESGM) used in CrESSI to explore the structural issues that cause and reproduce marginalisation, and the role of social innovation in overcoming or stabilizing this dynamic. The aim is to develop a novel set of research lenses well suited to the empirical examination of the key themes in the overall project¹:

- How can issues of social marginalisation be conceptualized within a structural model of socio-economic change?
- What are the long-term drivers of, and barriers to, structural social innovation for marginalized groups across various modes in which these goods and services are provided?
- What is the role of public policy instruments and of finance in driving structural social innovation?

The ESGM draws upon a variety of sociological, economic and philosophical sources in an attempt to provide a suitably sophisticated model for the exploration of these complex processes. Specifically, the model draws upon three key theoretical elements: the social grid analysis proposed by Jens Beckert (2010); the social sources of power analysis developed by Michael Mann (Mann 1986); the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2000). Each of these sources will be outlined in the following sections. However, it needs to be stressed at the outset that the intention of this ESGM is to suggest a mode of thinking that informs subsequent analysis and policy development rather than to represent a thorough commentary on individual thinkers and their schools of thought. The ESGM serves as a theoretical orientation for the CRESSI project as a whole and provides the core analytic orientation for the final year CrESSI book project.

The Social Grid

The first stream of work in economic sociology used in CRESSI draws upon Jens Beckert’s (2010) work on exchange theory in markets. Beckert noted that common analyses of markets as social structures fail to integrate different approaches. They tend to focus exclusively on one explanatory theory alone. This reductionist thinking fails to give a full account of the social enactment of economic structures and social exchange relationships and, as a consequence, typically does not acknowledge socio-economic exclusion as a product of market arrangements. Beckert identified three schools of theory in socio-economic analyses of market exchange relationships based upon: social networks; institutions; cognitive frames. Drawing on these literatures, Beckert proposes a triple-focus on:

- **Social networks**: the structures of social relations and relational patterns in society particularly at the field level. Fields are comprised of the specific structures of social networks that create power differences between actors and status hierarchies
- **Institutions**: the constraining and enabling rules and norms of the respective social context
- **Cognitive frames**: shared meanings and interpretations with which to make sense of society and its actions

¹ See also the background papers to the project: CRESSI (Creating Economic Space for Social Innovation): http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/research-projects/cressi.

² In a social grid analysis, ‘social exchange relationships’ are determined by structural factors that enact and socially reproduce hierarchical power relations. The role of social innovation is, therefore, to disrupt and reconfigure such relationships with a view to greater equity and inclusion.
Taken together, these three ‘forces’ constitute a social grid that, in Beckert’s analysis, shapes the formation of market fields. Critically, the three forces are held together by a set of dynamic relationships that are in flux. Thus, a social grid is not static, though it may be self-reinforcing in a particular mode (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Beckert’s social grid (Source: Beckert 2010).](image)

In conventional terms, the economic underpinnings of social innovation would be approached via the question of how different actors gain access to the resources needed to innovate in a general context of scarcity. However, economic sociology has stressed the need to analyse innovation in terms of the formal and informal rules and institutional structures governing access to, and use of ‘scarce’ resources, as well as the networks within which innovators are located and the cognitive frames that define and legitimize innovation in a social context. Beckert’s social grid framework captures all these dimensions and calls attention to their relationships and interactions. It highlights the dynamic relationships between each of the three elements in a model that allows for continual change and innovation.

Our rationale for this schematic model is its emphasis on explanatory pluralism: approaches based on a single explanatory theory typically fail to give a full account of the social enactment of economic structures and social exchange relationships and, by implication, of social innovation as a contested process. Following Beckert, the working assumption here is that there is important analytic value in an investigation of the relationships between social networks, institutions and cognitive frames that first understands the structures of marginalisation and, second, explores social innovation as a set of interventions across the dynamic relationships of a social grid that change such structures and so reduce the marginalisation of certain populations. Such an analysis will, therefore, allow the identification of the key dimensions and leverage points within a social grid that may be targeted by social innovation (policy) to best address systems of economic and social marginalisation. As Beckert noted,

