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The CRESSI project explores the economic underpinnings of social innovation with a particular focus on how policy and practice can enhance the lives of the most marginalized and disempowered citizens in society.

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Forms of power, European empires and globalizations. Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power and beyond.

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Abstract

Historical sociology is said to be a chimera of research programmes, which took many of their questions from Marx and most answers from Weber. This characterization fits relatively well with Michael Mann who has recently completed his five millennium-long journey from the emergence of the state to our time, with two new volumes in The Sources of Social Power series. Volume 3 is subtitled Global Empires and Revolution, 1890-1945 and volume 4 Globalizations, 1945-2011. In this review article I will first describe what is specific in Mann’s neo-Weberian approach to historical development and particularly in his approach to power. I will then highlight some of the historical narrations in each of the four volumes. Finally, I will recall the theoretical aspects of Mann’s work and make two theoretical interventions. I will ask, first, whether his theoretical approach could be made more systematic and developed further, and, second, whether his classification of power sources is the most suitable one for the purposes of the analysis of our time. The interventions include discussion on the relationship of Mann’s approach to Foucault’s analytics of power and an attempt to expand Mann’s most important theoretical tool, the so-called IEMP model (ideological, economic, military and political power sources), to a NACEMP model (natural, artefactual, cultural, economic, military and political power sources) with an even broader scope.

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Introduction

Historical sociology is, according to the famous characterization of Reinhard Bendix, a chimera of research programmes, most of which took many of their questions from Marx and most answers from Weber. Provided that creativity is allowed in formulating both questions and answers, this characterization fits relatively well with the possibly greatest of living historical sociologists, Michael Mann, who has recently completed his five millennium-long journey from the emergence of the state to our time, with two new volumes in The Sources of Social Power series. One of the new volumes, volume 3, is subtitled Global Empires and Revolution, 1890-1945 (Mann 2012) and another, volume 4, Globalizations, 1945-2011 (Mann 2013).

In what follows I will first briefly describe what is specific in Mann’s neo-Weberian approach to historical development and particularly in his approach to power. I will then highlight some of the historical narrations in each of the four volumes. My focus will be on the two recent volumes, but the two earlier volumes cannot be completely neglected because they provide the context for the two new books. Finally, I will recall the theoretical aspects of Mann’s work and make two theoretical interventions. I will ask, first, whether his theoretical approach could be made more systematic and developed further, and, second, whether his classification of power sources is the most suitable one for the purposes of the analysis of our time, or whether it could be adjusted in one way or another.

What is power and how does the IEMP model work?

Mann is not a grand theorist. He finds it difficult to understand the use of theory that has not emerged in the context of empirical social research. Therefore, his concepts tend to be methodological ideal types in nature and oriented toward a middle-range type of interpretation of social processes. Yet he cannot avoid social ontology completely, even if he tries to keep his commitments on that level few, abstract and open to reinterpretation.

Here is what he says. Human beings are purposeful creatures who reach for various ends. In their actions they both purposefully and unwittingly create social networks in which their actions are embedded. Those networks give birth to different forms of institutional organization and these provide actors with power resources, i.e., means to control their environment to achieve desired ends. How exactly this happens in each time and place is for empirical social research or historical study to reveal but conceptual tools can be developed which are useful for study in varying contexts.

The most important of such concepts is that of power. In its conceptualization Mann (1986) accompanies Giddens (1995) as both of them swim against the current of time and discipline and find Parsons’ understanding of power useful in some senses. The most established forms of power analysis (such as Mills 1956 and Dahl 1957) tend to understand power as a scarce resource that is subject to competition in a zero sum game where every increase of the power of actor A simultaneously is a loss in the power of actor B, and vice versa. Mann admits the importance of such a form of power analysis (departing here from Parsons, who never quite got the point of Mills’ The Power Elite, as is evident from Parsons 1960) but continues (following Parsons) that this form of power, which Mann calls ‘distributive power’, is just one side of the phenomenon. Another side is the analysis of ‘collective power’ by which he refers to cases in which A and B, acting together, can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature. A great part of Mann’s historical narration
of our civilization concentrates on changes taking place in the amount of collective power due to technological development (such as agricultural, industrial and military revolutions or printing) or new forms of social organization (such as the Roman legions, bureaucratic organization, or democracy). He maintains that such leaps in the amount of available power resources are central to our understanding of the course of history, and therefore, in his studies he concentrates on the ‘leading edges’ or such historical episodes that result in enhancement of the collective power resources of actors. To the relief of those to whom such an account sounds far too Parsonian (even if Mann does not commit himself to Parson’s linear evolutionism) it may be noted that Mann always connects his analysis of increasing collective power to an analysis of distributive power games in which some actors win and some lose due to the very innovations that cause the enhancement of collective power. The general part of Mann’s analysis also includes two other distinctions, i.e., extensive vs. intensive and authoritative vs. diffused power. If we cross-tabulate these we get an army command structure as an example of the authoritative-intensive form of power, and market exchange as an example of the extensive-diffused form. The intermediate cases of extensive-authoritative and intensive-diffused forms are exemplified by a militaristic empire and a general strike.

The forms of people’s purposeful actions are various and Mann believes that it is not possible or even useful to try to develop a conceptualization that covers all forms without exception. Yet he also believes that we need some kind of general conception of different forms of power that can be used in empirical study of the contexts. To find such a conception he turns to Weber, who transformed Marx’s binary conceptualization of base and superstructure to a triad consisting of the economic, cultural (or status-related) and political (or institutional-organizational) spheres. Weber also loosened Marx’s expectations of causal determination, which according to Marx in the end always went from the economic base structure to the ideological and legal superstructure, by saying that the study of causal links is a matter of empirical study: sometimes it goes exactly as Marx expected but sometimes it goes exactly the opposite way. Mann accepts all that in Weber but interprets Weber’s spheres as forms of social power and divides (mainly due to the influence of Herbert Spencer, to mention another today to some extent unjustly unpopular figure in addition to Parsons) Weber’s political sphere into two different forms of power, i.e., ‘political power’ and ‘military power’. This is a move justified by several empirical analyses in different volumes of Mann’s book series, showing that political and military forms of control of the environment often take different paths in cases such as the Roman Empire or Western Europe and Japan after World War II. He also changes the term ‘cultural’ to ‘ideological’. That is how we end up with his IEMP model where the letters stand for ‘ideological’, ‘economic’, ‘military’ and ‘political’ power.

