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We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the U.S. and Europe. In recent years the “7% solution”, as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000), has become even more prevalent in the U.S., and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250m. The same banks dominate both markets but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1bn a year by paying European fees.
We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices.
We develop and empirically test a trade-off model for the analysis of leverage changes in mergers and acquisitions. This study extends prior findings of a post-merger increase in leverage for the acquiring firm by linking this leverage increase to merging firms that are less correlated, create significantly larger growth options, have lower bankruptcy costs and lower volatility. Specifically, we show that acquiring firms are more likely to finance diversifying acquisitions with debt as equity holders exploit the increased debt capacity with higher leverage resulting in total merger gains that are positively associated with financial synergies. This study further corroborates recent theoretical evidence of a U-shaped relationship between growth options and leverage theoretically and empirically in the context of mergers.
This paper proposes a metric for a financial fragility index for the Chinese banking sector. This metric is a weighted average of two variables: bank profitability and multiple probability of undercapitalization. The weights of the two variables are assigned based on their effects on real output, estimated by a vector autoregressive model. The main contribution is two-fold: incorporating a capital adequacy ratio into a quantitative measure and aggregating insolvency risk through a multiple probability measure. We confirm that our metric successfully identifies three periods of financial turmoil accompanied by economic downturns and rules out one minor perturbation caused by side effect of the policy between 2007 and 2014. In particular, this study provides an economic rationale for the relationship among financial instability, policy, and economic activity.
This paper proposes a metric for a financial fragility index for the Chinese banking sector. This metric is a weighted average of two variables: bank profitability and multiple probability of undercapitalization. The weights of the two variables are assigned based on their effects on real output, estimated by a vector autoregressive model. The main contribution is two-fold: incorporating a capital adequacy ratio into a quantitative measure and aggregating insolvency risk through a multiple probability measure. We confirm that our metric successfully identifies three periods of financial turmoil accompanied by economic downturns and rules out one minor perturbation caused by side effect of the policy between 2007 and 2014. In particular, this study provides an economic rationale for the relationship among financial instability, policy, and economic activity.
We investigate the role of trade credit links in generating cross-border return predictability between international firms. Using data from 42 countries from 1993 to 2009, we find that firms with high trade credit located in producer countries have stock returns that are strongly predictable by the returns of their associated customer countries. This behavior is especially prevalent for firms with high levels of foreign sales, and is robust to a variety of controls. To better understand this effect we develop an asset pricing model in which firms in different countries are connected by trade credit links. The model has further predictions about this phenomenon, including stronger predictability during periods of high credit constraints and high uninformed trading volume. We find supportive empirical evidence for these results.
This paper examines the current changes in the minority segment of the private equity market. It argues that there is a confluence of three major changes: the demographic
changes in the US population, the changes in the amount of funding available for private equity and the elimination of the SSBIC program. Together, these changes imply a
profound rethinking of the investment concepts in the minority market.
This paper examines the size-effect in the German stock market and intends to address several unanswered issues on this widely known anomaly. Unlike recent evidence of a reversal of the size anomaly we document a conditional relation between size and returns. We also detect strong momentum across size portfolios. Our results indicate that the marginal effect of firm size on stock returns is conditional on the firm’s past performance. We use an instrumental variable estimation to address Berk’s critique of a simultaneity bias in prior studies on the small firm effect and to investigate the economic rationale behind firm size as an explanatory variable for the variation in stock returns. The analysis in this paper indicates that firm size captures firm characteristic components in stock returns and that this regularity cannot be explained by differences in systematic risk.
Our analytical description of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, leverage is not procyclical. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of US commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. Fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage.
We investigate stock return and trading volume reactions to analyst recommendation changes issued by local and foreign analysts for international stocks from 40 countries cross-listed in the U.S. We find that recommendation changes by analysts based in the U.S. lead to significantly higher abnormal returns and lower abnormal volumes in the home market of the cross-listed firm, compared to changes made by local analysts. Our results are strengthened by an identification strategy that relies on analysts who move locations. We do not find evidence that the U.S.-location premium to analyst recommendations can be explained by a bonding or certification role of U.S. analysts or differences in broker or analyst characteristics. Our findings suggest that U.S. analysts facilitate U.S. investors’ access to investments in the foreign firm’s home market. U.S. analysts seem to improve the information environment and stock return responsiveness of cross-listed firms, in particular for firms from developed countries where the local analyst advantage is smaller.
This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four criteria for failure: one economic, two legal and one regulatory. It is clear from this comparison that balance sheet valuations of assets are in two cases crucial in these definitions, and so the choice between “fair value” or other valuations can be decisive in whether a bank fails; but in two cases fair value is irrelevant. Bank failures might arise despite capital adequacy and balance sheet solvency due to sudden shocks to liquidity positions. Two of the most prominent bank failures cannot, at first sight, be attributed to fair value accounting: we show that Northern Rock was balance sheet solvent, even on a fair value basis, as was Lehman Brothers. The anecdotal evidence is augmented by empirical tests that suggest that mark-to-market accounting does not increase the perceived bankruptcy risk of banks.
We provide evidence on the benefits and costs of voluntary earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions, shedding light on the motives and capital market consequences of voluntary disclosures. Specifically, we find a higher propensity of forecast disclosure when the acquisition is made with stock and during periods of high bidder valuations, when target shareholders are concerned about receiving overvalued shares. These forecasts are associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion, expedited deal closing, and with a lower acquisition premium. Our results are most consistent with forecast disclosure positively affecting the value perceptions of target shareholders. The evidence, however, also suggests that the benefits of forecast disclosure only accrue to bidders that have built a credible forecasting reputation prior to the acquisition. Furthermore, we document that merger forecasts attenuate the generally negative investor reaction to acquisition announcements. Explaining why not all bidders forecast, we provide evidence on high forecasting costs, particularly higher likelihood of post-merger litigation.
This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score-matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control.
Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive recommendations at the expense of the clients of brokers without analyst coverage. Significant profits come from transactions before recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps. Value added from downgrades and from recommendations for small caps is largely insignificant despite high abnormal returns to these categories. Brokers making profitable recommendations for their clients are rewarded by abnormal trading volumes, and capture much of the value added themselves.
Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive recommendations at the expense of the clients of brokers without analyst coverage. Significant profits come from transactions before recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps. Value added from downgrades and from recommendations for small caps is largely insignificant despite high abnormal returns to these categories. Brokers making profitable recommendations for their clients are rewarded by abnormal trading volumes, and capture much of the value added themselves.
Just as the “lost city of Atlantis,” the CAPM is empirically invisible most of the time. Yet, recent evidence shows that a strong CAPM relation holds on macroeconomic announcement days. We show that these findings coexist in an economy with asymmetric information. In this context the CAPM relation holds relative to the market consensus—the average beliefs across investors—but fails for the econometrician who does not observe investors’ information nor the market portfolio. On announcement days, when investors learn about macroeconomic factors to which stocks are exposed, fundamental risk better explains variations in asset returns, clearing the “shoal of mud” that stands in the way of the CAPM.
The financial crisis of 2007-9 revealed serious failings in the regulation of financial institutions and markets. Prompting a fundamental reconsideration of the design of financial regulation, the financial system has become ever-more complex and interconnected, and the pace of evolution continues to accelerate. It is now clear that regulation must focus on the financial system as a whole, but this poses significant challenges for regulators. Principles of Financial Regulation describes how to address those challenges.
Examining the subject from a holistic and multidisciplinary perspective, Principles of Financial Regulation considers the underlying policies and the objectives of regulation by drawing on economics, finance, and law methodologies. The volume examines regulation in a purposive and dynamic way by framing the book in terms of what the financial system does, rather than what financial regulation is. By analysing specific regulatory measures, the book provides readers to the opportunity to assess regulatory choices on specific policy issues and encourages critical reflection on the design of regulation.
Inadequate regulation of the financial system is widely thought to have contributed to the financial crisis. The purpose of the book is to articulate a framework within which financial regulation can be analysed in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. The book’s approach is distinctive in several respects. First, it views the subject from a multidisciplinary perspective of economics, finance and law. Second, it takes a holistic approach, starting from the premise that financial regulation is best understood in the context of an appreciation of the entire financial system. Third it is international and comparative in nature, contrasting approaches, in particular in the EU and US. The book focuses on underlying policies and the objectives of regulation, using specific regulatory measures as examples. This allows the reader to compare choices in respect of the same policy issue in different regulatory frameworks. This introductory chapter sets out the motivation for the project and outlines the book’s analytic framework and contents.
In this note, we reconsider the notion of ‘economic sovereignty.’ We argue that a small country may need to invest in assets of the sort of a port even when the common
scale-economy argument indicates that using a port of a neighbouring country will be more cost effective. The reason for such an investment would be purely strategic, as the sovereignty of the parties involved prevent them from writing down enforceable contracts. We show that such second-best strategic investments are likely to show accounting losses. The specific example of port of Gaza is used in order to make the analysis more vivid, and to demonstrate the pitfalls of policy recommendations based
on standard first-best technological argument.
We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial entry, or if it undermines bank monitoring incentives. We derive a "pecking order" for support schemes: support funds should be channeled first to credit guarantee schemes and then, when entrepreneurs start to substitute public for private collateral, to co-funding entrepreneurial projects. The optimal level of credit guarantee is diminishing in the costs of incentivising bank monitoring. We show in an extension that the long-term effect of public subsidies may be to impair the private sector's initiative to uncover cost savings.
This study provides first empirical results on entrepreneurs’ negotiation behavior. In a series of negotiation tasks, we compare persuasive behaviors and negotiation outcomes of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Our results show that entrepreneurs make extensive use of emotions and arguments as means of persuasion. Due to their assertive behavior, they close fewer deals; however, when they close a deal, they make higher profits than non-entrepreneurs. These results demonstrate the relevance of studying entrepreneurs’ interpersonal interactions as determinants of entrepreneurial success and highlight the role expressed emotions and arguments play in this context.
The paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilibrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits – to a proxy of welfare.
We argue that, ceteris paribus, introducing a habit that resolves the equity–premium puzzle is equivalent to increasing the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, AP-RRA. If we constrain the AP-RRA to a constant ‘acceptable’ level, the effect on the equity premium is quantitatively insignificant. In a dynamic setting, the fluctuations of the habit increase the equity premium, slightly, though generates unrealistic fluctuations in the risk-free interest rate. We conclude a habit is observationally equivalent, up to a first-order approximation, to a higher AP-RRA and to a preference shock. These effects cannot resolve the equity–premium puzzle.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of institutional share dumping surrounding control events. Uninformed institutional investors dump shares, despite trading losses, in order to manipulate share prices and trigger activism by activist "relationship" investors. Nonactivist institutional investors, who have private information regarding both firm value and the quality of their own information, are motivated to trade not only by trading profits but also by a desire to protect the value of their inventory and to disguise the quality of the information underlying their trades. Relationship investors, who use price and volume information to identify target firms, profit both from improving firm performance and from their private information about their own targeting activity. In addition to explicating recent empirical results on the relationship between institutional investor trading and corporate control events, the paper provides a number of new insights into the interaction between market microstructure and corporate governance, including predictions regarding the effect of share volume on subsequent governance activity, the relationship between the trading patterns of activist and nonactivist strategic investors, the effect of order flow on subsequent shareholder activism, and the effect of institutions' portfolio positions on the informativeness of their trading activity.
We model the effects of cash flow taxes on company profit which differ according to the base and location of the tax. Our model incorporates a multinational producing and selling in two countries with three sources of rent, each in a different location: a fixed basic production factor (located with initial production), mobile managerial skill, and a fixed final production factor (located with consumption). In the general case, we show that for national governments, there are trade-offs in choosing between alternative taxes. In particular, a cash-flow tax on a source basis creates welfare-impairing distortions to production and consumption, but is partially incident on the owners of domestic production who may be non-resident. By contrast, a destination-based cash-flow tax does not distort behaviour, but is incident only on domestic residents.
Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, detailed, international sample of buyouts from 1980-2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross-sectional factors – suggested by traditional capital structure theories – that drive public firm leverage. Instead, variation in economy-wide credit conditions is the main determinant of leverage in buyouts, while having little impact on public firms. Higher deal leverage is associated with higher transaction prices and lower buyout fund returns, suggesting that acquirers overpay when access to credit is easier.
The form of the interest rate on newly issued mortgages, namely whether they are adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) or fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), varies considerably both across countries and over time. We attempt to uncover the sources of this variation in the "ARM share" of ARMs issued, relative to total mortgage issuance. Our emphasis is on drawing inferences about how household mortgage choice is affected by households' reactions to movements in interest rates. We complement newly assembled panel data from nine countries on the ARM share and mortgage interest rates with a panel instrumental variables approach in which we test exclusion restrictions that are implied by alternative explanations for variation in the ARM share. We uncover strong evidence in favour of current cost minimization as the proximate driver of household mortgage choice.