*I argue that networks, institutions, and cognitive frames are irreducible and that one important source of market dynamics stems from their interrelations. The structures lead to the stratification of fields by positioning actors in more or less powerful positions. At the same time, actors gain resources from their position which they can use to influence institutions, network structures, and cognitive frames. To simultaneously consider all three social forces in market fields and their reciprocal influences allows us to consider their interrelations as sources of field dynamics (Beckert 2010, 606).*
From this perspective, (economic) agency (or lack of it) in social exchange markets is a product of the social forces and ties that enable or dis-empower key actors within a social grid. The three analytic elements (or ‘forces’) of the model are closely connected through multiple interactions and feedback loops. Following Beckert’s model allows one to conceptualize social innovation as a response to a social grid that has marginalised certain populations historically. Thus, social innovation here refers to a process change in social relations across these three forces.

However, our model also extends Beckert’s framework in two significant ways. First, this research applies Beckert’s model to contexts outside of the market. Second, CRESSI connects a macro- and meso-level social grid analysis to a micro-level focus on individuals who receive benefits or get harmed, who are affected by and reproduce a status quo, but who also provide the seeds for change by seeking to co-determine social life.

It is acknowledged here that applying Beckert’s social grid model to non-market settings goes beyond Beckert’s original intention. Two reasons justify this extension – one theoretical, one empirical. First, Beckert himself acknowledges that his social grid is based upon principles drawn from general field theory – and that these foundations are not specific to market contexts:

*Such a more comprehensive understanding needs to be based on a general framework that can encompass the notions of networks, institutions, and cognitions. I suggest that the notion of fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Bourdieu 2005; Fligstein 2001a: 67ff) makes it possible to bring simultaneous attention to the different types of social structures relevant in markets and at the same time shift the theoretical focus on the relationship between structures and agency processes. Fields are understood here as local social orders or social arenas where ‘actors gather and frame their actions vis-à-vis one another’ (Fligstein 2001b: 108). Based on the field concept I discuss the interrelationships between the three types of structures identified and their role in the change of market fields (Beckert 2010, 606).*

So, our research uses Beckert’s model in the context of its more general grounding in field theory rather than narrowly exploring market issues alone (though these, of course, will often be relevant to the analysis carried out in the project).

Second, it is apparent that, in practice, marginalisation is not only a matter of markets. Marginalisation also includes many non-market variables such as cultural effects as well as access to non-market goods such as education or healthcare. It is, therefore, important to consider non-market factors within the overall model in order to provide effective analysis and policy recommendations and it is proposed here that such a use of Beckert’s model does not render it invalid. Indeed, the extension of Beckert’s model to an analysis of the conversion factors that affect individual capabilities via a power framework plays exactly to Fligstein’s definition of a field as: A population of actors that constitute a social arena by orienting their actions toward each other (Fligstein 2001, 108).
Social Change and Power

As noted, social change in general, and social innovation more specifically, only partly concern markets and the economy. Rather, specific instances of social change typically involve economic drivers as well as other political, cultural, and environmental forces. Therefore – and this is in line with the rejection of reductionism that motivates the social grid model – there is a need to endorse explanatory pluralism.

Drawing on a multi-volume study of world history, Michael Mann has specifically argued for four irreducible social sources of power as ideal types for the analysis of ‘messy’ reality: ideological, economic, military, and political (known as the IEMP: Mann 1986, 22). In his approach, power is understood as the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment. Power is social when it is exercised over other people: it is ‘the capacity to get others to do things that otherwise they would not do’ (Mann 2013, 1). Such power has two intertwined aspects: its distributive aspect refers to one party’s power over another and its collective aspect lies in the ability of all parties involved to enhance joint power over third parties or over nature. Both types of power have increased considerably throughout history and particularly during the past two or three hundred years.

The four social sources of power in the IEMP approach are introduced by Mann in the following terms:

‘Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices with others … economic power derives from the human need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the produce of nature … I define military power as the social organization of concentrated and lethal violence … political power is the centralized and territorial regulation of social life’ (Mann 2013, 1-2).

