Optimal Bank Regulation In the Presence of Credit and Run Risk

Kashyap, Anil, Tsomocos, Dimitrios and Vardoulakis, Alexandros (2017) Optimal Bank Regulation In the Presence of Credit and Run Risk. Saïd Business School Working Paper.

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We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets
on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset portfolio and capital structure interact to support credit extension, as well as
to provide liquidity and risk-sharing services to the real economy. Our modifications create wedges in the asset and liability mix between the private equilibrium and a social planner’s equilibrium. Correcting these distortions requires the joint implementation of a capital and a liquidity regulation.

Item Type: Oxford Saïd Research Paper
Keywords: Bank Runs, Credit Risk, Limited Liability, Regulation, Capital, Liquidity
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2017 15:33
Last Modified: 21 Sep 2018 15:05
Funders: n/a
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/6593

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