The United Kingdom's Leasehold Valuation Tribunal hears extension and enfranchisement cases between landlords (freeholders) and tenants (leaseholders). In these cases, the two parties argue about the terms of housing lease extensions of up to 90 years in length, and about enfranchisements to convert leasehold contracts of specific durations to perpetual ownership freeholds. The widely-followed decisions of the leasehold valuation tribunal provide a unique insight into household-level variation in expectations of long-run discount rates and cash-flows, and set bounds on the prices that market participants may be willing to pay for housing over long periods of time. We use the record of decisions since 1995 to extract information about long-run cash-flow and discount rate expectations in this unique setting, which requires no estimation, but has real stakes for the participants in these negotiations. We find evidence that the discount rate associated with these decisions causes values of properties discounted for long periods (above 90 years) to be close to zero.
This paper models the real investment and financial portfolio decisions of a regulated utility, selling power at fixed prices to consumers and buying power in an unregulated spot market. Consumer demand is stochastic and subject to large shocks. Utilities can either meet consumers' demand by buying power on the spot market or by adding capacity. The risk associated with a surge in consumer demand can be hedged by trading in a financial derivatives market. Solving for the optimal policy for an individual utility, we show that, as power shortfalls increase, the optimal hedge position is a nonlinear mixture of price risk and quantity risk hedging. We then examine the aggregate impact of these hedging positions and show that the spot price process shifts from a marginal-cost-based regime to a regime based on aggregate financial capacity of the power industry. Although individual utilities, acting as price takers, can lower their expected power shortfalls by hedging with derivatives, derivative demand in the aggregate increases spot price volatility when power default occurs, and may thus increase the number of power defaults. At the same time, punitive regulatory penalties for power defaults may actually increase aggregate defaults by encouraging utilities to hedge outage risks through derivative markets rather than through increased capacity.
This paper develops a new theory of the capital structure of parent subsidiary organizations based on legal-system arbitrage: The capital structure of parent subsidiary organizations is chosen to minimize the agency costs generated by selective renegotiation of claims written on the component legal entities. We show that optimal mixes of parent subsidiary level financing minimize the default premia associated with the organization's overall financing package by equating the marginal enforceability of debt contracts written at the parent and subsidiary level. The enforceability of creditor claims depends not only on the legal regime but also on the size of the debt claims and the liquidation value of the firm's assets. Small claims written under a weak creditor rights regime may be more enforceable than large claims written under a regime with strong creditor protection. Thus, all optimal mixes involve some borrowing at the subsidiary level even if the subsidiary legal regime features weaker creditor protection than the parent regime. However, the mix between parent and subsidiary financing tilts toward the regime that features stronger creditor protection.
The financial crisis has brought a new focus on the accuracy of credit rating agencies (CRAs). In this paper, we highlight the incentives of analysts at the CRAs to provide accurate ratings. We construct a model in which analysts initially work at a CRA and can then either remain or move to a bank. The CRA uses incentive contracts to motivate analysts, but does not capture the benefits if the analyst moves. We find that rating agency accuracy increases with CRA monitoring, bank profitability (a positive "revolving door" effect), and can be non-monotonic in the probability of an analyst leaving.
The reduced accuracy of credit ratings on structured finance products in the boom just preceding the financial crisis has prompted investigation into the business of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). While CRAs have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior, the value of reputation depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle. We analyze a dynamic model of ratings where reputation is endogenous and the market environment may vary over time. We find that ratings accuracy is countercyclical. Specifically, a CRA is more likely to issue less-accurate ratings when income from fees is high, competition in the labor market for analysts is tough, and default probabilities for the securities rated are low. Persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results, while mean reversion exacerbates them. The presence of naive investors reduces overall accuracy, but ratings accuracy remains countercyclical. Finally, we demonstrate that competition among CRAs yields similar qualitative results.
Why does venture capital work in some countries but not in others? This clinical study of the first German venture capital firm examines the difficulties of creating a venture capital market in a bank-based financial system. The analysis identifies the problem of creating appropriate
governance structures to protect investor returns. It exposes the difficulties of established banks - not to mention government - to devise venture investment strategies. It identifies the availability of high quality entrepreneurs as a critical complement. And it provides a reinterpretation of the hypothesis of Black and Gilson (1997), arguing that the existence of an active stock market is a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for the development of venture capital.
Previous analyses of the wage/profit relationship at a disaggregative level in Britain have given positive results for pre-war years but negative results for early post-war years. However, this is probably due to the increasingly unreliable nature of the enterprise- based profits series published in the National Accounts until 1982. We have constructed, instead, what are essentially establishment-based Census data on profits for fourteen manufacturing industries, up to 1986. We have also been able to extend the disaggregative unemployment data, the publication of which also ceased in 1982. The wage equations that we have estimated include profits and unemployment (and other variables) in an explicit Nash bargaining model, in line with widely held views as to the way that wage negotiations are actually conducted. The results obtained show a highly significant role for profits, as well as having other implications, notably the positive (hysteresis) effect of industry unemployment, by contrast with the normal negative effect of aggregate unemployment, and the important effects of relative wages - which play a large role in various disaggregative studies of the propagation of inflation.
This Report examines the monetary unification of Europe and the creation of a European Central Bank. It deals first with the macroeconomics of monetary union and highlights four issues. What monetary constitution is required to deliver price stability, and do the draft statutes of the European Central Bank (ECB) meet these conditions? Are fiscal rules a necessary adjunct to such a constitution? Is convergence of inflation rates a precondition for embarking on monetary union? Finally, how should the transition be managed?
This paper examines the impact of a major change in dividend taxation introduced in the United Kingdom in July 1997. The reform was structured in such a way that the immediate impact fell almost entirely on the largest investor class in the United Kingdom, namely pension funds. We find significant changes in the valuation of dividend income after the reform, in particular for high-yielding companies. These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that taxation affects the valua- tion of companies, and that pension funds were the effective marginal investors for high-yielding companies
This paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial crisis. We investigate the impacts of bank ownership and management structures on the probability of default of US commercial banks. Our results suggest that defaults are strongly influenced by a bank’s ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower-level management, such as vice presidents, increase default risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers (managers with a “chief officer” position, such as the CEO, CFO, etc.) do not have a direct impact on the probability of failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce lower-level management to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may eventually result in bank default. Our results further show that the probability of default specifically increases when incentives of chief officers and lower-level management are aligned. Accounting variables, such as capital, earnings, and non-performing loans, also help predict bank default. However, other potential stability indicators, such as the management structure of the bank, appear to be less important.
Using a new data source on share price indices, this paper finds no evidence that the substantial variations in the reactions to the crash of October 1987 across countries are related to the structure of markets. However, trading halts and capital controls on residents may have moderated the speed of declines in some markets. The paper also examines one measure of interlinkages between markets, the trading of foreign stocks on domestic markets, and finds this to be closely related to interdependence between markets.
Families are more likely to save if they can commit to savings before funds are in-hand (and subject to spending temptations). For low- and moderate-income U.S. families, an important savings opportunity arises annually, during income tax season. We study a group of low-income individuals in Tulsa, Oklahoma, who were encouraged to save parts of their federal refunds at the time of tax filing. Those who agreed to save directed a portion of their refund to a savings account and arranged to have the rest sent to them in the form of a check. Eligible individuals could also open low-cost savings accounts. We document the demand for these services, the characteristics of those who sought to participate, the savings goals of those who participated, the immediate savings generated by the program, and the disposition of savings a few months after receipt. This pilot study suggests that there may be demand among low-income families for a refund-splitting program that supports emergency needs as well as asset building, especially if a basic savings product is available to all at the time of tax filing.
This paper considers the claim that explicit profit sharing reduces the marginal cost of labour This is contrasted with the view that implicit profit sharing occurs through wage bargaining Using a microeconomic data set from the UK we find no evidence that the introduction of profit sharing reduces base wages and hence the marginal cost of labour However firm profitability is found to have a positive effect on wages which supports the hypothesis of implicit profit sharing through wage bargaining These findings suggest that it is hard to justify the favourable tax treatment of profit related pay found in the UK
With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for their users, to write the small print of an agreement, and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But serious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In this paper, we review what game theory has to offer in the light of experience gained in programming automated agents within the ADEPT (Advance Decision Environment for Process Tasks) project, which is currently being used by British Telecom for some purposes.
In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyers regarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the under-provision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures, specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financial institution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, although conflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision for sufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategically to increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher prices than specialized banks, thus providing a new reason for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, if independent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and therefore market power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.
The collapse of AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers’ ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency-enhancing regulatory interventions.
This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A theoretical model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive suggests that 1) in principle, excessive risk taking (in the form of risk shifting) may be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the price of debt (proxied by the credit default swap spread), but 2) shareholders may be unable to commit to designing compensation contracts in this way and indeed may not want to because of distortions introduced by either deposit insurance or naive debtholders. The paper then provides an empirical analysis that suggests that debt-like compensation for executives is believed by the market to reduce risk for financial institutions.
For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers' preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist's optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer's valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can't observe a consumer's past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted. For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.
We conduct a laboratory experiment on the determinants of beliefs about own and others’ ability across different domains. A preliminary look at the data points to two distinct forces: miscalibration in estimating performance depending on the difficulty of tasks and gender stereotypes. We develop a theoretical model that separates these forces and apply it to analyze a large laboratory dataset in which participants estimate their own and a partner’s performance on questions across six subjects: arts and literature, emotion recognition, business, verbal reasoning, mathematics, and sports. We find that participants greatly overestimate not only their own ability but also that of others, suggesting that miscalibration is a substantial, first order factor in stated beliefs. Women are better calibrated than men, providing more accurate estimates of ability both for themselves and for others. Gender stereotypes also have strong predictive power for beliefs, particularly for men’s beliefs about themselves and others’ beliefs about the ability of men. Our findings help interpret evidence on gender gaps in self-confidence.
We present a model of stereotypes based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representative-ness heuristic. A decision maker assesses a target group by overweighting its representativetypes, defined as the types that occur more frequently in that group than in a baseline ref-erence group. Stereotypes formed in this way contain a “kernel of truth”: they are rooted intrue differences between groups. Because stereotypes focus on differences, they cause beliefdistortions, particularly when groups are similar. Stereotypes are also context dependent:beliefs about a group depend on the characteristics of the reference group. In line with ourpredictions, beliefs in the lab about abstract groups and beliefs in the field about politicalgroups are context dependent and distorted in the direction of representative types
We present a simple model of asset pricing in which payoff salience drives investors' demand for risky assets. The key implication is that extreme payoffs receive disproportionate weight in the market valuation of assets. The model accounts for several puzzles in finance in an intuitive way, including preference for assets with a chance of very high payoffs, an aggregate equity premium, and countercyclical variation in stock market returns.
We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit "commoditized" price salient equilibria, while others exhibit "de-commoditized" quality salient equilibria. When the costs of quality change, innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets, as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by Starbucks. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the phenomenon of "reaching for yield".
We present a model of credit cycles arising from diagnostic expectations – a belief formation mechanism based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) representativeness heuristic. In this formulation, when forming their beliefs agents overweight future outcomes that have become more likely in light of incoming data. The model reconciles extrapolation and neglect of risk in a unified framework. Diagnostic expectations are forward looking, and as such are immune to the Lucas critique and nest rational expectations as a special case. In our model of credit cycles, credit spreads are excessively volatile, over-react to news, and are subject to predictable reversals. These dynamics can account for several features of credit cycles and macroeconomic volatility.
We present a theory of consumer choice that combines elements of limited recall and of allocation of attention distorted by salience. The theory helps clarify and organize a variety of evidence dealing with consumer reaction to information, including surprises in quality and prices, unshrouding of hidden attributes such as taxes or maintenance costs, and reminders. Our model explains how consumers under or overreact to information, depending on what draws their attention. It also yields a normative analysis of reaction to reminders which adjusts the "sufficient statistic" methodology.
We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test. We also use the model to modify the standard asset pricing framework, and use that application to explore the well-known growth/value anomaly in finance.
We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge's attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can effect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy effects in choice of legal remedies, and framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.
We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer's attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good's characteristics, in the precise sense of being furthest away in that good from its average level in the choice set (or more generally, an evoked set). A local thinker chooses among goods by attaching disproportionately high weights to their salient attributes. When goods are characterized by only one quality attribute and price, salience tilts choices toward goods with higher ratios of quality to price. We use the model to account for a variety of disparate bits of evidence, including decoy effects in consumer choice, context-dependent willingness to pay, balance of qualities in desirable goods, and shifts in demand toward low quality goods when all prices in a category rise. We then apply the model to study discounts and sales, and to explain demand for low deductible insurance.
We provide a novel account of experimental evidence for the endowment effect using the salience mechanism (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2011). The two-stage procedure implemented in experiments implies that the endowed good and other goods are evaluated in different contexts. We describe conditions under which the standard effect occurs, but also account for recent evidence such as a reverse endowment effect for bads and a role for reference prices in modulating the WTA-WTP gap.
We examine the effect of trust on financial investment decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. We then consider the relationship between trust and performance, evaluating two competing hypotheses: one based on the notion that higher trust benefits investment performance, the other based on the notion that lack of trust constitutes a hurdle to investments. We find evidence of a negative relationship between trust and exit performance, especially for IPOs. We further show that more sophisticated investors are more likely to make low trust investments, and that by doing so they achieve superior performance. Based on this and some additional evidence we conclude that lack of trust is a hurdle to making venture capital investments, but that investors who overcome this hurdle tend to do well.