Drawing on and developing the theory of social forces of power, the CRESSI project extends the social grid model in a way that avoids market reductionism’s inability to do justice to the complex and messy world of social innovation. As the following paragraphs will outline, it does so in two ways: by understanding ‘economic’ power as itself not only a matter of markets; and by considering further sources of power.

Following Mann, this project understands economic power broadly in terms of the transformation, distribution and consumption of the products of nature, and the various modes of provision associated with this. Exchange relations in markets are one especially dynamic part of this power, but they do not exhaust economic power. Self-provision, informal provision in families and communities, as well as public provision by government are further examples of providing and distributing ‘the produce of nature’. These further modes are needed for a comprehensive analysis of economic underpinnings of social innovation; and they are especially relevant for a focus on social innovation and marginalisation: self, communal and even public forms of provision tend to be under enormous pressure from capitalist markets. This point is evidenced by the fact that a major approach to political power and the state, namely class theories inspired by Marx, tend to reduce the state to economic power linked to the interests of the dominating economic class.

3 To put it differently, it is assumed here that economic determinism – as for example attributed to orthodox Marxism – cannot adequately explain social change processes.

4 The brief exposition here is complemented by an in-depth exposition in the next chapter by Risto Heiskala. See also Heiskala 2014 and Lodemann 2014.
We already came upon this point, when we noted the unease with ‘hybrid’ logics to the extent that these introduce a market logic that undermines other objectives and framings; for example, reducing social issues to a matter of financial impact investing, even if there is no short- or medium term prospect of financial returns. In the ESGM, we do not want to downplay this dynamic, but we also to no want to reduce our analysis in this way. Following Mann, the ESGM draws upon plural social sources of power for an in-depth analysis of the ‘messy’ world of social innovation.

An evident further source is political power. While class and economic interests no doubt influence government (and their relations), and sometimes even entirely set the agenda, there is still a distinct set of institutions and personnel in modern states that wield some authoritative power from the political and administrative centres across their respective state territories (Mann 2013, 55). A well-known candidate is the ‘rational-legal domination’ with which state administrations exercise power, as Weber famously pointed out in his analysis of the modern state and bureaucracy (Weber 1978). If the political aspect of social innovation is to be taken seriously, this source of power cannot be ignored. In fact, the ‘democratic experimentalism’ mentioned in the introduction originates with a brighter vision of political power (in American pragmatism). A key idea: while central political and administrative powers set targets and standards, there should be some freedom at the local level in the implementation of targets and standards. In fact, there should be a ‘transformative’ freedom that, if need be, can propose revisions or changes to targets and standards. Thus, a closer focus on political power reveals space for social innovation, and the political aspect of social innovation. Or as Mann remarks, infrastructural power [as] the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions . . . is a two-way street: it also enables civil society to control the state (Mann 2013, 59). Accordingly, it is an important analytical question as concerns our focus on social innovation for the marginalised just how, and in what ways, such ‘enabling’ is possible. Indeed, given that it likely also has a role in the reproduction of marginalisation, can the state act as a social innovator or as promoter of social innovation? Do multi-level entities such as the European Union offer opportunities to tackle this (Ziegler et al. 2017)?

The ESGM adopts a plural focus on power, but it also modifies and extends Mann’s account. The modifications: First, in terms of the IEMP model, Risto Heiskala has pointed out that ‘ideology’ is a narrow term for such phenomena as Christianity, gender relations, patriarchy or racism (Heiskala 2016). The term ‘culture’ appears to capture this ideal-type better. This point holds in particular once it is noted that here the analysis complements notions of power within Beckert’s social grid so as to pay attention to cognitive frames in culture as a key element of ‘ideology’. Second, Mann uses the term ‘military’ in relation to organized, lethal violence. Following Heiskala (2016), we adopt the wider term ‘security’ to capture ‘all organized violence capacities’. With these modifications, we aver culture over ideology, switching from IEMP to CESP.