**Ideological power** in the model refers to ‘the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices. … Religions provide most examples … with secular ideologies like liberalism, socialism and nationalism.’ Diffusion of ideological power takes two principal forms: ‘It may be socio-spatially “transcendent.” That is, an ideology may diffuse through the boundaries of economic, military, and political organizations. Second, ideological power may solidify an existing power organization, developing its “immanent morale.”’ (Mann 1993:7) Despite the definition that puts emphasis mainly on ritually affirmed value commitments, Mann has dealt under the title ‘ideology’ also cognitive cultural categorization throughout his career. Thus he emphasised already in Volume 1 the role of world religions in general and Christianity in particular after the collapse of the Roman Empire in Europe as a shared worldview and context of action. In the more recent volumes, written well after the ‘cultural turn’, cultural cognition tends to affect also the definition of ideological power so that Mann (2012:7) adds a third factor, ‘institutionalized ideologies’ such as patriarchy to this power source and therefore comes close to replacing the term ‘ideological power’ with that of ‘cultural power’. However, for the
sake of continuity and some other factors to be discussed in the closing section of this paper, he keeps on speaking about the IEMP model instead of the CEMP model.

*Economic power* for Mann includes market exchange but is not restricted to it. Instead, it derives ‘from the need to extract, transform, distribute and consume resources of nature’ (Mann 1993:7). The meaning of ‘economic’ then clearly goes beyond the neo-classical canon and resembles more the way the term was used by Karl Polanyi and political economists from Smith to Marx. All these theorists were, in addition to their concern with market exchange, interested in the reproduction of the societal whole and relations between classes, thus departing from current neo-classical economics. In Volume 1, which came out in 1986, Mann emphasized this in using the term ‘circuits of praxis’ in referring to economic organization. But fashions change as time goes by and he dropped this semi-Marxist terminology in Volume 2 in 1993. However, the definition of the economic form of power has remained the same throughout all the four volumes.

*Military power* is the social organization of physical force and *political power* ‘derives from the usefulness of territorial and centralized regulation. … Domestically, it is “territorially centralized”; externally, it involves geopolitics’ (Mann 1993:9). Here Mann differs from Weber in two senses. First, he makes a distinction between military and political power, referring to historical cases in which it is obvious that military and political power have not been, contrary to Weber’s understanding, integrated. Here it suffices to refer to the current EU and Mark Eyskens, who in 1991 when he was the foreign minister of Belgium famously said, just before the operation Desert Storm was launched, that ‘Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm’ working under the US military shield. Secondly, while Weber’s analysis of political domination (*Herrschaft*) included all kinds of institutional organizations Mann wants to reserve the term ‘political power’ for the analysis of states, i.e., territorially centralized power organizations. The third relevant factor in this context is that in the course of writing his book series Mann made a slight change in his definition of military power. While in Volume 1 he was quite ready to follow Spencer and include all forms of *corvée* labour (enforced labour from that which built the pyramids or the Roman network of highways to that which provided the European nobility with its affluence compared to the populace) under the title of organized physical force, from Volume 3 onwards he starts to put more emphasis on the lethal nature of military power, and underlines that its message everywhere is ‘if you resist, you die’ (Mann 2012:11).

It is important to understand that Mann considers his IEMP model as an analytical tool and not a structural description of society. After the emergence of state all societies probably have had some forms of all four power sources but it is a matter of empirical study to detect, which forms of power are institutionalized and to what extent in a certain society and which forms are living in the interstices of others and waiting for the possibility to flourish. Therefore, the status of the IEMP model for Mann is quite different from the base/superstructure model for Marx or the AGIL scheme for Parsons or the System/Lifeworld scheme for Habermas. He emphasises that ‘societies are much messier than our theories of them’ (Mann 1986:4) and understands his concepts as analytical tools to ‘cope with the patterned mess that is human society’ (Mann 1993:4). Therefore, he says, ‘my IEMP model is not one of a social system, divided into four “subsystems,” “levels,” “dimensions,” or any other of the geometric terms favored by social theorists. Rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with mess. The four power sources offer distinct, potentially powerful organizational means to humans pursuing their goals. But which means are chosen, and in which combinations, will depend on continuous interaction between what power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among them.’ (Mann 1993:10.)
The two first volumes

Volume 1 is subtitled ‘A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760.’ It starts from the emergence of first states and closes with the collapse of the last European non-territorial state. In effect, it covers the period of agrarian societies preceding the modern state and industrialization. The volume is a story of human innovation or development of the leading edges of enhancement of available power resources. The reverse side is a story of how human beings are, at the same time, slowly but firmly being ‘caged’ within power organizations which have increasing resources for surveillance, control, taxation and adjustment of behaviour.

There is no way of giving even a telegraphic summary of the volume but some highlights may be telling.

Did the rulers of traditional empires possess such an absolute power over their territories as is reflected in the ideological codifications of their regimes? – No, they did not. Simple logistical calculations show that traditional military powers were unable to move their troops from one centre to another faster than the maximum speed of 30 kilometres per day. Even that needed to be carefully planned because maintaining a marching army was a difficult business. If successfully implemented, conquering a rebelling centre was possible but even then the conquering army usually lost its contact with the centre from which it had left. Moreover, it was more difficult to maintain a standing army than a marching army and therefore troops of the central power often eroded or merged into the local population if they did not move on to ascertain maintenance. Hence the astonishing speed at which armies such as Alexander the Great’s moved during their campaigns. Territorial control or caging of populations then is a difficult business that requires developed communication channels, transportation routes and organizational capabilities, and was not very effective before modern times.

Why did the Inca empire surrender to the attack of 160 Spanish warriors, 60 of whom were mounted, who came in three ships? On the surface this encounter looks like a confrontation between two traditional empires. Yet the one with significantly less manpower and far from home won. Why? The answer can be found in the division of power resources between the parties. Compared to the Incas, the Spanish empire had several power technological benefits at its disposal. It had means of transportation in the form of ships, and skill in navigation. It had better arms and knights mounted on horses, and it had better military organization. Naturally also the diseases brought unintentionally by the Europeans contributed to the result (a factor not mentioned by Mann but emphasized by Diamond 1997) but obviously the difference in available power resources is a major part of the solution to the riddle.