We examine the effect of trust on financial investment and contracting decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms' individual partners further contributes to the effect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the effect of trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.
We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.
This paper examines the determinants and consequences of investor activism in venture capital. Using a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals, it shows the importance of human capital. Venture capital firms with partners that have prior business experience are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies. Independent venture capital firms are also more active than ‘captive’ (bank-, corporate-, or government-owned) firms. After controlling for endogeneity, investor activism is shown to be positively related to the success of portfolio companies.
In recent years, a “third mission” pursued by universities, i.e. knowledge transfer to industry and society, has become more important as a determinant of enhancements in economic growth and social welfare. In the vast world of technology transfer practices implemented by universities, the establishment and management of university venture capital and private equity funds (UFs) is largely unknown and under-researched. The focus of this work is to provide a detailed description of this phenomenon from 1973 to 2010, in terms of which universities set-up UFs, their target industries and the investment stages of portfolio companies, which types of co-investors are involved in the deals, and which are the determinants of UFs’ ultimate performances. The picture offers us the opportunity to draw some implications about the relevance of UFs in different contexts (i.e. Europe and the United States) and provide to interested stakeholders with some useful guidelines for future development.
This article examines enterprises funded by government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs). We find that enterprises funded by both GVCs and private venture capitalists (PVCs) obtain more investment than enterprises funded purely by PVCs, and much more than those funded purely by GVCs. Also, markets with more GVC funding have more VC funding per enterprise and more VC-funded enterprises, suggesting that GVC finance largely augments rather than displaces PVC finance. There is also a positive association between mixed GVC/PVC funding and successful exits, as measured by initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions, attributable largely to the additional investment.
This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture
capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns,
this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation,
and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to
assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results
indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a
variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As,
and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance
arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for
investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which
subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective
mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective
treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not
allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government
interventions in the venture capital market.
Injecting more public money into the venture capital industry will not on its own ensure success, say University of British Columbia’s James Brander and Thomas
Hellmann, and IRPP’s Tyler Meredith. The authors argue that, as the federal government allocates $400 million in new support for venture capital, it must avoid the past pitfall of using the money to meet political goals. It must embrace a system that promotes competition and performance, and work with the provinces to transform how governments support venture capital.
The persistence of returns is a critical issue for investors in their choice of private equity managers. In this paper we analyse buyout performance persistence in new ways, using a unique database containing cash-flow data on 13,523 portfolio company investments by 865 buyout funds. We focus on unique realized deals and find that persistence of fund managers has substantially declined as the private equity sector has matured and become more competitive. Private equity has, therefore, largely conformed to the pattern found in most other asset classes in which past performance is a poor predictor of the future.
This paper presents new evidence that international investors are compensated for bearing currency risk. We present a new three-factor international capital asset pricing model, comprising a global equity factor denominated in local currencies, and two currency factors, dollar and carry. The model is able to explain a wide cross-section of equity returns from 46 developed and emerging countries from 1976 to the present, is also useful at explaining the risks of international mutual funds and hedge funds, and outperforms standard models proposed in the international asset pricing literature. We rationalize our findings with a simple model of endogenous exchange rate risk in complete markets, and identify the importance of correctly identifying the dynamics of quantities and market prices of risk.
Both U.S. and international stock markets enjoy high returns and Sharpe ratios on days of scheduled FOMC meetings, consistent with global investors demanding a premium to bear risks associated with Federal Reserve decisions. There is no comparable result for other major central banks, whose announcements do not command positive risk premia either globally or, more surprisingly, domestically. Other macroeconomic announcements have impact on local stock markets and, to some extent, even on the U.S. market. These findings suggest that the Federal Reserve exerts a unique impact on global equity prices that does not simply stem from the size and importance of the U.S. economy.
This paper studies the properties of bond risk premia in the cross-section of subjective expectations. We exploit an extensive dataset of yield curve forecasts from financial institutions and document a number of novel findings. First, contrary to evidence presented for stock markets but consistent with rational expectations, the relation between subjective expectations and future realizations is positive, and this result holds for the entire cross-section of beliefs. Second, when predicting short term interest rates, primary dealers display superior forecasting ability when compared to non-primary dealers. Third, we reject the null hypothesis that subjective expected bond returns are constant. When predicting long term rates, however, primary dealers have no information advantage. This suggests that a key source of variation in long-term bonds are risk premia and not short-term rate variation. Fourth, we show that consensus beliefs are not a sufficient statistics to describe the cross-section of beliefs. Moreover, the beliefs of the most accurate agents are those most spanned by a contemporaneous cross-section of bond prices. This supports equilibrium models and Friedman's market selection hypothesis. Finally, we use ex-ante spanned subjective beliefs to study predictions of several reduced-form and structural models and uncover a number of statistically significant relationships in favour of rational expectations.
As financial stability has gained focus in economic policymaking, the demand for analyses of financial stability and the consequences of economic policy has increased. Alternative macroeconomic models are available for policy analyses, and this paper evaluates the usefulness of some models from the perspective of financial stability. Financial stability analyses are complicated by the lack of a clear and consensus definition of ‘financial stability’, and the paper concludes that operational definitions of this term must be expected to vary across alternative models. Furthermore, since assessment of financial stability in general is based on a wide range of risk factors, one can not expect one single model to satisfactorily capture all the risk factors. Rather, a suite of models is needed. This is in particular true for the evaluation of risk factors originating and developing inside and outside the financial
Over 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed during 2001-2005. Rates of closure are strongly related to economic conditions and family structure. Closures are more frequent in US counties with low levels of social capital. Rates of closure are strongly related to the structure of local banking markets. Access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure.
The "Central Bank" series analyzes the use of information and product design for managing the counterparty risk of newly acquired customers. Central Bank, a mid-sized regional U.S. bank, was attempting to grow its customer base by increasing the number of new checking accounts. Like many banks, Central saw checking accounts as an important tool for customer acquisition and loyalty-building. However, the bank realized that the aggressive pursuit of new accounts could result in an increased number of overdrafts and, ultimately, customer defaults. The first case, "Central Bank: The ChexSystems(SM) QualiFile(R) Decision," analyzes how QualiFile, a debit scoring product commercialized by ChexSystems, can be used to manage this risk.
The recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. This paper discusses consumer financial regulation, emphasizing the full range of arguments for regulation that derive from market failure and from limited consumer rationality in financial decision making. We present three case studies--of mortgage markets, payday lending, and financing retirement consumption--to illustrate the need for, and limits of, regulation. We argue that if regulation is to be beneficial, it must be tailored to specific problems and must be accompanied by research to measure the effectiveness of regulatory interventions.
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to improve the functioning of consumer financial services markets. The Bureau is scheduled to open its doors in July 2011. Its first director will be responsible not only for setting the policy direction of the agency but also for establishing its organizational structure and management climate. In this open letter to the director, four professors-Campbell, of Harvard University; Jackson, of Harvard Law School; Madrian, of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government; and Tufano, formerly of Harvard Business School-offer advice on how to set priorities and craft policy responses. They suggest eight simple ways in which the new director can identify problems that deserve early attention: Look for high stakes. Prioritize problems that put large numbers of households at material financial risk. Look for confusion. Be concerned when consumers routinely misunderstand the terms of a financial product. Look for regret. Big financial decisions are often made so infrequently that consumers do not become adept at them. Look for folly. Some groups of people, for instance, routinely miss the opportunity to refinance their mortgages when interest rates drop significantly. Look for suckers. Some financial products generate a large chunk of their profits from a small fraction of customers. Look for rip-offs. If an expensive product survives in a very competitive market, it could mean that some consumers don't understand what they're buying. Look for opportunities. don't limit the focus to only problems-actively seek innovative products that will benefit consumers.
The recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver consumer financial services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. In response, the Obama administration proposed a new agency to oversee consumer financial services, and the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act embraced the Administration’s proposal by creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Other regulatory reforms have been advanced, and in some cases adopted, in recent years, at both the federal and state level. In this paper, we provide an overview of consumer financial markets, detailing the purposes they serve, the extent to which they suffer from market failures or other deficiencies, and the structure of our current system of regulation. To illustrate our analytical framework, we present case studies on retirement savings, residential mortgages, payday lending, and mutual funds. We conclude with a series of observations on the limits of government intervention, suggestions about how to measure whether government intervention is successful, and potentially fruitful lines of future research and data collection.
Many questions about institutional trading can only be answered if one tracks high-frequency changes in institutional ownership. In the United States, however, institutions are only required to report their ownership quarterly in 13-F filings. We infer daily institutional trading behavior from the tape, the Transactions and Quotes database of the New York Stock Exchange, using a sophisticated method that best predicts quarterly 13-F data from trades of different sizes. We find that daily institutional trades are highly persistent and respond positively to recent daily returns but negatively to longer-term past daily returns. Institutional trades, particularly sells, appear to generate short-term lossespossibly reflecting institutional demand for liquiditybut longer-term profits. One source of these profits is that institutions anticipate both earnings surprises and post-earnings announcement drift. These results are different from those obtained using a standard size cutoff rule for institutional trades.
Focusing on the interdependence of institutional change in the payments system and monetary policy, this book examines the different channels via which payment systems affect monetary policy. It is intended for researchers and practitioners in the field of monetary economics.
This paper investigates the process by which East German enterprises have been privatized and their resulting ownership and control structure. A corporate system with a very high level of concentration of ownership has been created. This is particularly closely associated with ownership and direct control by West German companies. The paper argues that this has allowed East German enterprises to gain access to finance, markets, and managerial skills which they might otherwise have been denied. The resulting "insider" system of corporate control will over time allow East German companies to participate in the control of their own and West German companies. The Treuhandanstalt has organized the privatization process to achieve certain industrial and social objectives. It has broken up the large multiplant enterprises to an extent that East German enterprises are now smaller than their West German counterparts. It has used informal liquidations rather than formal bankruptcies to be able to achieve its objectives. Privatizations have not involved the flotation of companies on the stock market. Instead, the Treuhand has arranged share and asset transfers on a scale which is in excess of merger activity commonly observed in the West.
To date, most of Eastern Europe has pursued privatization through markets: auctions, vouchers, mutual funds, and stock market flotations have all been widely advocated. The state has been viewed as an impediment whose involvement in the enterprise sector needs to be terminated at the earliest opportunity. There is one exception. Despite having an unusual abundance of managerial and financial resources, responsibility for restructuring East German enterprises has fallen on a state agency, the Treuhandanstalt (THA). This paper is an exploration of the way in which the THA has undertaken its function and of the lessons, if any, that it provides for the rest of Eastern Europe. We are not concerned here with the process of German unification and the course of events that rendered the vast majority of East German industry unprofitable (see, for example, Akerlof et al. 1991; Sinn and Sinn 1991; Dornbusch and Wolf, chap. 5 in vol. 1). This paper focuses on how the THA has engaged in restructuring and privatization in a situation in which the majority of tradable-sector jobs were under immediate threat.
Eastern Europe's enterprises are undergoing fundamental reform. This paper evaluates alternative forms of corporate restructuring, emphasizing different sequences in which reforms can be organized. In some countries, restructuring is undertaken by the state prior to privatization; in some, restructuring is delegated to private sector institutions before shares are offered to the public at large; and in some, public share offerings are preceding restructuring. The paper develops a general framework for evaluating sequencing, drawing on recent literature on corporate ownership and vertical integration. It points to market failures that are particularly acute during the initial stages of transition. These discourage privatization through wide share ownership and explain why privatization has in practice progressed slowly. The paper examines in some detail restructuring in the one country in which reform has been rapid -- East Germany. The paper discusses the role of the government, the Treuhandanstalt, the banks, the incumbent management and Western firms in the reform process. It uses the theoretical framework to explain the contributions of public and private sector institutions and considers whether any lessons can be drawn for the design of institutions elsewhere.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. The new requirements for the largest bank will be based on bank ratings of the probability of default of the borrowers. There is evidence that the choice of loan ratings which are conditional on the point in the economic cycle could lead to sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions. This makes the question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. The paper uses a general equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The results indicate that banks would not choose a stable rating approach, which has important policy implications for the design of the Accord. It makes it important that banks are given incentives to adopt more stable rating schemes. This consideration has been reflected in the Committee's latest proposals, in October 2002.
Sally Jameson has a large block of appreciated stock, which she is contemplating selling to purchase a home. She is comparing an outright sale, borrowing against the stock, shorting against the box, and a stock loan proposed by a small financial services firm.
This case focuses on how much external financing a firm needs and what securities the firm should issue to raise this financing. Cox Communications is a major player in the cable industry, which is consolidating due to technological changes/capabilities brought about by the Internet. The corporate treasury of Cox Communications must decide how much external financing is necessary to finance a series of intra-industry acquisitions that Cox has recently undertaken. The choices are plain-vanilla equity, debt, asset sales, and a new equity-linked derivative known as FELINE PRIDES, offered by Merrill Lynch. The treasurer and his team must make this decision facing the usual market constraints. There are also some special constraints, including maintaining financial flexibility for further acquisitions and limiting the dilution of Cox's largest shareholder, who owns nearly 70% of the firm.
