Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

Tufano, Peter and Sevick, Matthew (1997) Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 46 (3). pp. 321-356.

Abstract

This study uses a new database to describe the composition and compensation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds. We use these data to examine the relation between board structure and the fees charged by a fund to its shareholders. We find that shareholder fees are lower when fund boards are smaller, have a greater fraction of independent directors, and are composed of directors who sit on a large fraction of the fund sponsor's other boards. We find some evidence that funds whose independent directors are paid relatively higher directors' fees approve higher shareholder fees.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Mutual funds; Boards of directors; Governance
Date Deposited: 25 Oct 2011 15:43
Last Modified: 14 Aug 2015 13:04
URI: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/id/eprint/948

Actions (login required)

Edit View Edit View