Why did the centre of power in Europe move from the Mediterranean to northern Europe and England? The solution to the problem is based on the fact of agricultural revolution that over several centuries transformed the European economy and created the base for the industrial revolution by liberating part of the population from agricultural production. The single most important invention in this long process was the new type of plough dragged by draft animals such as horses and oxen, enabling the cultivation of the Central- and North-European soil irrigated by rainwater.

Did Marx and Engels get it right when they said that all history is the history of class struggle? No, they did not. Class struggle requires symmetrical and politically organized classes. Such a condition has indeed existed in modern times but this is a special case accompanied only by some rare historical constellations such as the struggle between debtors and lenders in ancient Greece and Rome. What has been the normal case in history has been an arrangement in which the ruling class has been organized but other classes have been latent at the most. Hence, the endless succession of
unsuccessful revolts motivated by famine in the course of the history of agrarian societies.

These highlights show that the enthusiasm with which Mann’s first volume was received was to a great extent based on his ability to tell informative, condensed and often surprising historical stories. A great part of the attraction was that often in these stories technological innovations and new forms of social organization were entangled together and this interlink provided the solution to the question, why did the direction of history change?

Volume 2 is subtitled ‘The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914’. It takes the form of five interlinked case studies, i.e., studies of France, Great Britain, Habsburg Austria, Prussia-Germany and the US as the North-American offshoot of Europe. The selection of cases is justified by an attempt to cover relevant variation and limit the cases to a representative set of ‘leading edges.’

Volume 1 showed that the enlargement of state took huge leaps in Europe due to the military revolution and constant waging of war between the European states over several centuries preceding the industrial revolution. These resulted in a huge increase of tax collection and recruitment of men to armies. This again made the state a significant factor within societies and turned everybody’s attention to the state. The new architectonics of power was codified in the bourgeoisie’s demands to have a say in the use of state power and Lenin’s maxim according to which political struggle is nothing if it is not struggle of the state power – both strikingly new ideas in a world that had been accustomed to attempt to avoid the reach of the state on a routine basis instead of trying to conquer it.

The rising importance of the state was now accompanied by the industrial revolution, causing a significant increase of material resources, on the one hand, and great suffering of most of the working population, on the other hand. The bourgeois demands of equal participation in political power were thus quickly followed by similar demands coming from other social strata. The demands of bourgeois men were therefore soon accompanied by analogous demands from the men of the rising working class and both bourgeois and working women. This is the hidden history behind the still universal demands for equality and democracy in modern times.

The rise of classes other than the nobility and clergy was accompanied by a cultural revolution in the form of the rise of nationalism. It too was a new phenomenon creating, for the first time in history, mass-scale populations that loved the state bureaucracy caging them so much that they were soon ready to march to their deaths to protect that bureaucracy and its elites in World Wars I and II. The extension of educational institutions and development of mass media were an important condition for this development. The most important carrier groups though were the state-dependent strata such as military personnel, civil servants and their family members.

According to Mann, the respective rises of classes and of nation-states were new and thoroughly interlinked processes. The form of linkage, however, varied. In Germany, France and England one enforced the other and created a relatively integrated nation-state. In Austria-Hungary the new movements eroded the empire. The US was somewhere in between and also different in the sense that as a conquered land it did not have the European abundance of past traditions for the new movements to fight with. It was also virtually an island and thus did not have to constantly prepare for war. All the cases were different but in their own ways all of them brought us to the modern architectonics of power we have today.

A terrifying feature of the process of modernization was that the increase of economic and military resources was coupled with increasing complexity of the international system. The concluding chapter of the volume in which Mann analyses the process leading to World War I exemplifies this. He joins that current of scholars who believe that the war was an accident brought about by a group
of ‘sleepwalkers’, and reading his analysis quite convinces the reader that the responsible parties actually did not know what they were doing.

Volume 3: global empires and revolution, 1890-1945

Temporally, the third volume does not start exactly from where the second ended, i.e., from the beginning of World War I. This is so because in addition to continuing the story of the deepening capitalist-industrial transformation of the economy and strengthening of the nation-state that was started in Volume 2 Volume 3 also tells the story of the rise and fall of European empires, and that story needs to be started from the end of the 19th century at the latest.

In Volume 2 Mann based his account of the booming increase of the powers of the state on the curious European pattern of the states to constantly wage war with each other. In Volume 3 he puts even more emphasis on this European curiosity and says that even if it may not be true that men are from Mars and women from Venus it seems to be the case that Europeans are from Mars since for almost a millennium they had been waging war on each other. At the end of that millennium European empires had become so strong that they were able to transfer that pattern from Europe to all other continents of the world. This is how they, for a short period of time, conquered almost the entire globe. That period Mann calls the time of sectorial globalization, thus emphasizing the two crucial features of the era, i.e., first, a genuine increase of inter- and transnational connectedness under the violent control of the European powers, and, second, the fact that that form of globalization was restricted to within the sectors controlled by the different European empires.

In addition to the sectorial nature of colonialist globalization, Mann’s account of colonialism emphasises the extremely violent nature of European power in the colonies and its political and military nature, which leaves economic factors in a somewhat marginal position. According to Mann, most of the time most colonial powers did not profit economically from the colonies but ended, in the final count, putting more resources into their conquests than what could be gained. This makes theories such as Wallerstein’s world-system analysis doubtful because the economic centre-periphery model does not seem to work in the way expected in the theory. Rather, colonialism seems to be a continuation of the European age-long pattern of politically and militaristically motivated conquests.

World War II, of course, brought European colonialism crashing down. It meant the end of all European empires. According to Mann, this was a new world era started that is less violent than the previous one run by European imperialism. It began in the European continent and then spread around the globe. The new start was sealed by the establishment of the forerunner of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Union, which made it impossible for any European state to monopolize access to the two products necessary for waging a modern war. Outside Europe the gradual process of decolonization sealed the process.