The ESGM extends the IEMP, now CESP, model by including nature and artifacts. As Mann notes, with climate change the modernist idea of a ‘conquest of nature’ is put into question, and may even prove self-destructive (Mann 2013, 395). This suggests the addition of nature as a further source of power to the IEMP model (Heiskala 2016). There are two ways, in which this addition can be made. First, nature has the capacity to get others to do things that otherwise they would not do – for example, via floods and droughts caused by global warming. Moreover, this power has distributive consequences: the enactment of individual human capabilities will be heavily influenced by whether one lives in a cold or hot climate, in an arid or humid region, under conditions of stable or unpredictable weather. This concept of nature makes the case for including physical force and natural

5 It is for this reason also interesting to note that for Weber, a ‘party’ is any group collectively organized for the acquisition of power (Mann 2013, 59)
structures as potentialities of power in the CESP model. At the same time, natural power in this sense is different from the other power dimension as this power cannot be attributed responsibility, and hence potentially be made to change in response to reason and argument, even though discussion of climate change are motivated strongly by precisely this point. More generally, ‘the climate’ does not act according to cognitive frames, follow rules, etc. Second, however, nature can also be interpreted in terms of a social category: ‘Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature’ (Nussbaum 2006, 77) is a central human capability. In times of global ecological crisis, it has given rise to global ‘environmental’ power: Climate change activists seek to reconfigure human relations to nature, for example calling for major reforestation programmes worldwide. More generally, all over the world nature conservationist have pushed for national parks, biosphere reserves and other schemes and regulations that control, with distributive consequences, human relations to the natural environment. They have also co-shaped political consumerism and self-governance in terms of life-styles. Transnational NGOs such as Greenpeace – with an estimated membership base of 3 million people worldwide – co-structure this power. In this second sense, the addition of ‘nature’ is therefore consistent with the approach taken to the other social sources of power, so that we can speak of CESP\textit{N}.

Climate change science illustrates the need to consider yet a further source of power: Scientists who advise government agencies dealing with the environment and provide an inner channel of concern for politicians. Ralph Schröder has argued that in the modern period the enormous growth of the institutions of science and technology has converted them into another source of social power (cited in Mann 2013, 363\textsuperscript{6}). As science has a practical power impact mainly via technology, this can be called a source of artifactual power that includes ‘science as an institution but also tools, technologies and other artifacts as well as infrastructures’ (Heiskala 2016). This source of power also responds to a central human capability: ‘being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reasons … informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training’ (Nussbaum 2006, 76). In turn – and as in the case of environmental power – it is, therefore, not surprising to see this source of power evolve across different cultures throughout history. Thus, we are now ready to travel with CESP\textit{N\textendash}A.

The IEMP, now CESPNA, model has methodological implications for the ESGM:

- A non-reductive source of social power model rests on the assumption that ‘society’ is not a unitary or total phenomenon (Mann 1986, 1f). Rather, when society is studied, it is in terms of specific social aspects of history, present or future: the nation state, capitalism and so on.

- The methodological implication for the study of social change is a focus on specific historical patterns or ways of life: for it is here that power ‘congeals’ (i.e. not in three or n-dimensional models of society and its dimensions etc.). For CrESSI, this is the contemporary European nation state and its membership of the EU as a supra-national entity.\textsuperscript{7} Social change and social innovation happens through these historical forms, which are neither purely political, nor purely economic but ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power’ (Mann 1986, 1). In this spirit, the empirical CrESSI work packages study social innovations such as social housing or freshwater supply as internally complex, dynamic patterns.

- In the light of the last point, what Mann calls ‘promiscuity’ is a further methodological implication that is important for the study of social change and social innovation (Mann 1986, 1).

\textsuperscript{6} Mann has first refused to make this addition but in the light of climate change (science) acknowledged that he “wavers” (Mann 2013, 363).

\textsuperscript{7} For an early discussion of social innovation in EU nation states and their regions see Hämäläinen and Heiskala 2007.
17). For example, the administration of a nation state is not purely focused on policy preparation/implementation, nor is the administration of a corporation purely focused on business. Rather they are likely to embody a variety of ends and means: political, economic, cultural etc. Mann - with a whiff of modernist purism – calls this the ‘functional promiscuity’ of organized power networks. At the conceptual level, this introduces a phenomenon of social entrepreneurship and social innovation: the hybrid nature of organizations, networks and approaches, and the ethical and political this gives rise to.