A major U.K.-based multinational is reevaluating its leverage policy as it restructures its business. The treasury team models the tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of debt financing, using Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the savings from the interest tax shields and expected financial distress costs under several sets of leverage policies. The group treasurer (CFO) must decide whether and how the simulation results should be incorporated into a recommendation to the board of directors and, more generally, what recommendation to make regarding the firm's leverage policy.
model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) who meet in a search process. Projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long-term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan. The model generates, under proper parameter conditions, two steady states without or with rollover, and rollover is socially inefficient. Under imperfect information, the standard debt contract is privately efficient. However, it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover. The global dynamics displays a continuum of equilibrium paths that each exhibits sudden discontinuities—crises—in which the mass of outstanding loans is reduced by a quantum amount of terminations. Crises have a cleansing effect.
The theory, principles and practice of multi-agent systems is typically characterised as a computational and engineering discipline, since it is through the medium of computational systems that artificial agent systems are most commonly expressed. However, most definitions of agency draw directly on non-computational disciplines for inspiration. During the 1999 UK workshop on multi-agent systems, UKMAS'99, we invited four speakers to address the conceptualisation of multi-agent systems from their perspective as non-computer scientists. This paper presents their arguments and summarises some of the key points of discussion during the panel.
We develop a model in which individual and institutional reputation concerns conflict with one another to study why investment bank reputation concerns may have diminished in recent years. Unproven but talented bankers have incentive to signal their ability through actions that may or may not best serve their clients. In the spirit of Kreps (1990), we treat the bank as a hierarchical firm whose only asset is its institutional reputation for curbing behavior that is suboptimal for the client. The conflict between individual and institutional reputation concerns is more likely to resolve in favor of institutional reputation when firms recruit only the most talented people, and less so when unique ability is especially valuable. We discuss how technological change has contributed to a “star” culture that is unfavorable toward preservation of institutional reputation.
We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and type-reputation concerns.
We consider contracts to purchase assets by means of streams of payments over time, with the asset as security. These give the purchaser an option not present if all payment is made up front, the option of stopping payments and delivering the asset in satisfaction of the remaining debt. We argue that the value inherent in such options explains the attractions of asset-backed loans, employee stock option plans and MBOs.
There has been renewed advocacy for restrictions on international financial flows in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Motivated by this trend, we explore the extent to which cross-border flows affect real economic activity. Unlike previous research efforts that focus on aggregated capital flows, we exploit novel data on forced trading by global mutual funds as a plausible source of exogenous flow shocks. Such forced trading is known to generate large liquidity and price effects, but its real impacts have not been studied extensively. We find that both country- and firm-level investment growth rates are significantly affected by these exogenous capital shocks, and that their effect is more pronounced for firms whose marginal investment decisions are more equity-reliant.
This paper studies the adoption and impact of prize-linked savings (PLS) accounts, which offer random, lottery-like payouts to individual account holders in lieu of interest. Using micro-level data from a bank offering these products in South Africa, we show that a PLS product was attractive to a broad group of individuals, across all age, race, and income levels. Financially-constrained individuals and those with no other deposit accounts were particularly likely to open a PLS account. Participants in the PLS program increased their total savings on average by 1% of annual income, a 38% increase from the mean level of savings. Deposits in PLS did not appear to cannibalize same-bank savings in standard savings products. Instead, PLS appears to serve as a substitute for lottery gambling. Exploiting the random assignment of prizes, we also present evidence that prize winners increase their investment in PLS, sometimes by more than the amount of the prize won, and that large prizes generate a local “buzz” which lead to an 11.6% increase in demand for PLS at a winning branch.
In this paper, we analyze the spending decisions of over 1.5 million Americans who vary in their degree of revealed credit constraints. Specifically, we analyze how these Americans spend their income tax refunds, using transaction-level data from a stored-value card product. Card-holders may choose among several tax settlement and loan options, effectively receiving cash as much as 90 days earlier than would have been possible without a settlement product. Those selecting earlier settlement options pay higher fees and interest, therefore revealing the level of credit constraints or impatience. We find that more credit constrained or impatient individuals spend their monies more quickly. The mix of cash and merchant transactions is similar between more and less constrained groups. Finally, the primary merchant uses of refunds are to pay for necessities (grocery stores, gas stations, etc.), and the fraction of the refund spending devoted to these necessities is higher for those with greater revealed credit constraints.
BASIX, an Indian microfinance corporation, must decide whether to continue to sell weather insurance to its clients. A brand-new financial product, weather insurance pays if measured rainfall during the growing season falls below a pre-specified limit. Mr. Sattaiah, managing director of the BASIX's bank, considers a revised insurance policy for the coming season, weighing the costs and potential risks of expanding the product against the potential benefits.
Executives at First National Bank in South Africa are considering whether to launch a potentially exciting, but rather unorthodox, new savings product. Instead of paying interest, this product gives depositors the chance to win large cash prizes each month. Michael Jordan, CEO of the bank's Consumer Solutions Division, must decide whether to approve the product, weighing the potential benefits against large upfront investment, uncertain market demand, and the complication that the product might face legal challenges.
The main aims of this paper are, first, to construct a consistent comparative set of data on the sources of finance for investment over the period 1970--89 for Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States and second, to challenge some conventional views of the international differences in financing patterns. The paper documents the substantial problems of international comparisons, and argues that net sources and using data based on National Income Accounts provide the most appropriate and consistent information. We conclude that there is no `market-based' Anglo-US pattern of financing of industry. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are internally financed with small or negative contributions from market sources. Japan has been more externally financed with both banks and markets contributing larger shares than in the former group. Over the 1980s, the period of financial liberalization, all countries, except Japan, have become more internally and less market financed.
The aims of this paper are, first, to construct a consistent comparative set of data on the sources of finance for investment over the period 1970–94 for the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Japan, and, second, to challenge conventional views of the international differences in financing patterns. We find that there is little evidence to support the view that Germany is a “bank-financed” system nor that the United Kingdom or the United States are “market financed”. Whilst bank finance is more important in Japan, there has been a steady decline in the proportion of investment financed by banks over the last 25 years.
Eastern Europe is engaged in a massive programme of financial reform. This paper argues that while this programme has many desirable features, it has failed to address some of the most basic issues. These concern the relationship between the financial system and the enterprise sector, and the association suggests that there is a choice between financial systems that has not as yet been adequately considered and that it is far from evident that Eastern Europe is at present proceeding with the right model.
The investigations into LIBOR have highlighted that it is subject to manipulation. We propose a mechanism that gets banks to reveal their borrowing costs truthfully at no cost to the administrator. The mechanism works even when borrowing does not occur. First, banks report the rates at which they can borrow. Second, a whistleblower bank may contest another bank's report by revealing a transaction or stating a different rate at which the reporting bank could borrow. Third, the whistleblower's claim and the initial reported rate are confirmed or denied by the willingness of other banks to lend at these rates.
Williams, a Tulsa, Oklahoma-based firm in various energy businesses, must decide whether to accept a financing package offered by Berkshire Hathaway and Lehman Brothers. The proposed one-year credit facility would provide the firm with financial resources in a difficult period.
This paper has been written with the intention of helping new entrepreneurs in British Columbia to quickly understand Government Funding and the opportunities it offers. Research for this paper consisted of extensive data collection of funds available at present and interviews with current entrepreneurs who have made use of these funds. The goal was to understand what the different forms of non-dilutive, non-debt funding
are and what the experiences of entrepreneurs have been. With this information in hand, a conceptual framework was developed for entrepreneurs to use when first
approaching Government funding and when approaching different funds for the first time. The experiences of current entrepreneurs have been integrated into the paper as a whole, but responses that were received from multiple entrepreneurs are highlighted throughout the text. The first section of this paper describes non-dilutive funding and its different forms.
The second section presents a conceptual framework which provides an entrepreneur with a way of approaching Government funding from the initial information gathering
on the different sources, to the more focused research on the applicable funds, to important considerations when applying for funding.
We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In their influential analysis of continental European industrialization, Gerschenkron and Schumpeter argued that banks promoted the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing financial intermediaries into a “big push” model. We show that banks may act as catalysts for industrialization provided they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms and that they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. The theory provides simple conditions that help explain why banks seem to play a creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that universal banking helps to reduce the cost of acting as catalyst.
This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services, and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.
Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Smaller investors tend to free ride on decisions made by larger investors. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. These results are consistent with increasing returns to scale for due diligence, and with the savings generated by increased scale going into increasing scope rather than into cost reduction. Our findings provide an explanation for the observed outperformance of larger investors when it comes to investing in private equity.
Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized − measured by the degree to which the investor focuses on private equity rather than other classes of investments − and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. In particular, Endowments are not special according to the survey measures. These results are consistent with the changing LP-GP relationship in private equity as capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of large investors.
We investigate inattention on the part of pension plan participants using a dataset covering savings in Sweden's Premium Pension System. These data permit direct comparison of the investment behaviours of pension and retail mutual fund investors. Unlike retail mutual fund investors, pension investors do not seem to react to past fund performance. This behaviour means that pension investors face a greater risk of being caught in poorly performing funds. Our evidence suggests that inertia and inattention to past performance may translate into poorer investment results for pension investors. We discuss a potential change in the design of defined contribution pension schemes that may mitigate costs for inattentive investors while maintaining flexibility for attentive investors.
We examine the daily activity and performance of a large panel of individual investors in Sweden's Premium Pension System in the period 2000 to 2010. We find that active investors outperform passive investors, and that there is a causal effect of fund changes on performance. Chosen funds outperform discarded funds over all the horizons we study. This outperformance is most significant for changes made within an asset class and towards funds with better recent past performance. While activity is beneficial for the individual investor, extreme flows out of mutual funds affect funds' net asset value negatively for all investors.
This paper examines the trajectory of pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) in the years immediately after chief executive officers (CEOs) assume their positions. We show that PPS “steady state equilibrium” is not achieved overnight, but instead evolves through a process whereby CEO incentives increase gradually before eventually leveling off. We discuss various factors that might contribute to these observed dynamics including liquidity constraints, career concerns, entrenchment, survivor bias, and learning of the CEOs’ true abilities. We find strong support for some, but only mixed support for others. Because median CEO tenure in ExecuComp is eight years, our results suggest that this dynamics of incentive accumulations over a CEO’s tenure cannot be ignored when studying executive incentive schemes. Finally, we show this gradual adjustment of PPS over a CEO’s tenure to have a meaningful impact on firm valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q.
This paper develops a model for the pricing of credit-sensitive debt contracts. Over the past two decades, the debt markets have seen a proliferation of contracts designed to reapportion interest rate and credit risks
between issuer and investors. Contracts including credit-sensitive notes (CSNs), spread adjusted notes (SPANs), and floating rate notes (FRNs) adjust investors' exposures to three risks: interest rate risk, changes in credit risk
caused by changes in the credit rating of the issuer of the debt, and changes in credit risk caused by changes in spreads on the debt, even when ratings have not changed. In the paper, we develop a pricing model incorporating all three risks, with special emphasis on credit risks. The model incorporates a decomposition of credit spreads into two stochastic elements: the default process and the recovery process in the event of default. The model is
easily implementable as it uses observable inputs. By using a discrete time formulation the model is numerically easy to employ, and also permits the pricing of debt with embedded options of American type. It also allows for pricing contracts between parties with varying credit ratings such as swaps where each counterparty may have different credit quality. These features impart a degree of generality and practicality to the model which should make it attractive to academics and practitioners alike.
This paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.
Buyout funds increasingly sell their portfolio companies to other buyout funds. These secondary
buyouts (SBOs) underperform primary buyouts. Yet, only SBOs made late in the investment period
underperform, consistent with funds using SBOs to sometimes “go for broke”. After a fund invests
in late SBOs, investors appear to shun the follow-on fund. Differences in risk do not explain these
results. SBOs bought by specialized funds and those bought from a fund-raising seller perform
better. Some companies seem better suited to private equity ownership as we find persistence in
both returns and exit channels between successive buyout transactions.
We investigate the predictive information content in foreign exchange volatility risk premia for exchange rate returns. The volatility risk premium is the difference between realized volatility and a model-free measure of expected volatility that is derived from currency options, and reflects the cost of insurance against volatility fluctuations in the underlying currency. We find that a portfolio that sells currencies with high insurance costs and buys currencies with low insurance costs generates sizeable out-of-sample returns and Sharpe ratios. These returns are almost entirely obtained via predictability of spot exchange rates rather than interest rate differentials, and these predictable spot returns are far stronger than those from carry trade and momentum strategies. Canonical risk factors cannot price the returns from this strategy, which can be understood, however, in terms of a simple mechanism with time-varying limits to arbitrage.
This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that “dividend-averse” institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relation between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy may reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating towards low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax cost of institutional investors receiving dividends results in changes in firm dividend policy.
CSFB equity research analyst Laura Martin publishes a report on valuing Cox Communications that introduces an innovative approach to valuation. She contends that EBITDA multiple analysis, typical for the cable industry, is flawed because it overlooks the value of the "stealth tier" (unused capacity on cable companies' fiber optic network). Martin proposes using real options valuation to impute value to the stealth tier, and she thereby arrives at a higher valuation for Cox stock. This provides the context for contrasting several valuation methodologies--traditional DCF analysis, regression-based ROIC and multiple analysis, and real option theory--and assessing how selected assumptions impact the various valuation techniques. In particular, Martin reviews ways in which the industry is evolving and students can think about how these changes impact which valuation method is most appropriate. More generally, this case provides a context for discussing the role of equity research analysts, highlighting all the constituencies they serve and how this can create conflicts of interest. Martin's application of real options theory provides an opportunity to evaluate where it works, where it doesn't, and why.