However, the route to the new world order with fewer inter-state wars and consolidation of the capitalist-industrial nation-state system was not a smooth process. It involved two European wars that due to colonialism extended across half the globe and caused a death toll of tens of millions of people. World War I was analysed in Volume 2 and was found to have been a consequence of the somnambulism of the at the time still very hierarchical and aggressively expansive European empires. The unfortunate peace treaty of World War I and the rise of the fascist alternative to the capitalist-democratic modernization caused World War II. As Mann presents more thoroughly elsewhere (Mann 2004) and summarizes here, Nazism was an ideologically coordinated movement
that captured first hegemony and then the German state with a skilful combination of the use of paramilitary troops and propaganda. The political programme of the movement was suicidal and without prospects of long-term success from the beginning. However, the extremely intensive nature of the movement become evident at the end of the war when Nazi troops often fought to the bitter end in battles that clearly were already lost, a phenomenon rarely seen in wars. Japanese colonialism during World War II also benefited from the intensive ideological power and the use of paramilitary troops to affect the state but it was also enforced by the strong hold of the military elite on the state machinery before the war and the general (and realist) Japanese understanding that colonialism on the Asian mainland was the only solution to the serious lack of resources of the Japanese islands. These aggressive-expansive forms of colonialist imperialism should not be confused with more peaceful forms of internally-oriented corporatism under hierarchical rule backed by ideological power and the use of paramilitary troops, such as Italian fascism. Fascists there too were nothing but nice guys but the death toll of the Italian fascist revolution was still counted only in tens of thousands, which is a completely different number compared to the number of victims of German Nazis or Japanese colonialists.

In addition to fascism there was, of course, another alternative to the capitalist-industrial modernization. That is, the socialist revolution. Such revolution took place in the Russian cities and slowly spread from there to the countryside, finally consolidating the Soviet power in a hierarchical and authoritarian form in Russia with the outbreak of World War II. Other attempts at socialist revolution in Europe were rare and weak and failed soon in the wake of the German attempt, which meant that the plans for world revolution were soon replaced by the pragmatic policy of Komintern, oriented toward the national interests and survival of the Soviet Union. Revolutions in general, according to Mann, occur rarely because people often have also something else to lose other than their chains and are, therefore, driven to such a risky form of action only in desperate situations. Attempts at revolution are also rarely successful because challenging the powers that be is so difficult and problems of coordination are so hard to solve even if the first battles are won. Moreover, even if revolutions succeed people do not usually get what they were striving for, as evident from the examples of the French and Russian revolutions.

In addition to the urban proletarian revolution outlined by Marx and Lenin there was also a second variant of anti-capitalist revolution. This type was exemplified by the successful agrarian revolution in China. Due to certain bad experiences with the Kuomintang in the urban areas its most important leader and ideologist Mao Zedong outlined a completely new strategy based on the idea of the Long March through agrarian areas with a revolution that only in its last phase entered city centres. As this strategy was, in the main, successful (despite severely traumatic and for many people lethal experiences such as the Cultural Revolution under the regime of Mao) it became a model for several other coup attempts in the Third World.

In general, the world after World War II witnessed the victory of the capitalist-industrial economy and nation-state with the collapse of fascism and all the European empires as well as the Japanese empire. The existing capitalist-industrial nation states, of course, varied according to the degree of affluence, democracy, ability of the state to structure people’s lives in their area and benefits provided to their population. The strongest in this sense were soon to be those mostly Western countries that came to be called the OECD group, with the rest of the world not coping as well – a curious result because the war had been caused by these areas and they had also suffered the worst damage during it. In addition, there were also some such state-socialist enclaves as the Soviet Union and China, which for some time managed to convince the world that there was a struggle between two alternative world-systems going on. This illusion, however, was soon to be revealed as false.
**Volume 4: globalizations, 1945-2011**

The title of Mann’s Volume 4 is ‘globalizations.’ The plural is there to underline the view included in the IEMP model that we are not dealing with a single process but several interlinked processes in the fields of ideology, economy, the military sector and politics. Some of these phenomena push certain forms of internationalization or transnationalization forward and some have an exactly opposite impact. The phenomena must, therefore, be studied empirically. This is so when we speak about the period after World War II in general. However, it is particularly important in the study of the period from late 1970s onward when the current intensive globalization wave set up due to new policy solutions by states in general and the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in particular meant tackling the decline of the long post-war economic boom. Space does not allow covering of the whole volume, which is rich in subject matter, and I can do no more than just touch superficially on some of the themes analysed in the volume. These are the nature of the US as the only remaining empire, the development and variations of the welfare state, neoliberalism and the forthcoming environmental crisis.

As the victor of the war the US was in the leading role when the new world-order for the era succeeding World War II was drafted. Keynes’ plans for creating a genuine global currency and central bank were side-tracked at the Bretton-Woods Conference when the economic institutions of the UN, such as the IMF and World Bank, were established. Instead, the US made the US dollar, and then backed by the gold standard a virtual world currency, thus replacing the pound sterling and the UK. This move was later sealed by the US support of the economies and currencies of the losing states, Germany and Japan.

That economic strategy was in congruence with the general policy of the US. After the destruction of all European empires and the Japanese empire in the war, the rising US empire was the only one in the world. However, it was different from the previous ones, ‘an incoherent empire’ as the title of a separate book on the topic published by Mann (2003) says. The previous empires were based on military invasion, and the heavy and long-standing presence of the colonialists who also often mixed with the local population and were extremely cruel in their conquests and when dealing with cases of revolt. The US empire, too, has sent troops around the world but it has been wary of keeping them anywhere for long periods. Under the public pressure from the home-front it has desperately tried to minimize its own casualties and has in all ways tried to prevent any closer contact between its troops and the local population. According to Mann, this just is not how empires are genuinely run. There is no doubt of the fact that the US military machinery that today controls one half of the entire military resources of the world is invincible. Yet the way its use is restricted to the above limits channels US imperialism towards other forms of power and, therefore, it is the economy that has been its principal tool.