In summary, the ESGM draws on multiple, entwined social sources of power to study change processes. It analyses this multi-faceted processes with the help of the social grid schema, i.e. in terms of institutions, social networks and cognitive frames. It analyses these historical contexts, where possibilities congeal in an organized and promiscuous way – and where new possibilities and alternatives emerge.

**Power, Capabilities and Marginalisation**

A particular vision of human nature lies at the core of Mann’s theory of social power: *Human evolution has differed from the evolution of other species by the very fact that it has retained its unity. Speciation has not occurred* (Mann 1986, 35). Human beings are ‘restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so ... These human characteristics are the original source of power* (ibid. 4).

However, due to his specific focus on power issues, Mann did not pay much attention to human ends or to their evaluation. As purposive beings, we can choose and create means. From these means, new needs may emerge. For the study of power, it is the means that matter: what is effective, what succeeds, and why in a specific context? In this view, the primary needs as well as the emergent needs associated with means are secondary of importance. As Mann lapidarily commented: ‘We leave the area of goals and needs altogether’ (Mann 1986, 6).

Yet, in order to evaluate the process and impact of social change, there is a need to uncover anthropology and the ends of human beings. The formation and structure of a social grid is not a neutral process, but, rather, reflects particular power relations and pre-existing social structures. The ESGM draws on the capability approach (CA) to human development (Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2006, Robeyns 2016) to explore the evaluative, ethical aspect of social innovation and marginalisation in an explicit way. The ethical individualism of the CA adds a focus with which to render explicit the evaluative aspect of social innovation processes, which are strongly present in social innovation discourse but rarely explicitly analysed.

Capabilities are a form of power: the real opportunity to do and to be what one has reason to value. They are a ‘power to’ that in practice depends on distributive and collective power. Capabilities as freedom ‘to do’ and ‘to be’ refer to heterogeneous functionings such as ‘participating in decision-

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8 The discussion of impact in social innovation is usually anthropocentric. From an ethical perspective, however, questions concerning the scope of the ‘community of impact’ arise: human beings only (anthropocentrism), sentient beings (sentientism), living beings (biocentrism). Conceptually the capabilities approach is open to variations of all these approaches (Ziegler 2017). Moving beyond anthropocentrism is another conceptual frontier that needs to be taken seriously when seeking to analyse and understand social innovation processes that need not only be about and for human beings. A well-known historical example is national parks, an innovation attributed in part to John Muir and the Sierra Club. As will be seen in chapter four, this seemingly “exotic” environmental theme, is also relevant for thinking about moral patients on more established social settings.
making’ or ‘being in good health’. This heterogeneity of the good is important for understanding marginalisation and social innovation. Disempowerment, lack of recognition and material poverty all refer to deprivations that detract from a ‘dignified’ or even ‘good’ life. There are some absences or disfunctionalities of capabilities and functionings that imply great harm and disadvantage to individuals. An example is insufficient nutrition, a disadvantage that is much more serious than, for example, the missing opportunity to fly four times a year on holiday. Marginalisation in the ethical sense has a plural content, reflecting heterogeneous ends and goods. The specification of disadvantages (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007) and the related central capabilities (Nussbaum 2006)\(^9\) are in practice contested - not least due to the redistributive policy implications for the better off or competing others.

Marginalisation, from a CA perspective, results from social processes through which personal, social or environmental traits are transformed into actual or potential factors of disadvantage (von Jacobi et al. 2017). For example, if physical difference (skin colour, gender, handicaps) becomes associated with humiliation or differential treatment at home, at work or in public, or with a lack of access to infrastructure mobility. Or, if location in a rural setting is associated with a way of infrastructure management that is unnecessarily expensive or politically unwanted in this setting – for example, a government plan to connect a hamlet to a central wastewater system versus the preference of the hamlet to avoid the costs of connecting to such a system and using instead a constructed wetland.