We study a model where investment decisions are based on investor’s information about the unknown and endogenous return of the investment. The information of investors consists of endogenously determined messages sold by financial analysts who have access to both public and private information on the return. We assume that the return is increasing in the aggregate investment. This results into a beauty contest among analysts (or a “conformism” effect). There may exist multiple equilibria, each of which entails analysts sending the most informative messages possible. Beyond the “regular” equilibrium involving an overweighing of the public information, multiplicity introduces “inverted” equilibria where public information is negatively correlated with the return. The correlation across analysts’ information sources implies that not all the information available is transmitted to investors.
This paper is an exploration of the ability of game theory to explain real-world corporate maneuvering. We explore this issue by investigating bond tender offers accompanied by a threat to call nontendered bonds, so called "Simultaneous Tender and Call" (STAC) offers. We argue that STACs engender a transparent game played by bondholders and shareholders. We model this game and use this model to predict the outcome of STACs. Finally, we investigate the issue of whether this theoretical model explains the outcomes of four actual STAC issues made by James River, May Department Stores, and Houston Lighting & Power Company. Our clinical analysis provides support for the explanatory power of our model. Calibrating the predictions of the model with data from these STACs, we demonstrate a correspondence between theory and actual corporate behavior. As predicted by our model, subgame perfection, or threat credibility, and preplay coordination are central to explaining the outcomes of the STACs.
This paper investigates, from both a theoretical and clinical perspective, bond tender offers accompanied by a threat to call nontendered bonds, or so-called STACs. The theoretical analysis explains the use of STACs and derives conditions under which the call threats embedded in STACs are credible. These conditions relate to the degree of bondholder coordination, and the relative costs of adverse selection and suboptimal call policies. Next, three cases of actual STACs-James River, May Department Stores, and Houston Power and Light-are investigated. A rough correspondence between the evolution of these STACs and the different strategic equilibria of the model is established.
This paper provides an updated survey of a burgeoning literature on testing, estimation and model specification in the presence of integrated variables. Integrated variables are a specific class of non-stationary variables which seem to characterise faithfully the properties of many macroeconomic time series. The analysis of cointegration develops out of the existence of unit roots and offers a generic route to test the validity of the equilibrium predictions of economic theories. Special emphasis is put on the empirical researcher's point of view.
We develop a new methodology to estimate abnormal performance and risk exposure of non-traded assets from cash flows. Our methodology extends the standard internal rate of return approach to a dynamic setting. The small-sample properties are validated using a simulation study. We apply the method to a sample of 958 private equity funds. For venture capital funds, we find a high market beta and underperformance before and after fees. For buyout funds, we find a relatively low market beta and no evidence for outperformance. We find that self-reported net asset values significantly overstate fund values for mature and inactive funds.
This paper examines the challenge of entrepreneurial companies to go beyond the start-up phase and grow into large successful companies. We examine the long-term financing of these so-called scale-up companies, focusing on the US, Europe and Canada. The paper first provides a conceptual framework for understanding the challenges of financing scale-ups. It then shows some data about the various aspects of financing scale-ups in the US, Europe and Canada. Finally the paper raises the question of long-term public policies for supporting the creation of a better scale-up environment.
We examine the impact on stock prices of a major upgrade to the New York Stock Exchange's trading environment. The upgrade improved information dissemination on the trading floor and reduced the latency in reporting trades and quotes. The portion of the upgrade that reduced latency for electronic orders had significant impacts on liquidity, turnover, and returns. A portfolio that is long stocks undergoing the upgrade in the first 20 days of the upgrade and short stocks receiving the upgrade later has a return of roughly 3% over the period. The abnormal return was a priced effect of the improved liquidity produced by the upgrade.
Documents a pricing anomaly in the large and liquid treasury bond market. The prices of callable treasury bonds seem to be inconsistent with the prices of noncallable treasuries and an arbitrage opportunity appears to exist. Permits instructors to introduce the treasury market, the concept of creating synthetic instruments, principles of arbitrage, and institutional frictions in the bond markets.
Originated with an Institute for Fiscal Studies project on fiscal policy in the corporate sector that used company accounting data to analyze the effects of corporate taxation on firm behavior, focusing on how company accounts can best be applied to economic analysis. Discusses the assessment of complete activities using accounting profitability data. Reviews the value-to-the-owner rules for capital valuation and the assessment of activities over limited segments using accounting profitability data. Examines inflation accounting, focusing on the case for real terms accounts and alternative profitability measures. Discusses taxation and accounting profitability, and concludes with a summary of proposals.
We show, in a monetary exchange economy, that asset prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank, through its effect on default and interest rates. Two agents trade goods and nominal assets to smooth consumption across periods and future states, in the presence of cash-in-advance financing costs that have effects on real allocations. We show that higher spot interest rates reduce trade and as a result increase state prices. Hence, states of nature with higher interest rates are also states of nature with higher risk-neutral
We show that, in a monetary equilibrium, trade and asset prices depend on both the supply of liquidity by the central bank and the liquidity of assets and commodities. Because money demand is a function of the liquidity of assets and commodities, monetary aggregates provide information on trade inefficiencies and are thus instructive for the conduct of monetary policy. We also show that assets that promise higher payoffs in liquidity constrained states in the future are relatively more expensive. This generates a term premium in the yield curve, even in absence of aggregate real uncertainty. The term premium is also higher than what would be calibrated in a representative agent model because monetary costs affect individual agents’ marginal utilities even if aggregate income is unaffected. Our results hold in any monetary economy with heterogeneous agents and short-term liquidity effects, where monetary costs act as transaction costs and the quantity theory of money is verified.
In December 1996, Enron Europe and The Eastern Group were on the verge of signing an innovative transaction in the utility industry. Eastern was going to buy a long-term option to convert natural gas into electricity from Enron, thereby giving it the economic right to operate a "virtual" power station. This structure was vastly different from the traditional independent power plant (IPP) structure, and the executives involved had to convince their superiors of its wisdom before they could proceed. This case was jointly written for Large-Scale Investment and Corporate Financial Engineering, and it covers topics related to both project finance and financial engineering. It illustrates a new paradigm in the electric power industry: the creation of virtual power stations backed by physical power stations with merchant exposure. It also illustrates how physical operations (constructing and operating a power plant) can be used to offset contractual obligations and trading exposures.
Banc One's share price has been falling recently due to analyst and investor concern over the bank's heavy use of interest rate derivatives. Dick Lodge, chief investment officer in charge of the bank's investment and derivative portfolio, must recommend to the CEO a course of action to allay investors' fears and communicate to the market the reasons for Banc One's use of derivatives. The bank uses interest rate swaps to manage the sensitivity of its earnings to changes in interest rates and as attractive investment alternatives to conventional securities.
This paper investigates the relation between stock liquidity and firm performance. The study shows that firms with liquid stocks have better performance as measured by the firm market-to-book ratio. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry or firm fixed effects, a control for idiosyncratic risk, a control for endogenous liquidity using two-stage least squares, and the use of alternative measures of liquidity. To identify the causal effect of liquidity on firm performance, we study an exogenous shock to liquidity—the decimalization of stock trading—and show that the increase in liquidity around decimalization improves firm performance. The causes of liquidity's beneficial effect are investigated: Liquidity increases the information content of market prices and of performance-sensitive managerial compensation. Finally, momentum trading, analyst coverage, investor overreaction, and the effect of liquidity on discount rates or expected returns do not appear to drive the results.
In this paper, we study the impact of changes in the urban labor force and foreign direct investment on the banking sector, using a dynamic general equilibrium model with a financial sector. Numerical simulations are performed using stylized Chinese data, and bank failures are generated through increases in the growth rate of the labor force, a revaluation of the exchange rate, or an increase in debt issue to finance the government deficit, as compared to a benchmark scenario in which banks remain solvent. Thus bank failures can result from what might seem to be either beneficial economic trends or correct monetary and fiscal policies. We introduce fiscal policies that modify relative factor prices by lowering the capital tax rate and increasing the tax rate on labor. Such policies can prevent banking failures by raising the return to capital. It is shown that such fiscal policies are, in the short run, welfare reducing.
This paper analyzes certain policies that are typical of a number of rapidly growing East Asian countries in which a fixed exchange rate, combined with a surplus labor market, has made domestic assets relatively inexpensive, generating high rates of FDI as well as domestic capital formation. This “investment hunger” can lead to unanticipated declines in the returns to investment, and resulting financial insolvencies. Private consumption remains low and there are concerns that high savings rates cannot be sustained.
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model and apply it to a stylized Asian economy, loosely based upon China. We calibrate a benchmark equilibrium, and carry out various counterfactual simulations to analyze alternative policies, in particular tax cuts and exchange rate revaluations, as instruments in increasing private consumption while avoiding bank failures.
The goal of this study was to examine cultural differences in the value of family involvement in German and Chinese small businesses due to their differences in collectivism/individualism. Our analyses, based on a sample of 562 Chinese and German owners, showed that family involvement — measured as the number of family members that work in the business — is higher in China than in Germany. Compared to German business owners, Chinese owners received most of their start-up capital from family members. Moreover, we were interested in whether family involvement is related to the business owner's ability to make use of start-up capital to turn it into business outcomes. Building on existing literature and based on the match hypothesis we hypothesized that the effects of family involvement on business outcomes depend on the cultural values underlying a business. Our analyses revealed that family involvement negatively affected relationships of start-up capital with business outcomes both in China and in Germany. Our study contributes by showing that a negative effect of family involvement on the ability to make use of start-up capital is not only evident in individualistic cultures such as Germany but does also apply to collectivistic Chinese businesses. Practically, owners in both cultures are suggested to develop strategies in order to prevent and overcome negative effects of family involvement on business outcomes. Our results suggest fruitful avenues for future research.
A combination of privatization and public-sector expenditure constraints has given rise to a substantial reduction in public-sector investment. Private ownership offers incentives for efficiency in capital investment and forms of equity finance which are particularly needed in developing countries. To avoid distortions between public and private-sector investment, similar investment criteria should be employed in the two sectors. In particular, risk characteristics and premiums should be the same for equivalent projects. However, in those areas where public ownership is most relevant, namely natural monopolies, regulation is required and the private sector will not in general employ appropriate investment criteria. Furthermore, the private-sector cost of capital may be in excess of that of the public sector for distribution and interconnectedness reasons. Careful consideration needs to be given to institutional design to ensure that the private-sector potential is fully realized and to achieve efficiency in public-sector investment where it is required. The paper points to a form of public ownership which has strikingly similar properties to regulated ownership and allows appropriate choices of investment to be implemented.
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the UK and US. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.
An authoritative study of the investment management business, focusing on the use of capital requirements for investment managers as a means of investor protection. This report was commissioned by the Investment Management Regulatory Organization.
This paper examines the relation between capital markets and corporate control in France, Germany and the UK. It compares levels of takeover activity in the three countries and describes the degree to which takeovers are associated with changes in corporate control. The paper examines the influence of regulation on forms of corporate ownership and control. It compares regulation pertaining to the rights of employees, managers and shareholders in the three countries and finds that regulatory rules are related to patterns of ownership and control changes. The paper suggests that a fundamental objective of control changes is to correct managerial failure, and that takeovers are suited to the correction of particular classes of managerial failure that cannot be readily rectified by contracts. Thus, markets with low levels of takeovers may suffer from a low level of correction of managerial failure. However, by changing ownership, takeovers may give rise to an inability of owners to commit themselves to the long-term interests of managers and employees. As a consequence, financial systems with active takeover markets may be associated with inadequate investment in firm-specific assets and an unduly short-term investment horizon. There is, therefore, a tradeoff between alternative methods of correcting managerial failure. This is particularly important for European countries facing an extension of UK takeover activity to the Continent. The process is being encouraged by the European Commission which aims to harmonize regulation on a UK-style takeover code. Harmonization of regulation may have far-reaching consequences for the structure of different countries' capital markets and, in view of the tradeoff, is of uncertain merit.
Twentieth century Japan provides a remarkable laboratory for examining how an externally imposed institutional and regulatory intervention affects the ownership of corporations. In the first half of the century, Japan had weak legal protection but strong institutional arrangements. The institutions were dismantled after the war and replaced by a strong form of legal protection. This inversion resulted in a switch from Japan being a country in which equity markets flourished and ownership was dispersed in the first half of the century to one in which banks and companies dominated with interlocking shareholdings in the second half of the century.
We use a unique data set to study how U.K. banks deal with financially distressed small and medium-sized companies under a ‘contractualist’ bankruptcy system. Unlike in the U.S., these procedures limit the discretion of courts to strict enforcement of debt contracts, without any dilution of creditors’ claims. We show that lenders and borrowers select a debt structure that avoids some of the market failures often attributed to a contractualist system. Collateral and liquidation rights are highly concentrated in the hands of the main bank, giving it a dominant position in restructuring or liquidating a defaulting firm. There is little litigation, and no evidence of co-ordination failures or creditors’ runs. However, there is some evidence that the bank’s dominance makes it ‘lazy’ in monitoring, relying heavily on the value of its collateral in timing the bankruptcy decision.