Yet there is no doubt that the US economic hegemony, crystallized in the central role of the US dollar in the international system, has been backed by ideological, political and military means. Due to the strong position of the US cultural industry from Hollywood onwards the US culture has become familiar and loaded with positive connotations everywhere in the world. Politically and whenever needed militarily, the US has been and still is backing friendly governments and parties everywhere and has not hesitated to defend its interests and access to resources such as oil with explicit threats, such as the following statement made by President Carter in 1980 as a response to Soviet pressure in Afghanistan: ‘Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force’ (Mann 2013:124). In its front yard, at home, and in Western Europe, this has usually also meant promoting democracy and freedom. In all other parts of the world the US ideological canon crystallized from Carter’s administration onwards to the slogan of ‘human rights’ has been just a deceptive facade covering from sight the back stage in which the US has cynically supported whatever paramilitary troop or despotic government has promoted its interests in the part of the world in question. Such a policy was crystallized already in the 1930s by the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull who famously said of a Latin American dictator: ‘he may be a son-of-a-bitch but he’s our son-of-a-bitch’ (Mann 2013:105).

During the Cold War, of course, it was not so obvious that the US was the only remaining empire in the world. The Soviet party too had a say in the world order, at least in the sense that it could, in a hostile relationship with the US, create together a situation that researchers of international relations call ‘mutually assured destruction’ or MAD. The expression, of course, refers to the fact that both of the two superpowers had the capability to destroy all life on the entire globe with their nuclear warheads and were related to each other in the way that a complete global destruction sometimes seemed to be the most realist scenario – as people such as myself well remember, who spent their youth watching films like Kubrick’s *Dr. Strangelove* and fearing the worst. According to Mann, the problem was solved or the situation at least eased considerably when Reagan and Gorbachev signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty at the Reykjavik Summit in 1986 after a closely avoided catastrophe that scared both parties, in which a NATO military exercise almost launched an automatic Russian lethal counter-strike system. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s further reduced the threat and left the US the only remaining empire on the world scene.

According to Mann, it is still too early to predict how successfully the US will be able to defend its position as an incoherent empire against the currents moving to shift the balance of power resources to Asia, even if he seems to think that the US position is stronger and its influence on firmer ground than is usually thought. What we already know, however, is that one of the positive features that came with the end of World War II was that it put an end to the European Martian pattern of expansionist inter-state wars that had burdened Europe for almost one millennium and the rest of the globe for several hundred years. What followed was a still on-going era of significantly reduced inter-state violence, even if it has been overshadowed by an increasing risk of ethnic cleansing in existing and emerging nation-states in which the effort to create culturally homogenous nationalities often takes violent forms as ‘the dark side of democracy’ as the title of Mann’s (2005) separate book on the topic reads.

In addition to new aspects, Mann’s interpretation of the development of the welfare state includes many conventional factors. Thus he builds on Marshall’s (1949/1963) classification of the forms of citizenship, Polanyi (1944/1957) on the rise of the market society and Esping-Andersen (1990) on the distinction between three types of welfare regimes. Yet he is also faithful to his style and tailors the sources used for his own purposes, for example in naming, the three welfare models as Anglos, Euros and Nordics. Over and above innovative naming and adjustment of the classifications of others there are also some more original features in his analyses. Probably the most important one is the new interpretation of the development of the US welfare model.

It is conventionally believed that the US welfare model has constantly lagged behind those of the European welfare states. Mann agrees that this indeed is the current situation but qualifies the conception and the process leading to the current situation in many ways. First, contrary to the common belief, there actually exists a full-blown welfare state in the US. The only problem is that it is restricted to the military sector, which provides extensive healthcare benefits, social security and possibilities for education to its personnel. Second, outside the military sector, too, if we focus our
attention on the level of total investment in welfare and not on whether it is channelled through the
public or the private sector we find that the total investment in welfare in the US is at the top level
compared to other OECD countries. The high level of total investment in welfare, however, does not
make the great inequality in the allocation of resources within population vanish. People are divided
into those upper-class, middle-class and prosperous working class families that can secure their
wellbeing through private insurance, often based on terms negotiated by their employers, and those
who are marginalized and left almost completely without any protection. Third, even the obvious
lagging behind of the US in the treatment of the marginalized is not an age-old pattern but something
new that emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. Before that point in time the US system had been
moving toward the centre-left type of a welfare regime that is relatively normal among the OECD
countries. Neoliberalism, however, changed its route.

Another new factor is the analysis of the process in which the Anglo model with its lower level of
benefits (in the US) and ongoing reduction of existing systems (in the UK) seems today to be moving
further and further from the two other regimes. This was already included in the above analysis of the
US scene but is a new feature in the UK that in the tradition of Beveridge Plan used to be a relatively
equal system rewarding all social strata for their sacrifices in World War II. In that sense it was in the
early phases of welfare state construction often seen as a model country among the North-European
countries all of which today are much more equal and treat their marginalized people better than the
UK.

The change in the US and in the UK is, of course, part of the process called the rise of neoliberalism.
What exactly neoliberalism is, is a tricky question according to Mann. On the surface we are dealing
with the rise of market fundamentalism and a related invasion of free market thinking into every
sector of society. However, if we study what has actually happened in different societies under the
neoliberal movement it turns out that in the financial sector indeed something that can be called
removing obstacles to free market actions has taken place. In all other sectors the situation is more
complex. In the US the neoliberalist political movement was implemented with carrier groups, many
of which were not liberal in any sense but conservatives. The neoliberalist turn then reallocated
resources from investment in welfare to the military and other forms of security maintenance systems
such as jails and the police, which was the reason why neither the Reagan administration nor the
Thatcher administration actually managed to cut state expenses even though they both successfully
increased inequality among citizens. Deregulation advanced in the financial sector and market
thinking entered the public sector in the form of new public management that considered the state as
a concern to be run along the lines of business doctrines. These developments, however, were
coupled to an emergence of an abundance of new forms of regulation that increased public
surveillance, inspection and adjustment, which all was quite against the official neoliberalist dogma
but in accordance with the agenda of the value conservative carrier groups of the change.

What Mann calls the Great Neoliberalist Recession that started in 2007 was caused by the
deregulation of the financial sector. It has caused tremendous trouble around the world. Yet the
curing of the problems has been to a great extent left to the same interest groups that originally
caused the trouble. Measures taken in the US have resulted in a modest potential for new recovery
but the EU, which has had a far more less developed regulative toolbox at its disposal than the US
federal state, has been merely causing itself more trouble with its restrictive austerity policies. The
recession is all but over and it remains to be seen how the OECD countries and the rest of the world
are going to cope with it in the future.