Disadvantage is frequently associated with exclusion from political decision-making as well as from economic systems. The marginalised are not only disadvantaged in terms of income, health and education, they are also marginalised in decision-making. Therefore, empowerment in the sense of including and strengthening marginalised voices in decision-making plays an important role in policies and social innovation projects that seek to understand what marginalisation means for those affected by it and that seek to overcome it.

An important analytical tool within the CA that explores these issues is that of a ‘conversion factor’ (Robeyns 2016, 406ff). The basic insight here is that, with respect to any good or service, the ability of people to use the good and benefit from it differs affecting the ultimate functioning outcomes. The difference can be in part explained by different traits. A physically impaired person will find it more difficult to convert a mobility good (bike, public transport, etc.) into mobility functioning; women are blocked from using cars in patriarchal societies; and for the Finish colleagues in our research project, it might simply be too cold to use a bike in the winter months. In short, there are personal, social, and environmental conversion factors that need to be taken into account when studying the goods and services at issue in social innovation processes.\(^10\)

Thus, the ESGM can be summarized as follows: For the study of social marginalisation processes, the model suggests the need to pay attention to the social powers that structure the position of those involved in the process in a historical context. The ESGM fine-tunes this with a focus on the cognitive frames, institutions and social networks that reproduce and enact marginalisation processes. For the evaluation of these processes, the emphasis is on disadvantage associated with personal, social or environmental traits. The three key conceptual elements of the ESGM set out above are summarized in Figure 2. This figure aims to show their inter-relationships albeit presented as a static model. Dynamism and change across the ESGM – the purpose of social innovation as construed here – is considered further below.

\(^9\) In the capabilities approach, central capabilities usually refer to those capabilities required for leading a life in dignity and are therefore politically closely associated with human rights (see Lodemann and Ziegler 2014, section 3).

\(^10\) For an in depth discussion of the intricacies of ‘conversion factors’ specifically in relation to technology design see Oosterlaken 2015, 84ff.
Social Innovation, Marginalisation and the ESGM

With a focus on innovation in social change, the ESGM at first sight might seem to suggest a variety of ‘spheres’ of innovation: cultural, economic, security-related, political, natural and artifactual innovations to be studied in terms of the dynamics of social networks, institutions and cognitive frames. This suggestion is helpful in the sense that it situates a frequently business focused perspective on innovation, in a broader conceptual framework of social powers.

The suggestion, however, is problematic if it reproduces the ‘silod’ or ‘sectoral’ thinking that social innovation seeks to address. Social innovations, as also power processes more generally, can be expected to be ‘promiscuous’. It can be hypothesized that social innovations are not purely economic, or purely political etc. Rather, they will impact on and involve social power in different, interrelated ways. As a feature of social change, this point has also been noted in the CA. Sen (1999) argues that human development depends on the complementarity and mutual strengthening of various societal and individual level objectives. The purist argument of economic-growth-first-everything-else-later is conceptually and empirically false, Sen argues, because it ignores the interrelations between various societal objectives and their corresponding human capabilities. Social innovation can facilitate and strengthen such interrelations of capabilities (Ziegler 2010). This point is particularly important for marginalisation, especially if disadvantages cluster. As a result, inversing the process and promoting ‘fertile’ rather than ‘corrosive’ capability/functioning (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007) is both important - and especially challenging. As noted by György Molnár (2016), there is a danger of focusing on the ‘least marginalised’ of the marginalised, where success is relatively speaking ‘easy’ and less costly for social innovators (but not for the least marginalised, who in fact bear the costs of further inclusion (Molnár 2016). Therefore, the effect of a social innovation on marginalised or even socially excluded groups is an important analytical question.
Another entry point to dynamism in the ESGM is to focus on agency in changing the relationships between cognitive frames, social networks and institutions (see Scheuerle, Schimpf and Mildenberger 2014). There are six such dynamic relationships in the ESGM (see Table 2). Between institutions and social networks, the former can influence the structure of social networks, whilst the latter can establish collective power to shape institutions. Between institutions and cognitive frames, the former can make values socially relevant for the latter, whilst the latter provides legitimation and can shape the wider perceptions of institutions. Finally, between social networks and cognitive frames, the former can shape and diffuse cognitive frames whilst the latter can shape perceptions of network structures. Table 1 shows some analytical options.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Force</th>
<th>Dynamic Effect</th>
<th>Social Innovation (Example)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Influence the structure of social networks</td>
<td>Build bridging social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make values socially relevant for cognitive frames</td>
<td>Influence regulatory norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>Establish collective power to shape institutions</td>
<td>Increase political mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shape and diffuse cognitive frames</td>
<td>Deepen focused activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Frames</td>
<td>Provide legitimation and shape the wider perceptions of institutions</td>
<td>Build a social movement for change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shape perceptions of network structures</td>
<td>Change value perceptions of cultural material</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Social Innovation Dynamics in the Social Grid Model