In this paper we construct an evolutionary theory of bankruptcy law in which bankruptcy law is perceived as a mechanism for standardizing the default clauses in debt contracts. Our theory is motivated by the comparative histories of England and the US. A central normative question is why bankruptcy law cannot be left to the contracting parties operating in a market environment. We argue that State intervention may be required because freedom-of-contracting regimes suffer from a problem of under-innovation and tend to slip into institutional stagnation. Judges and legislators can resolve the problem, but they tend to be biased towards the preservation of private benefits, and thus make bankruptcy law too soft. Our theory also explains why cycles in institutional structure may occur.
Current bankruptcy legislation in many countries tends to follow the US model of Chapter 11, whereby the courts have the authority to stay the contractual rights of the secured creditors. The alternative approach of freedom of contracting whereby the privately negotiated debt contract defines a contingency that the courts strictly implement in the event of financial distress, is largely ignored. We study the resolution of financial distress in shipping, where the ex-territorial
nature of assets have distanced the industry from on-shore bankruptcy legislation. We have four main findings. First, we demonstrate how contracts and other private institutions have adapted to the industry's special circumstances so as to deliver effective resolution of financial distress.
Second, we use vessel arrest as a proxy for the economic cost of financial distress. We show that the level of arrests are low and their overall cost is modest, mostly originating in dysfunctional owners. Third, we estimate the expected economic life of vessels (conditional on age) in financial distress, and show that it is significantly shorter than the rest of the vessel population, reflecting under-maintenance of the vessel prior to arrest; this provides a significant test for Myers (1977) under investment hypothesis. Finally, our estimates of the under-maintenance effect, suggest that fire sale discounts estimated in the literature using standard methods may be seriously over-estimated. In summary, the shipping industry provides a rare opportunity to study the operation of legal institutions generated by an Hayekian spontaneous order.
We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market efficiency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.
We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combine a bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate's risk-taking incentives depend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate's liability strucure. We examine optimal capital requirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates, and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies. For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability of failure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, when risk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reach of the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increased risk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract higher capital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to hold assets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirements encourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage, or of transfering assets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss the policy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debate on the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existing US bank holding company regulation.
In this paper, we explore the cross-section of Japanese banks’ industrial loan portfolios over the last 34 years. We show that banks with diversified lending (generalists) and banks with focused lending (specialists) coexist. Similarly, industries with diversified borrowing (generalists) and industries with focused borrowing (specialists) also coexist. Interestingly, specialist banks and specialist industries rarely interact, suggesting significant overlap in banks’ loan portfolios. We introduce a model to describe these interaction patterns and identify a persistent and economically meaningful set of generalist banks/industries. We find that size is an important determinant for being a generalist. Finally, we show that generalist banks tend to be less vulnerable compared to specialist banks.
We decompose currency returns into (permanent) intrinsic-value shocks and (transitory) expected-return shocks. We explore interactions between these shocks, currency returns, and institutional-investor currency flows. Intrinsic-value shocks are: dwarfed by expected-return shocks (yet currency returns overreact to them); unrelated to flows (although expected-return shocks correlate with flows); and related positively to forecasted cumulated-interest differentials. These results suggest flows are related to short-term currency returns, while fundamentals better explain long-term returns and values. They also rationalize the long-observed poor performance of exchange-rate models: by ignoring the distinction between permanent and transitory exchange-rate changes, prior tests obscure the connection between currencies and fundamentals.
Using a new technique, and weekly data for 25 countries from 1994 to 1998, we analyze the relationship between institutional cross-border portfolio flows, and domestic and foreign equity returns. In emerging markets, institutional flows forecast statistically indistinguishable movements in country closed-end fund NAV returns and price returns. In contrast, closed-end fund flows forecast price returns, but not NAV returns. Furthermore, institutional flows display trend-following (trend-reversing) behavior in response to symmetric (asymmetric) movements in NAV and price returns. The results suggest that institutional cross-border flows are linked to fundamentals, while closed-end fund flows are a source of price pressure in the short run.
Discusses a company deciding what it should do to manage its worldwide hedging operations.
We use a comprehensive data set of funds-of-funds to investigate performance, risk, and capital formation in the hedge fund industry from 1995 to 2004. While the average fund-of-funds delivers alpha only in the period between October 1998 and March 2000, a subset of funds-of-funds consistently delivers alpha. The alpha-producing funds are not as likely to liquidate as those that do not deliver alpha, and experience far greater and steadier capital inflows than their less fortunate counterparts. These capital inflows attenuate the ability of the alpha producers to continue to deliver alpha in the future.
The presented study shows how Bain Capital and other Buyout Investment Firms applied Dividend Recap Schemes to financially benefit from their portfolio companies. The so generated distributions represented a large portion of the overall financial success from these investments. Although these schemes made the investments highly profitable for the buyout funds and their investors, it can be assumed that the involved portfolio firms were financially hurt in the process.
This paper analyzes exit strategies of buyout funds in their portfolio companies following Initial Public Offerings. We use a data set of 222 buyout-backed IPOs in the United States between 1999 and 2008 including hand-collected data about each exit process to draw up a detailed road map of buyout investors’ divestment processes. Using this data, we document timing and aggressiveness of the exit strategies, and analyze to which degree a multitude of possible determinants influence the choice for a given exit strategy. Our results show that buyout funds stay invested in their portfolio companies for a substantial period of time after the IPO, and that the choice for a given exit strategy depends not only on characteristics of each respective portfolio company, but also on the financial success of the deal from the perspective of the buyout investor.
Our purpose in this paper is to unify international trade and finance in a single general equilibrium model. Our model is rich enough to include multiple commodities (including traded and nontraded goods), heterogeneous consumers in each country, multiple time periods, multiple credit markets, and multiple currencies. Yet our model is simple enough to be effectively computable. We explicitly calculate the financial and real effects of changes in tariffs, productivity, and preferences, as well as the effects of monetary and fiscal policy.
We maintain agent optimization, rational expectations, and market clearing (i.e. perfect competition with flexible prices) throughout. But because of the important role money plays, and because of the heterogeneity of markets and agents, we find that fiscal and monetary policy both have real effects. The effects of policy on real income, long-term interest rates, and exchange rates are qualitatively identical to those suggested in Mundell-Fleming (without the small country hypothesis), although our equilibrating mechanisms are different. However, because the Mundell-Fleming model ignores expectations and relative price changes, our model predicts different effects on the flow of capital, the balance of trade, and real exchange rates in some circumstances.
This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.
We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.
We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.
A green paper discussion document.
We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.
The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self-enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficient allocations. Moreover, we show that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts. We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations.
We define a non-tâtonnement dynamics in continuous-time for pure-exchange economies with outside and inside fiat money. Traders are myopic, face a cash-in-advance constraint and play dominant strategies in a short-run monetary strategic market game involving the limit-price mechanism. The profits of the Bank are redistributed to its private shareholders, but they can use them to pay their own debts only in the next period. Provided there is enough inside money, monetary trade curves converge towards Pareto optimal allocations; money has a positive value along each trade curve, except on the optimal rest-point where it becomes a veil while trades vanish. Moreover, generically, given initial conditions, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve not only in real, but also in nominal variables. Finally, money is locally neutral in the short-run and non-neutral in the long-run.
We study the choice of bank nationality by foreign-born retail banking customers in the context of bank globalization. We argue theoretically that banks enter foreign markets to follow their non-corporate customers and thereby are able to exploit competitive advantages over domestic banks. Using detailed survey data on more than 1000 Turkish immigrants in Germany, we find that product differentiation explains the choice of a home nation bank and that ethnic origin in itself provides the strongest comparative advantage for foreign banks. We find evidence for a persistent ‘home-bias’ of customers with an immigration background even with increasing integration into the host country's culture. This result may be surprising given that a systematic difference in the choice of bank nationality should not be observable with more integrated immigrants. Our results contribute to the existing economic research on multinational bank expansion by providing insights into bank globalization as an accompaniment to labor market internationalization.
In this companion paper to Goodhart et al. (2012), we explore the interactions of various types of financial regulation. We find that regulations that control fire-sale risk are critical for delivering financial stability and improving the welfare of savers and borrowers. We describe the combinations of capital regulations, margin requirements, liquidity regulation, and dynamic provisioning that are most effective in this respect. A policy featuring margin requirements together with countercyclical capital requirements delivers equal or better outcomes for the economy than does an unregulated financial system. But it is easy to produce combinations of regulation that look sensible but, when combined, have adverse effects on the economy.
Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect.
We study a monetary economy with two large open economies displaying net real and financial flows. If default on cross-border loans is possible, taxing financial flows can reduce its negative consequences. In doing so it can improve welfare unilaterally, in some cases in a Pareto sense, via altering the terms of trade and reducing the costs of such default.
Until recently, financial services regulation remained largely segmented along national lines. The integration of financial markets, however, calls for a systematic and coherent approach to regulation. This paper studies the effect of market based regulation on the proper functioning of the interbank market. Specifically, we argue that restrictions on the payout of dividends by banks can reduce their expected default on (interbank) loans, stimulate trade in this market and improve the welfare of consumers.
Mainstream macro-models have assumed away financial frictions, in particular default. The minimum addition in order to introduce financial intermediaries, money and liquidity into such models is the possibility of default. This, in turn, requires that institutions and price formation mechanisms become a modelled part of the process, a ‘playable game’. Financial systems are not static, nor necessarily reverting to an equilibrium, but evolving processes, subject to institutional control mechanisms themselves subject to socio/political development. Process-oriented models of strategic market games can be translated into consistent stochastic models incorporating default and boundary constraints.
Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious interrelationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit excessive risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogenous agents (commercial banks and investors), endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable. Financial fragility emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. In our model a version of the liquidity trap can occur. Moreover, the Modigliani-Miller proposition fails either through frictions in the (nominal) financial system or through incentives, arising from the imposed capital requirements, for differential investment behaviour because of capital requirements. In addition, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.
The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we use simplified, thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos, A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility, Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2003fe13, 2003]. The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and endogenous default, thus allowing various feedback and contagion channels to operate in equilibrium. Such a model leads to different results from those obtained when using a standard representative agent model. For example, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and financial stability, not only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy. Moreover, agents who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more effectively by transferring ‘negative externalities’ onto others
The purpose of this paper is to assess the choice between adopting a monetary base or an interest rate setting instrument to maintain financial stability. Our results suggest that the interest rate instrument is preferable, since during times of a panic or financial crisis the Central Bank automatically satisfies the increased demand for money. Thus, it prevents sharp losses in asset values and enhanced asset volatility.
The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private sector agents. To this end, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The setting of three heterogeneous banks allows us to study not only interaction between any two individual banks, but also their interaction with the rest of the banks in the banking system. We show that the model is analytically tractable and can be calibrated against real UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk assessment tool for financial regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy as well as credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.
This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003,2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be readily used to assess financial fragility given its flexibility, computability, and the presence of multiple contagion channels and heterogeneous banks and investors.
he article defines the framework to assess the financial stability as currently practised by central banks and international organizations. The author criticizes the comparison of the current methodology to the practices of central banks three or four decades ago. The article provides a brief introduction of original research defining the framework for financial stability assessment.
International monetary relationships have been under strain in recent years. This is largely because adjustment mechanisms are asymmetric; the IMF has no means of putting pressure on countries with large current account surpluses to adjust. But such countries' accompanying capital account outflows have often had disappointing returns. So, we propose a method to impose symmetric constraints on the net capital flows both of deficit and surplus countries.
What is the main limitation of much modern macroeconomic theory, among the failings pointed out by William R. White at the 2010 Mayekawa Lecture? We argue that the main deﬁciency is a failure to incorporate the possibility of default, including that of banks, into the core of the analysis. With default assumed away, there can be no role for ﬁnancial intermediaries, for ﬁnancial disturbances, or even for money. Models incorporating defaults are, however, harder to construct, in part because the representative agent ﬁction must be abandoned. Moreover, ﬁnancial crises are hard to predict and to resolve. All of the previously available alternatives for handling failing systemically important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs) are problematical. We end by discussing a variety of current proposals for improving the resolution of failed SIFIs.
What is the main limitation of much modern macro-economic theory, among the failings pointed out by William R. White at the 2010 Mayekawa Lecture? We argue that the main deficiency is a failure to incorporate the possibility of default, including that of banks, into the core of the analysis. With default assumed away, there can be no role for financial intermediaries, for financial disturbances, or even for money. Models incorporating defaults are, however, harder to construct, in part because the representative agent fiction must be abandoned. Moreover, financial crises are hard to predict and to resolve. All of the previously available alternatives for handling failing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are problematical. We end by discussing a variety of current proposals for improving the resolution of failed SIFIs.
This paper develops and experimentally implements a simple multi-negotiation bargaining game, in which one agent, called the "developer", must reach agreements with a series of other agents, called "landowners", in order to implement a value-increasing project. The game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under which the surplus from the project is split between the landowner and developer without any dissipation of value. In the actual experiments, however, on average almost half of the value of the project was dissipated. The costs of dissipation fell disproportionately on the developer, who was able to capture less than 5% of the value generated by the project. The results of this experiment call into question the ability of private negotiations between a large number of parties, even in a world without explicit contracting costs, to induce Pareto-optimal allocations of property rights.