Mann thinks that problems with the recession may be big in the future but he also says that the
biggest threat we are facing now and will face in the future is not recession but the environmental
crisis. Based on his studies, he is not a complete pessimist but is not very optimistic either. Creating effective policy solutions to deal with environmental threats requires an ability to coordinate the actions of different nations and interest groups on a global scale. Can we do that?

There are at least five cases, all taking place in the 20th century, which can be studied if we wish to learn something of our abilities to prevent the worst. There are the attempts to prevent the two World Wars, the attempts to tackle the Great Depression of the 1930s as well as comparable attempts to cure the still on-going great Neo-Liberalist recession that started in 2007, and finally, there are the attempts to prevent MAD. Studying these cases does not make one an optimist. Nobody wanted World War I but it was still fought, mainly due to the problems caused by the shocking inability of the parties involved to understand each other, negotiate, and coordinate their mutual actions. Hitler did want World War II, and he got what he wanted because other parties, once again, were shockingly unable to coordinate their joint actions. curing the Great Recession was first delayed by the austerity politics of Hoover, then somewhat eased by Roosevelt’s New Deal but a genuine recovery took finally place only due to World War II. The case of the 2007 recession situation may be even worse. Opinions are divided between the austerity policy camp and the Keynesians, and responsibility for resolving the situation is to great extent given to those who caused the problem. It seems then that the answer is ‘no we cannot’ on four counts: to the question ‘can we coordinate the policies of nation-states and interest groups to reach vital policy targets’ and the environmental challenge is even more demanding because it is genuinely global. Yet Mann sees some hope in the prevention of MAD by the nuclear arms reduction treaty in Reykjavik. It is a great achievement and encourages some optimism indeed, but I think that there is no reason for exaggerated enthusiasm in relation to this case either. First, it was an easy case in the sense that even if there were organized interest groups such as the military-industrial complex involved it was in essence a treaty between only two nation-states and was therefore easier to reach than a genuinely global treaty. Second, can we be sure that the treaty actually cured the problem? Even if the number of nuclear weapons has been significantly reduced, there are still enough nuclear warheads around to destroy all human life on the entire globe. In addition, the technology to build nuclear arms is widely spread and has not disappeared anywhere. Therefore, also if we remember Mann’s teachings, according to which even if innovations can be copied not all actors can copy all innovations, it is realistic to predict that there may be many more political actors with who possess nuclear arms in the future. That means that perhaps even the fifth of our test cases of tackling difficult coordination problems has not yet been solved!

I would not like to be a Doctor of Doom but, to put it mildly, at least these considerations make it easy to agree with Mann when he says that attempts to find solutions to environmental problems are among the most important topics of research in the social sciences now and in the foreseeable future.

Intervention 1: toward theoretical integration?

Above, I have tried to give the reader a feel for the type of analyses included in Mann’s book series. This has had to be in a telegraphic form of just outlining some highlights because it is simply not possible to cover a book series of more than 2 000 pages in less than 20. Yet I hope that what has been said will encourage some readers to pick up one or all of the books themselves. Be that as it may, in the rest of the paper I will make two interventions and deal with two issues: could the theoretical approach be made more coherent and should something possibly be added to it?
To start with, there are some themes one would have wanted Mann to discuss more thoroughly.

One is the future of capitalism. Mann has great confidence in the endurance and resilience of capitalism in the future. He has defended this view against Wallerstein, Collins and others elsewhere (see Wallerstein et al. 2013) and does not hesitate to do the same here. Yet he also mentions several times, particularly in Volume 4, that there are many varieties of capitalism and over much of the globe we are going to face one or another form of political capitalism instead of market capitalism pure and simple. This is nicely in line with Weber but quite abstract. Some kind of classification of the possible forms of political capitalism would have been illuminating. It would also have answered demarcation questions such as is it really correct to describe China today as a capitalist society or should we rather speak about a developmental state, including some market elements but largely based on slave labour and run by the political elites of the central government in tandem with the, to some degree, autonomous local political elites? A somewhat similar question can be asked about Russia. Is it a capitalist country now?

Another open question is the relationship between class politics and identity politics. Throughout Volume 4 Mann flirts with the conception that the current neoliberalist reduction of worker rights and benefits, along with the rise of inequality and the change in the balance of power for the benefit of those who have, is caused by the shift from class politics to identity politics. Given the legitimate demands of ethnic groups, women and queers, and the fact that Mann’s political orientation is that of a North-European social democrat born and educated in the UK who then moved to California to study the current leading edge of power he does not quite have the courage to say so. Yet he describes in an illuminating way the rise of identity politics, taking the US civil rights movement against institutionalized racism as a point of departure, and then showing how the identity political pattern of interest articulation spreads from ethnicity to other fields such as gender and sexual orientation. He also points out the strange phenomenon that while there would have been every reason for class politics to strengthen everywhere during the neoliberalist invasion, this has not happened in the West (in the US the union membership rate is now approaching 10 per cent of the labour force and is going down less radically in all other OECD countries as well). Instead, at a time of diminishing expectations people seem to have lost their interest in class politics and are focusing on questions of cultural identity. Why exactly this happens is relatively clear in the case of the US civil rights movement but not elsewhere. Moreover, why class politics has been replaced by identity politics instead of being supplemented with it is a good question but remains unanswered in Volume 4.

One could go on with pointing out topics lacking and themes not covered in full, but that would be both fruitless and unjust. Mann is an encyclopaedist who has in his four volumes and related books covered an astonishing number of topics, and quite justly says in the introduction to Volume 4 that one man cannot do everything. Therefore, it is more relevant to ask whether we are dealing with not just a series of brilliant books written by one man but a research programme that can also be followed by others.

The answer to the above question depends on whether we think that in addition to illuminating stories on the constellation of power relations in different times and places, Mann’s book series also includes a relatively coherent and distinctive theoretical view on social reality. The author himself seems to think so because he is currently engaged in writing a fifth and final volume to the series, including a systematic account of his social theory and methodology.

