Tufano, Peter and Sevick, Matthew (1997) Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 46 (3). pp. 321-356.
This study uses a new database to describe the composition and compensation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds. We use these data to examine the relation between board structure and the fees charged by a fund to its shareholders. We find that shareholder fees are lower when fund boards are smaller, have a greater fraction of independent directors, and are composed of directors who sit on a large fraction of the fund sponsor's other boards. We find some evidence that funds whose independent directors are paid relatively higher directors' fees approve higher shareholder fees.
|Keywords:||Mutual funds; Boards of directors; Governance|
|Date Deposited:||25 Oct 2011 15:43|
|Last Modified:||14 Aug 2015 13:04|
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