Investors in private equity funds must get comfortable about the economics of the partnership. In today's market place, are managers being overcompensated, ask Oliver Gottschalg, Bernd Kreuter and Ludovic Phalippou.
Depuis quelques années, la croyance en une surperformance du capital-investissement est alimentée par les articles élogieux sur les rendements de cette classe d’actifs qui paraissent régulièrement dans la presse économique et financière. Les statistiques de mesure des performances publiées par Thomson Venture Economics, qui servent de standard dans la profession, suggèrent que, sur longue période, les performances du capital-investissement se comparent favorablement à celles des indices boursiers. En dépit de ce consensus apparent, le point de vue d’une surperformance du capitalinvestissement vis-à-vis d’un placement dans le coté est erroné. En utilisant les données les plus complètes sur le capital-investissement en Amérique du Nord et en Europe, nous montrons que les performances du capital-investissement ont été, en moyenne, inférieures de près de 3 % par an à celles des grands indices de marché.
The article reports that calculating the performance of private equity funds with a modified internal rate of return (M-IRR) results in a more accurate performance yield or true return. The problem with the internal rate of return (IRR) method is that IRR overstates the fund's performance and misrepresents its relative ranking, which misleads investors about the reinvestment of cash proceeds and makes it difficult to compare fund managers. An example is given showing how M-IRR better represents the rate of return for private equity funds.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
Motivated by the observation that exchange-rate management resembles market-making, we use microstructure theory to conduct a welfare analysis of exchange-rate management, including the “corner solutions” of a free float and a fixed peg. We show that a policy that smoothes out exchange-rate fluctuations needs to trade off the welfare gain due to lower risk exposure of local producers against the trading losses that the policy would generate due to speculation. We identify the conditions under which exchange-rate management can increase welfare and argue that these conditions are more likely to be satisfied in illiquid markets, mainly small economies and emerging markets. We also explore the role of a Tobin tax (assuming enforceability) in facilitating exchange-rate management.
We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.
Leveraged investors may be subject to contagion when sales of repossessed collateral create a downward spiral in fire sales prices, increasing margin requirements and drying up the supply of liquidity. This raises the question whether market integration is desirable when the risk of contagion is significant. While a policy that erects barriers to the free flow of liquidity across countries (fragmentation) can mitigate the incidence of contagion, it creates another problem: Liquidity may remain idle in one country while its neighbour suffers a financial crisis. We conduct a welfare analysis to net out the two effects. We show that, by itself, fragmentation has a negative welfare effect: It can only fend off mild financial crises, at the cost of exposing the country to more severe ones. At the same time, since liquidity is under-provided in a competitive equilibrium, governments should inject more of it, which could involve fragmentation, in some cases. Nevertheless, in the absence of coordination, governments are likely to fragment over and above the social optimum. Such sub-optimal fragmentation is particularly likely when governments become massive suppliers of liquidity. It follows that the recent increase in fragmentation may reflect the implementation of beggar-thy-neighbour policies rather than the proper treatment of market failures.
We examine the interdependency between loan officer compensation contracts and commercial bank internal reporting systems (IRSs). The optimal incentive contract for bank loan officers may require the bank headquarters to commit not to act on certain types of information. The headquarters can achieve this by running a basic reporting system that restricts information flow within the bank. Origination fees for loan officers emerge naturally as part of the optimal contract in our set-up. We examine the likely effect of the new Basel Accord upon IRS choice, loan officer compensation, and bank investment strategies. We argue that the new Accord reduces the value of commitment, and hence that it may reduce the number of projects financed by banks.
This paper analyzes capital market reactions to international bank M&A. We investigate the combined stock return patterns of targets, bidders, and their peers upon takeover announcement, and closing or withdrawal. We distinguish five common M&A hypotheses and relate characteristic and mutually exclusive abnormal stock return patterns to each hypothesis. The findings show that there are more investors who believe in gains through the exploitation of market power by the post-merger entity than investors who believe in any of the other motives tested in the paper. In a multinomial logistic model we show that patterns related to market power significantly concur with large relative target size, intra-industry mergers, and increasing market concentration, suggesting a substantial lessening of competition through M&A.
We study the performance of nearly 1,400 U.S. buyout and venture capital funds using a new data set from Burgiss. We find better buyout fund performance than previously documented – performance has consistently exceeded that of public markets. Outperformance versus the S&P 500 averages 20% to 27% over a fund's life and more than 3% annually. Venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but underperformed in the 2000s. Our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls. Performance in Cambridge Associates and Preqin is qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss, but is lower in Venture Economics.
Assessing investment performance for private equity is inherently difficult due in large part to the nature of illiquid assets. Compounding this problem, investors and researchers alike are bedeviled by the existing lack of comprehensive, high-quality data. The current state of affairs obscures answers to basic practical questions, leads to lack of standardization, and creates confusion.
This paper examines measurements of “top quartile” performance, a status widely prized in the industry, especially in light of past research showing return persistence by funds raised by the same general partner. Using three popular data sources and applying metrics typically adopted in the industry, the authors demonstrate that even modest variations in methods can result in half of all funds being able to claim “top quartile” results. Sources of variation include methods of categorizing funds, definitions of vintage year, choice of the data source, specification of performance metrics, and treatment of geography and currencies.
Venture capitalists often hold extensive control rights over entrepreneurial companies, including the right to fire entrepreneurs. This article examines why, and under what circumstances, entrepreneurs would voluntarily relinquish control. Control rights protect the venture capitalists from hold-up by the entrepreneurs. This provides the correct incentives for the venture capitalists to search for a superior management team. Wealth-constrained entrepreneurs may give up control even if the change in management imposes a greater loss of private benefit to them than a monetary gain to the company. The model also explains why entrepreneurs accept vesting of their stock and low severance.
This paper examines the process of how entrepreneurs assemble resources. In the model, the entrepreneur's challenge is to convince two complementary resource providers to commit their resources to a new venture. Before committing their resources, one of them needs to perform a costly evaluation. The entrepreneur has a problem with getting sufficient attention, because each provider has an incentive to wait and free-ride on the other's evaluation. For some parameters the entrepreneur solicits both partners with equal intensity (“knocking on every door”); for others, the entrepreneur always solicits the same partner (“pestering”). For many but not all parameter ranges, the process of assembling resources takes too much time relative to what is socially efficient. The model thus explores what factors facilitate or hinder the creation of new firms.
This paper provides a new explanation for the use of convertible securities in venture capital. A key property of convertible preferred equity is that it allocates different cash flow rights, depending on whether exit occurs by acquisition or IPO. The paper builds a model with double moral hazard, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist provide value-adding effort. The optimal contract gives the venture capitalist more cash flow rights in acquisitions than IPOs. This explains the use of convertible preferred equity, including automatic conversion at IPO. Contingent control rights are also important for achieving efficient exit decisions.
In this note I develop some further thoughts that build on my paper entitled a "A Theory of Corporate Venturing." In this paper I develop a formal economic model of why corporations may face difficulties when making venture capital investments. In thinking broadly about the reasons why corporations may have difficulties when investing in entrepreneurial companies, I see three main sets of issues. The first set of reasons revolves around issues of intellectual property rights. The second set relates to strategic conflicts of interest. The third set concerns issues of organizational design and conflict within the corporation. The theory paper deals directly with the second set of issues, the conflicts of interest that result from the strategic objectives of the corporation. In this note I therefore want to focus on the first and third area of problems. Many would argue that entrepreneurs don't want corporate investors because they do not want their intellectual property stolen. I would actually argue that, while intellectual property is important, these problems should not be overstated.
This paper examines an economic theory of when employees become entrepreneurs. It jointly addresses the two fundamental questions of when employees generate innovations, and whether these innovations are developed as internal ventures or outside the firm. The model shows that if generating innovations distracts employees from their assigned tasks, firms may discourage innovation. Firms may reject profitable opportunities that fall outside of their core activities. If employees own the intellectual property (IP), they may leave to do a start-up. The allocation of IP rights also affects the generation of innovation. The external entrepreneurial environment is a complement to firm-internal innovation. If the external environment is particularly good, firms may embrace employee innovation and take advantage of it through spin-offs.
This theory paper examines an ex post rationale for the patenting of scientific discoveries. Scientists do not know which firms can make use of their discoveries, and firms do not know which scientific discoveries might be useful to them. To bridge this gap, either or both sides need to engage in costly search activities. Patents increase (decrease) dissemination when the search intensity of firms is sufficiently inelastic (elastic), relative to that of scientists. Patents also facilitate the delegation of search activities to the universities’ technology transfer offices, which enables efficient specialization. Patenting may be thus become a complement to doing research.
Some venture capital investors seek purely financial gains while others, such as corporations, also pursue strategic objectives. The paper examines a model where a strategic investor can achieve synergies, but can also face a conflict of interest with the entrepreneur. If the start-up is a complement to the strategic partner, it is optimal to obtain funding from the strategic investor. If the start-up is a mild substitute, the entrepreneur prefers an independent venture capitalist. With a strong substitute, syndication becomes optimal, such that the independent venture capitalist is the active lead investor and the strategic partner a passive co-investor. The expected returns for the entrepreneur are nonmonotonic, lowest for a mild substitute, and higher for a strong substitute as well as for a complement. The paper also explains why a strategic investor often pays a higher valuation than an independent venture capitalist.
The objective of the BC Angel on-line survey was to gather data on angel investing and to analyze the BC angel investment community, individual and organized investors, their composition (diversity), motivations, investment preferences and modus operandi. The survey also focused on individual and organized angel investors who invest in companies that qualify for the tex incentive schemes of the BC government. The on-line survey was analysed to provide further insight into the economic effects of the BC's Equity Capital Program (ECP), best practices within the program and to provide suggestions for program improvement.
This paper examines bank behavior in venture capital. It considers the relation between a bank's venture capital investments and its subsequent lending, which can be thought of as intertemporal cross-selling. Theory suggests that unlike independent venture capital firms, banks may be strategic investors who seek complementarities between venture capital and lending activities. We find evidence that banks use venture capital investments to build lending relationships. Having a prior relationship with a company in the venture capital market increases a bank's chance of subsequently granting a loan to that company. Companies can benefit from these relationships through more favorable loan pricing.
The performance and effectiveness of financial institutions are important considerations for policy-makers concerned about economic growth. Growth, after all, is heavily dependent on investment, and a significant fraction of all investment flows through financial institutions. Furthermore, incidences of financial instability in some countries have shown that poor financial policies can have serious consequences. For example, when the Southern Cone countries liberalized financial markets before achieving macroeconomic stability and low inflation, banks in those countries performed disastrously. In the United States the partial deregulation of the savings and loans (S&L) industry invited a great deal of gambling and looting of depositors ' funds, ultimately costing taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars. Partly because the financial sector of the east Asian high-growth economies grew substantially, financial development has received special attention recently in several developing countries. King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) demonstrated in a broad cross-country study that financial deepening had strong explanatory power for differential growth performance. If financial stability and financial deepening are worthy goals, what are the mechanisms that policy-makers can employ to achieve such goals?
This paper asks the question under what circumstances banks have incentives to increase the deposit collection, when the deposit market is not fully penetrated, i.e. when there is low financial depths. We compare outcomes under a perfectly competitive deposit market with outcomes under financial restraint, defined as a combination of deposit rate controls and restrictions on competition. In the first model we show that temporary exclusive rights may be an efficient way of inducing banks to open branches in new areas. In the second model we show that deposit rate controls can provide banks with stronger incentives to seek out new depositors, and thus to grow the deposit market.This paper represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent that of any organization with which they are or have been affiliated.
Deposit Mobilization through Financial Restraint (PDF Download Available). Available from: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228224729_Deposit_Mobilization_through_Financial_Restraint [accessed Aug 7, 2015].
This paper examines a set of financial policies, called financial restraint, that address financial market stability and growth in an initial environment of low financial deepening.
Unlike with financial repression, where the government extracts rents from the private sector, financial restraint calls for the government to create rent opportunities in the private sector. These rent opportunities induce outcomes that are more efficient than either financial repression or laissez-faire policies. It is argued that deposit rate controls and restrictions on competition create franchise value in financial markets that curtails moral hazard behavior among financial intermediaries. Lending rate controls may also increase the efficiency of intermediation by reducing agency cost in loan markets.
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path.
This paper models the generation, circulation, and completion of new ideas, showing how markets and innovative firms complement each other in a symbiotic relationship. Novel ideas are initially incomplete and require further insight before yielding a valuable innovation. Finding the complementary piece requires ideas to circulate, which creates appropriation risks. Circulation of ideas in markets ensures efficient completion, but because ideas can be appropriated, market entrepreneurs underinvest in idea generation. Firms can establish boundaries that guarantee safe circulation of internal ideas, but because firms need to limit idea circulation, they may fail to achieve completion. Spin-offs allow firms to benefit from the market's strength at idea completion, whereas markets benefit from firms' strength at generating new ideas. The model predicts diverse organizational forms (internal ventures, spin-offs, and start-ups) coexisting and mutually reinforcing each other. The analysis provides new insights into the structure of innovation-driven clusters such as Silicon Valley.