I too think so. Even if Mann has done almost all that can be done to downplay the status of his theoretical vocabulary, he actually has quite an extensive toolbox of theoretical concepts. These include the distinction between collective and distributive power, supplemented by the two other...
distinctions between extensive vs. intensive and authoritative vs. diffused power. In addition, just to mention some more, there is the important concept of caging, the IEMP model with the idea of historically contingent patterns of causation, and the way of embedding the model into the social totality through the concepts of purposive action, institutions and networks, as well as the idea of an interstitial emergence of new forms of power whenever leading edges arise. Closer to specified topics, each of the volumes also includes many conceptual schemes such as the (somewhat dubious) idea of historical dialectics between eras controlled by an empire and the erosion of empires to a multi-actor civilization, as well as distinctions between different forms of empire, class articulation, factors intersecting class articulation, or types of welfare states. No doubt there is a need to explicate this conception and develop it further in the form of an independent book.

I am looking forward to reading Mann’s theoretical volume and do not want to anticipate its content too much but one comment can be made now. Mann has this far avoided an explicit discussion with another currently popular approach to power, Michel Foucault’s power analysis. This has probably been due to the different intellectual styles. Mann writes admirably clear British sentences that formulate their message in ways that seldom leave the reader confused about the meaning intended. He is also an empirical historian who is proud of that fact, and has so far downplayed the theoretical element of his work. Foucault is something quite different. He is a philosophically-oriented critical theorist who, as a French intellectual, uses empirical material merely as an illustration of his ideas. Yet there are at least two reasons for Mann to discuss with Foucault explicitly.

First, Mann and Foucault share a distrust of grand theory. Weber was a methodological individualist because he was worried about not letting the concepts of the social scientist such as the state, protestant faith or capitalist economy become reified and self-sufficient structures to which researchers would mistakenly attribute causal powers. He, therefore, considered concepts such as the state only as the social scientist’s shorthand that the scientist must always when needed be able to deconstruct into single acts of specified actors in certain specified situations. Curiously enough, the same reason led Foucault, who was approaching the same problem from the structuralist direction, to replace the concept of structure with another because he believed (mistakenly, see Heiskala 2014) that the concept of structure cannot be defined in any other way than one in which it is reified from actual events. That was why Foucault (1978) replaced the concept of structure with that of dispositif with the idea that a dispositive only exists when actual events can be seen as tactical encounters implementing the strategic pattern the dispositive has. I believe this all should be very familiar to Mann who always aims for such middle-range types of theoretical account that are empirically grounded and says that ‘my power sources are distinct in not being abstract but embodied in real networks of people’ (Mann 2006:343).

Second, both Mann and Foucault are among those rare thinkers who have put an emphasis on the positive and productive nature of power. One of the implications of such an approach is that not only the actions, ends and means of the actors become relative to the situation of the action at hand; in addition, the identities of actors can and may transform in the course of the processes studied. Foucault has been very explicit on this and it is probably the most important single reason why his conception of biopower is so popular today. He also has appropriate conceptual means to deal with this phenomenon because his conception is explicitly relational and thus immediately open to problems of identity-transformation. Mann’s theory, again, is a Parsonian resource theory of power. On the surface it would seem that it is not fit to deal with transforming identities but presupposes solid identities. Yet when reading Mann’s volumes it immediately becomes obvious that his analyses of leading edges and transforming forms of caging often include also the element of transformation of the identities of the parties involved. Theoretically, too, there are ways to build up mediation between the resource theoretical and the relational approach in general, and Mann’s and Foucault’s
approaches in particular (see Heiskala 2001).

What does Mann’s project get if the above points are taken into account? Nothing radically new, but yet something important, one could say. First, integrating Foucault’s relational approach to power provides some currently lacking tools to specify descriptions of caging and identity transformation. Second, Foucault’s historical descriptions of the genealogy of biopower are worth checking. They are, of course, full of lacunae, idiosyncratic, and sometimes completely mistaken, as is fitting for a pioneer understanding himself rather as a critical intellectual than a historian. Yet the intuition and vision are strong and all the rest can be provided by other theorists (such as Dean 1999 and Miller & Rose 2008) and the efforts of careful empirical historians many of whom have already started their work. Such work is excellent material for such second order macro narrations in historical sociology as Mann’s.

**Intervention 2: toward the NACEMP model?**

It has been suggested by Schroeder (2007) that science should possibly be considered an independent modern social structure due to the great impact it has had on the enhancement of the power resources available for humankind during the series of industrial revolutions that have taken place under the expansion of the capitalist-industrial modernization (see also Goldstone 2006). In Schroeder’s conception, science is accompanied by two other structures, market capitalism and the state, but in relation to the IEMP model the question is, should science be integrated into it as the fifth source of power? Mann thinks that it should not. He admits that science and its impacts, especially the second industrial revolution, are important and he should have paid more attention to them. Yet he maintains that scientists themselves just try to create knowledge and rarely try to command our obedience. Science has indeed had ‘emergent properties in increasing the collective powers of human groups, but it has very little distributive power, for it places itself in the service of those who wield other sources of social power’ (Mann 2012:8; see also Mann 2006:375-378).

But let us see what happens if we extend the definition of the proposed fifth power source and call it, instead of science, artefactual power (A)? Such power includes science as an institution but it also includes tools, technologies and other artefacts as well as all infrastructures. This suggestion brings us to a conception, which is in congruence with the ‘material turn’ and analysis of agencement, through which social and material factors are interlinked as a new direction for social analysis proposed by actor-network theorists such as Latour (1987 and 2005). There are no doubt plenty of gimmicks and somewhat reckless essayistic position-taking in their writings. Yet they also have a sincere point to make: maybe it is time to finally drop the Durkheimian maxim (also shared by Weber in his definition of social action as the object of sociological analysis) according to which it is important to always explain social facts by other social facts (Durkheim 1895/1982; Weber 1922/1968). Maybe it is time to once again take material structures seriously, and pick up, in a new form, the idea of historical materialism according to which productive technologies and other material factors have a vital role in the explanation of the development of human societies. This idea was, without a genuine theoretical conceptualization though, included in the logistical analyses and analyses of technological innovations in Mann’s Volume 1. It was also one of the main factors explaining the great enthusiasm this volume evoked. Somehow, however, Mann lost this perspective in the later volumes, which are without doubt insightful books in many senses but do not build on this idea in any way.
There are two possible counterarguments to making the above addition. One was already presented in the context of science above: even if the element of collective power is obviously present if we start to speak about artefactual power, can we also detect the element of distributive power? I think that we can because material structures such as highways and the Internet provide great advantages to those who have proper means such as cars and computers to use the structures but marginalize others. The same is true of other infrastructures, as was discovered by many German people in front of the Berlin wall before it was taken down, and as many Mexicans can today discover in front of the emerging wall on the southern border of the US.

