Comparing the Chosen: Selection Bias When Selection Is Competitive

Noe, Thomas Comparing the Chosen: Selection Bias When Selection Is Competitive. Journal of Political Economy. (Accepted)

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Consider a decision maker who selects between paired random draws from two unconditional distributions, always selecting the larger draw in the pair. When will the resulting selection-conditioned distributions be ordered by first-order stochastic or monotone
likelihood-ratio dominance? In various guises, this question arises in many economic contexts—tournaments, contests, auctions, cheap-talk games, announcement returns, qualitative
choice models, and treatment effects under self-selection. This paper develops simple, applicable characterizations of the properties of unconditional distributions which result in dominance conditioned on selection and uses these characterizations to analyze a number of economic selection problems.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: selection bias, stochastic dominance, all-pay auctions, tournaments, self-selection, finance
Subject(s): Economics
Finance
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2018 15:15
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2018 15:15
Funders: not applicable
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/7116

Actions (login required)

Edit View Edit View