The Lender of Last Resort in a General Equilibrium Framework

Akshay, Kotak, Ozsoylev, Han and Tsomocos, Dimitrios (2019) The Lender of Last Resort in a General Equilibrium Framework. In: Tsomocos, Dimitrios and Goodhart, Charles, (eds.) Financial Regulation and Stability Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis. Edward Elgar Publishing. (Accepted)

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework. We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trigger default, leading to deterioration in the value of bank assets, and subsequent bank illiquidity in some states of the world. LoLR intervention is then assessed with regards to its economy-wide effect on welfare, bank profitability, and the level of default. The results provide a rationalisation for constructive ambiguity and the ‘too big to fail’ problem.

Item Type: Book Section
Keywords: Lender of last resort, default, bank bailouts, constructive ambiguity
Subject(s): Finance
Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2017 17:37
Last Modified: 10 Dec 2018 14:39
Funders: n/a
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/6603

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

Edit View Edit View