Another counter-argument has to do with Mann’s Weberian pattern of always accompanying the analysis of power sources with the analysis of carrier groups that organize the use of power in some institutional way. Therefore, he says, for example, that ‘I prefer the term “ideology” to “culture” and “discourse”’ because the other two terms are too all-encompassing, covering the communication of beliefs, values and norms, even sometimes all “ideas” about anything.’ Yet ‘ideas can’t do anything unless they are organized … ideas are not free-floating.’ (Mann 2006:345-347.) The analysis of carrier groups or, to put it in Bourdieu’s terms, cultural intermediaries such as teachers, journalists or priests, is without doubt a reasonable thing to do when analysing the ideological/cultural power source. However, the point of the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology has been exactly the discovery that in the age of highly efficient technological transmission of cultural messages, cultural categorizations have also and above the influence of the carrier groups, some autonomous power independent of any human intermediaries. Therefore, I defend the extension of the ideological to cultural power source (C). In a similar vein, artefactual instalments of all kinds have in addition to their undeniable purposive use in the service of ideological, military, economic and political ends, also some autonomous power independent of any human intermediaries. That is why artefactual power could and, as I try to show below with two examples, should be considered a source of power of its own.

Before we go to the examples, let us briefly discuss the possibility of adding one more source of power. Here I am proposing adding the sixth power source called natural power (N) to the model. This suggestion is even more contestable than the previous one because it involves considering one of the power sources as a natural structure and a set of potentialities that exist and are what they are without any human intervention. The reason to add this factor has to do with the fact that the human species has biologically developed to become a certain kind of an animal with certain kinds of faculties and qualities, and the globe as the environment in which that species lives also has a specifiable structure. Both of these dimensions include both variation and the limits in which that variation can take place. Going over the limits means that a point is reached where human life is no longer possible. Within the limits, however, some environments are more favourable to certain forms of agriculture and other productive technologies than others, and different people vary according to strength, endurance and intelligence. Such variation favours some people and groups living in certain environments over others. It explains, for example, why almost all early high cultures emerged in river valleys where agriculture could be cultivated with irrigation systems, as Mann shows in his Volume 1, or why the dissemination of agricultural innovations was more successful in Eurasia than in other continents, as shown by Diamond (1997) and McNeill & McNeill (2003) who both emphasize the fact that unlike the Americas and Africa, which extend from north to south, the whole of Eurasia is located on roughly the same latitudes which, therefore, enables transmission of plants and cultivation technologies from one area to another. The variation, therefore, provides power resources and also causes differences in the distribution of such resources. Note that one implication of adding natural power to the model is that the evolutionary topics dealt with in sociobiology and cognitive psychology must be taken seriously (see Laland & Brown 2011). That, of course, should be done with great caution because in the case of the human species the other five power sources that can be developed through innovations greatly modify the impact of our evolution based on biological
structures, and this has not always been taken into account to a sufficient degree in the existing sociobiological literature (Richerson & Boyd 2005).

This is how we end up with an extension of the original IEMP model to be called the NACEMP model. Let us now see whether there are any benefits from adopting the new model. This examination takes the form of a discussion of two exemplary cases, both extensively dealt with but under-theorised in Mann’s new volumes, the gender issue and the impending environmental crisis.

Mann was accused of omitting the analysis of gender in the two first volumes of his book series. This is an omission he has corrected in the two new volumes. I do not have any disagreement with his analyses that competently point out the importance of the spread of the ideology of equality after the rise of bourgeoisie, the increasing role of women in the workforce, and the variation caused by different welfare models. Yet it seems that, to a great extent, he conducts his analyses of gender not on the basis of but in spite of his conceptual toolbox. As an alternative, I would suggest that we start the analysis of the modern change of the gender system with the biological differences between men and women, and the range of gendered opportunity structures open to men and women in different societies. The less affluent a society is, the shorter the life expectancy is, and the larger the number of children women have during their life the more important the factors associated with natural power (N) pure and simple are in the determination of gender differences. Also, cultural power (C) always has a significant role but communities that stretch too far the limitations set by natural power are less likely to prosper than others that are less radical. In modern times this is all gradually changing due to political (P) and economic (E) factors but not without the mediating role of artefactual power (A), creating a possibility to distance more and more parts of the gender system from nature by the development of contraceptive technologies, mother’s milk substitutes, sex-change technologies, the possibility to create human beings in the future in hatcheries outside the female body etc. This is how we end up with the current world where gender, for the first time in history, is largely a cultural style (Heiskala 2009).

Another example deals with environmental problems. Mann (2012:6) writes: ‘The increasing productivity of agriculture and industry enabled a fourfold world population growth, from 1.6 billion in 1900 to almost 7 billion in 2010, with the average person being taller, heavier, living twice as long, and becoming twice as likely to be literate. These increases are rightly regarded as tremendous human achievements. Yet ironically, the increased extraction of resources from nature has also had a dark side of environmental consequences, which might even threaten human life on Earth. What hubris that would be: our greatest triumph becomes our ultimate defeat!’ With this quotation I can rest my case: if the forthcoming environmental crisis is our biggest challenge as Mann convincingly argues, surely we need concepts such as natural (N) and artefactual (A) power in addition to the other four power sources both to describe the current situation and the process that led to it and to attempt to come up with alternatives and policy solutions!

Let us be clear about what I suggest. With the above ideas and examples I am not trying to make the original IEMP model redundant. There are obviously several cases in which it is perfectly sufficient for the purposes at hand, as shown by Mann’s brilliant book series on social power. Therefore, I am just providing the NACEMP model as an additional theoretical tool for the purposes to which it is suited better than the original. The new model, of course, is not a model for studying just social power because natural power is also included. However, if dropping the sociological canon of always explaining the social only by the social and opening the discipline up to influences from other disciplines is what it takes to make an effective analysis of the forthcoming environmental crisis, I can live with the redefinition of the discipline.
Literature