Again, however, we need to stress the special challenges of marginalisation. An important explanatory hypothesis of Becker’s social grid model is that the dynamics of change depend on the ‘simultaneous consideration of all three structural forces’ (Beckert 2010, 606). Put differently, the reproduction of marginalisation depends on respective cognitive frames ‘about the marginalised’, institutions that constrain their possibilities, and social networks that successfully prevent change from happening. Molnár (2016) shows – with the example of Roma communities in Central Europe – how continued marginalisation and even exclusion depends on the interplay of all three social forces, rather than the influence of only one of them. Therefore, social innovation processes that seek to overcome marginalisation and exclusion are complex and challenging. As Beckert noted:

Agents must synthesize in their responses the demands stemming from different social forces. The demands are multifaceted and may stand in contradiction to each other, thereby opening up a variety of ways to respond to the situation ... an agency-centered approach of this kind to the analysis of the role of social structures demands that the focus is shifted to the interaction of social structures and agency processes (Beckert 2010, 611).

In keeping with the general insights of the social grid approach, overcoming marginalisation calls for tackling all three social forces. For example, in the case of decentralized freshwater supply as a marginalised practice in modern European nations states (Ziegler 2016), social innovators face a triple task. First, they need to work on cognitive frames in a context where the idea of using house fountains or local wells is perceived by mainstream water suppliers variously as romantic, ridiculous or simply too risky for health reasons. Second, even if they manage to organize their own network, they will also face a well-established network of water professionals, water authorities and politicians...
that are used to and, in part, directly benefit from the mainstream approach to drinking water provision. Finally, a central task of their network is to advocate for legislation – and for the implementation of legislation – in such a way that a decentralized solution has a real opportunity to happen and/or to sustain itself. In short cognitive frames, institutions and social networks all are relevant, for such an initiative to overcome marginalisation and effectively develop a voice in local water management.

The example also suggests that we should expect a variety of ways whereby social innovations grow and mature. Social innovators might aim at entirely reconfiguring a solution approach and establish their solution as the new mainstream. Alternatively, social innovators might aim at diversifying an existing solution approach by adding their solution as a new element in the existing mix of solution approaches (Smith and Raven 2010). Finally, social innovators might aim to restore the possibility of a solution approach that has already existed but has become marginalised by the mainstream and now needs to be restored (Ziegler 2016).

The term ‘solution approach’ is used as a placeholder for something very messy and complex in social reality. The lesson from Mann’s study of the social sources of power is that it would be ill-conceived to think of solution approaches as exclusively products and services for markets. Rather, multiple-sources of power are likely to be involved and the respective changes to cognitive frames, institutions and social networks will cut across political, economic, and cultural power depending, in each case, on the nature of the issue at hand. Yet, there is, of course, no ‘issue’ simply waiting out there to be discovered and studied. Rather, the very nature of a social issue is often a contested and interpretative matter.

This observation takes us to a final important point about social innovation and the ESGM. Social innovation discourse has very much focused on innovation not just ‘for’, but also ‘with’ citizens (BEPA 2010). In terms of the observations here, this focus is justified and important, as only in this way will a joint ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ discussion of the social issue be possible. In terms of an evaluative focus on human capabilities, this implies that there is a need to think of people not just as ‘objects’ that are empowered by a social innovation but, rather, as ‘agents’ who can co-create an innovation process. Participation, therefore, plays a crucial role in social innovation or, Nussbaum’s formulation, participation ‘in decision-making that governs one’s life’ (Nussbaum 2006, 77) plays a central architectonic role as it co-creates the way capabilities (health, education etc.) are perceived, discussed and enacted. This raises two, interrelated sets of questions for the study of social innovation via the ESGM:

- How are citizens involved in social innovation processes and policy making (von Jacobi et al. 2017)? Is this role changing over time? What are effective ways to involve citizens directly or indirectly?
- Why should citizens be involved in innovation processes as a normative question of democracy? What are the reasons for this, and when is such inclusion justified given that there is also a concern that social innovation might be a way of cutting costs or increasing processes of privatization of state functions in times of austerity (Evers, Ewert and Brandsen 2014)?

At this agency-in-innovation-processes point, the individual focus of the CA – with its account of human agency and its heterogeneous goods – intersects with the social forces of the ESGM. Accordingly, Figure 3 adds a dynamic element. Power structures not only influence individual conversions of actors, but the enactment of capabilities by agents includes a moment of choice and possible change that social innovators – as individuals and groups – draw on to initiate changes in
networks, institutions and cognitive frames across cultural, economic, security-related, political, natural and artificial power. Marginalised populations can co-create social innovation processes via the choices they make in social networks, institutional role understanding and cognitive frame interpretation, but they face formidable challenges due to the reproduction of cognitive frames, social networks and institutions (see green boxes in Figure 3).

Figure 3: The Extended Social Grid Model and Social Innovation (dynamic version)

Conclusion

In summary, for the analysis and explanation of social innovation and marginalization processes, the ESGM presented proposes a plural focus on social sources of power – cultural, economic, security-related, political, natural and artificial – and how these congeal and entwine in the cognitive frames, institutions and social networks of a time or context. Drawing on lessons from historical sociology, the ESGM expects social innovations to be functionally promiscuous – they will not be purely economic or political. Rather successful social innovations have to reconfigure the social grid across multiple sources of social power and their enactment via cognitive frames, institutions, and social networks. It will be a matter of empirical investigation whether this model, and its constituents, prove to be adequate for the analysis of social innovation trajectories.

Social innovation processes are neither good nor bad but rather contested and linked to cognitive frames that are contingent and shifting. As a normative vocabulary of analysing such contestation, the ESGM draws upon the CA to explore the processes and impact of social innovation with a specific focus on marginalised groups. This is a distinct challenge, as disadvantage tends to cluster, making the reversal of marginalisation process particularly challenging. Our approach suggests that at the level of individual impact evaluation, we should focus on the plural space of actual or potential
disadvantages that marginalised groups face, and the actual effect of any social innovation on such disadvantage for and within the group. For a focus on marginalisation, it is important to distinguish the cognitive frames of the marginalised about themselves from the cognitive frames that other groups supporting or opposing have of this marginalised group and of the social innovation. The effect of a social innovation on marginalised or even socially excluded groups is an important analytical question. Who is included, who is excluded? How are benefits and harms distributed?

In addition, our CA focus on the marginalized as ‘subjects’ of social change, makes participation particularly important, in both an analytical and evaluative way: A) How are citizens involved in social innovation processes and policy making (von Jacobi et al. 2017)? Is this role changing over time? What are effective ways to involve citizens directly or indirectly? B) Why should the marginalized be involved in innovation processes? What are the reasons for this, and when and how is this expectation justified, taking into account that social innovation might be a way of cutting costs or increasing processes of privatization of state functions in times of austerity (Evers, Ewert and Brandsen 2014)?

Finally, there is the role of the state: Can the state, which likely also has a role in the reproduction of the marginalisation, act as a social innovator? Or as a promoter of social innovation?

*Note:* The ESGM serves as the theoretical orientation of the final CrESSI book project. This book comprises a theory part with chapters on the model, on power, capabilities and innovation; on ethics and economic space for social innovation; and on methodological tools to use the ESGM in quantitative and qualitative research. The second part contains qualitative and quantitative studies of social innovation trajectories, covering topics such as social housing, freshwater supply, micro-credit and social impact bonds. The final part revisits the model and its implications for theory and practice.
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