The venture capital industry experienced its biggest decline ever in 2001. The National Venture Capital Association reports that, in the fourth quarter of 2001, investments by venture capital firms were at approximately a third of the level the year before and the amount of money raised by these firms had dropped 80 percent. Many people question whether this trend signals the eventual demise of venture capital.
However, according to the authors of this article, it is important to put these numbers in perspective. In terms of total dollars invested, 2001 ranks as the venture capital industry's third-best year, and the developments of 2001 are simply an anomaly in an otherwise exceptional growth curve. The article examines the significance of this difference between short- and long-term performance.
Using the findings from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies, an interdisciplinary research project that analyzed 170 technology start-up firms, the authors discuss the effects of venture capital on both the market position of the start-up and on internal operational issues. Their research supports the conclusion that venture capitalists provide value-added services that enhance the value of their portfolio companies. The article concludes with some thoughts on the evolution of the venture capital industry in the nineties.
This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture-capital-backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.
Venture capital financing is widely believed to be influential for new innovative companies. We provide empirical evidence that venture capital financing is related to product market strategies and outcomes of start-ups. Using a unique hand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups. Using a unique hand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups we find that innovator firms are more likely to obtain venture capital than imitator firms. Venture capital is also associated with a significant reduction in the time to bring a product to market, especially for innovators. Our results suggest significant interrelations between investor types and product market dimensions, and a role of venture capital for innovative companies.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the economic impact of the venture capital program (VCP) in the province of British Columbia. The study focuses on the economic and financial performance of the companies in the program, including a comparison of the tax credits received versus the taxes paid by these companies.
Angel funding is often viewed as a stepping stone towards obtaining venture capital. An alternative perspective is that angel investors and venture capitalists are distinct investor types that rarely mix with each other. Using a unique database from British Columbia, Canada, we provide evidence that angel and venture capital funding are dynamic substitutes, not complements. This finding applies across the performance range. Using an instrumental variable approach based on tax credits, we find evidence of both company-led selection and investor-led treatment effects. The substitutes pattern is more pronounced for casual angels and angel funds than for serial angels.
Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit or the equity market. An interesting question is whether credit and equity rationing are mutually compatible, and how they interact. We consider a model with two-dimensional asymmetric information, where entrepreneurs have private information about both the expected returns and the risk of their projects. We show that credit and equity rationing may occur individually or simultaneously. Moreover, competition between the two markets may generate the adverse selection that leads to rationing outcomes.
This paper develops a theory of contracting among founders of a new firm. It asks at whatstage founders agree to commit to each other, how they structure optimal founder contracts, and how this affects team formation, ownership, incentives, and performance. The paper derives a trade-off between upfront contracting, which can result in teams with ineffective founders, versus delayed contracting, which can enable some founders to appropriate ideas and start their own firms. Delayed contracting becomes more attractive when there are significant doubts about the skills of founders. Contingent contracts with vesting of shares may be used to mitigate inefficiencies in the team formation process. Interestingly we show that outside investors cannot easily undo ex-post inefficient founder agreements. We also show that laws that provide protection to implied partnerships may have the unintended effect of encouraging more formal contracting.
This paper develops a theory of how angel and venture capital markets interact. Entrepreneurs first receive angel then venture capital funding. The two investor types are ‘friends’ in that they rely upon each other׳s investments. However, they are also ‘foes,’ because at the later stage the venture capitalists no longer need the angels. Using a costly search model we derive the equilibrium deal flows across the two markets, endogenously deriving market sizes, competitive structures, valuation levels, and exit rates. We also examine the role of legal protection for angel investments.
This paper develops a multitask model where employees make choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities that fall outside of the performance metrics, and require ex post bargaining. If innovations are highly firm specific, firms provide lower-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovations. The opposite occurs if innovations are less firm specific. We also investigate the effectiveness of several possibilities to encourage innovation, such as tolerance for failure, stock-based compensation, and the allocation of intellectual property rights. (JEL D21, J33, M12, O31, O34)
We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a “displacement externality” under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a “retention externality” under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externalities less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Our model also shows that wealthy partners would want to commit to ex-post wealth constraints.
We examine the trade-off between efficiency and equality within the context of entrepreneurial founding teams. Using a formal theory where founders may have preferences over relative outcomes, we derive predictions about the antecedents and consequences of dividing equity equally amongst all founders. Using proprietary survey data we empirically test the predictions. Our central finding is that teams that split equity equally are less likely to raise funds from outside investors. The relationship appears not to be causal, but instead driven by selection effects across heterogeneous teams with varying degrees of inequality aversion.
The introduction of competition into utilities is currently being pursued in the many countries, including the UK. Competition can take various forms, such as competition for outputs, inputs, franchises, and outright takeovers. Attention is currently focused on output competition, whereby customers are being given a choice of final supplier in many industries. We consider the implications of the introduction of such competition, including the effects on industrial structure and contracts, cross-subsidies and distributional concerns, and uncertainty and stranded contracts. We also analyse the transitional problems encountered as competition is introduced and suggest that the UK regulators and government have, in some key respects, failed to define a clear and consistent policy.
The paper records the substantial deficiencies that exist in the design and implementation of infrastructure programmes around the world. It points to three sources of failure. The first is a failure to recognize the systems nature of infrastructure and the implication of this for the appropriate tools of analysis that should be employed in infrastructure assessments. The second is a preoccupation with income and expenditure flows rather than balance sheets in reporting public - as well as private-sector infrastructure accounts. This has had profound and in many cases perverse implications for the ownership, funding, and operation of infrastructure. The third is inadequate governance of infrastructure programmes to overcome the significant commitment problems that afflict both private- and public-sector providers of infrastructure. The paper describes a set of responses that recognize the systems nature of infrastructure, the importance of balance sheets, and the need for commitment mechanisms in the private and public sectors to promote the efficient provision of infrastructure.
The 1980s were a period of profound economic change in the UK. The consensus politics of the post-Second World War period disintegrated in the face of mounting disillusionment with the UK's economic record. It gave way to a radical style of politics that firmly rejected intervention by the state in managing economic activity and promoted the operation of free markets
This paper investigates the information in corporate credit ratings. If ratings are to be informative indicators of credit risk they must reflect what a risk-averse investor cares about: both raw default probability and systematic risk. We find that ratings are relatively inaccurate measures of raw default probability - they are dominated as predictors of failure by a simple model based on publicly available financial information. However, ratings do contain relevant information since they are related to a measure of exposure to common (and undiversifiable) variation in default probability ('failure beta'). Systematic risk is shown to be related to joint default probabilities in the context of the Merton (1974) model. Empirically, it is related to CDS spreads and risk premia. Given the multidimensional nature of credit risk, it is not possible for one measure to capture all the relevant information.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition.
Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive profits down to zero. This paper shows that profits may remain bounded away from zero when firms have to make a negligible small investment to learn the demand.
This paper provides a framework for explicitly modeling the information gathering activities of potential entrants and analyzes how entry behavior is affected by these activities. We assume that information is acquired secretly and that firms face uncertainty about more than one variable. When costs of information gathering are small, entry decisions are as if firms had perfect information so that lack of information cannot cause too much nor too little entry. This as if behavior is even exhibited in specialization equilibria in which different firms obtain information about few but distinct variables. Such equilibria are both socially desirable and robust.
This paper analyzes Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) in Europe. We document various aspects associated with European SPACs by using a unique and hand-collected data sample encompassing all 19 SPACs which have been listed on European stock exchanges since 2005. The paper shows that in spite of being listed on European stock exchanges, many SPACs do not have a European focus, neither in terms of investors, nor in their choice for target companies. Additionally, our results show that there is a great heterogeneity in the choice for target companies among the SPACs, especially with regard to financial performance, and that SPAC investors react negatively to the choice for an underperforming target company.
This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all U.S. commercial banks during the period 1998 to 2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk, as developed by the body of literature on bank stability risk in general and credit and liquidity risk in particular. They also serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks, such as the Basel III and Dodd-Frank frameworks.
The dissemination of robust real estate data can help to improve market efficiency and investment analysis. To provide a perspective on property prices, a long series is vital. While long commercial and residential real estate data series are available, agricultural land is less well served. Comparable series describing long-term price and return histories for farmland in England are fragmented. We redress this data deficiency after considering the methodological complexities involved. The study employs a chain-linking approach to construct a long-term farmland price series for England. It then adjusts the series for inflation to examine real land prices. The resulting two-century series of English farmland prices establishes a basis for a more efficient farmland market analysis.
Notwithstanding issues around long-run chain component heterogeneity, the combined series illuminates English average farmland price dynamics and changing land market fortunes. For more than two centuries English land price real capital returns were positive. Farmland real price growth was 0.33 per cent annually from 1781 to 2013 and 0.71 per cent from 1801 to 2013 as measured by the geometric mean. The series provides prima facie support for land investment, even when ignoring spatial peri-urban opportunities, rental income or tax advantages.
Using holdings data on a representative sample of all Shanghai Stock Exchange investors, we show that increases in ownership breadth (the fraction of market participants who own a stock) predict low returns: highest change quintile stocks underperform lowest quintile stocks by 23% per year. Small retail investors drive this result. Retail ownership breadth increases appear to be correlated with overpricing. Among institutional investors, however, the opposite holds: stocks in the top decile of wealth-weighted institutional breadth change outperform the bottom decile by 8% per year, consistent with prior work that interprets breadth as a measure of short-sales constraints.
Until recently, the periodic assessment of a company's cost of capital presented few problems to the company's finance director. However, the cost of equity capital, an important component of a company's overall cost of capital, can now be a more complex problem. Some of the most important techniques for computing the cost of equity capital are reviewed and the equity risk premium is discussed in some detail.
When a firm makes an initial public offering (IPO) of it equity, the accuracy with which its shares are priced will be an important factor determining the cost of "going public." In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan IPOs are systematically priced at a discount relative to their subsequent trading price. In the United States and the United Kingdom such discounts are, in average, around 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in normal trading conditions. In contrast, the average Japanese IPO rose in price by nearly 55 percent after one week. Existing theories seem unable to explain this persistent underpricing of IPOs across countries.
This paper considers the arguments for and against private‐sector financing—as opposed to operational management—of public services. Under certain conditions the costs of public and private finance will be similar, but these conditions are unlikely to hold for many public services. Using examples from the UK, we show how decisions to introduce private financing are often political, with little economic rationale.
This clinical paper analyses a new way of conducting IPOs which has recently been introduced in the U.K. The essential feature of Accelerated IPOs (aIPOs) is that investors form syndicates to bid for the entire offering, and then execute an immediate IPO (within a week). Vendors can use an auction to determine whether the valuation is higher in private equity, trade, or public equity hands. aIPOs address two problems that regulators and academics have associated with conventional IPOs conducted via bookbuilding: inaccurate valuation and questionable use of discretion over allocation. Conflicts of interest are avoided as the advisors who organise aIPOs work for the investors rather than the issuing company.
The real interest rate and the equity risk premium are critical economic parameters that influence a wide range of economic decisions. This paper considers the problems involved in estimating expected real interest rates and the equity risk premium, and hence the overall cost of capital. Using UK data, it suggests reasons why estimates based on historical returns may be misleading, and discusses alternative approaches to estimating the cost of capital.
Private equity’s high degree of leverage in the boom years leading up to the recent bust is a dominant factor in that market’s current precarious state. Valuations have fallen precipitously and are likely to fall farther, with some firms going into default. But many firms will prove robust, and those firms with cash available should be able to find excellent bargains in 2009 and 2010.
The merits of investing in private versus public equity have generated considerable debate, often fueled by concerns about data quality. In this paper, we use cash flow data derived from the holdings of almost 300 institutional investors to study over 1,800 North American buyout and venture capital funds. Buyout fund returns have consistently exceeded those from public markets; averaging about 3% to 4% annually. We find similar performance results for a sample of almost 300 European buyout funds. Venture capital performance has varied substantially over time. North American venture funds from the 1990s substantially outperformed public equities; those from the early 2000s have underperformed; and recent vintage years have seen a modest rebound. The variation in venture performance is significantly linked to capital flows: performance is lower for funds started when there are large aggregate inflows of capital to the sector. We also examine the variation in performance of funds started in the same year. We find marked differences between venture and buyout leading to a much more pronounced impact of accessing high performing funds in venture investing.
This paper uses evidence from a dataset of 27 European IPOs to analyse how investors bid and the factors that influence their allocations. We have the complete books for these deals - amounting to 5540 bids - and so can analyse directly how bids and allocations are related. All these deals are private sector IPOs where the bookrunner was a leading European investment bank. We make use of a unique ranking of investor quality, associated with the likelihood of flipping the IPO, as produced by a group of US and European investment banks. We find that "high quality" investors are consistently favoured in allocation and in out-turn profits. We also find that bids submitted via the bookrunner and large bids received better pro-rata allocations and higher average profits. We find that a very small proportion of all bids submitted during the bookbuilding contain price limits - especially in hot IPOs - and, in contrast to Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), we do not find that that such bids are favoured in terms of allocation.
Addressing some of the underlying economics and the empirical evidence on bookbuilding.
Despite the central importance of investors to all initial public offering (IPO) theories, relatively little is known about their role in practice. This article is based on a survey of how institutional investors assess IPOs, what information they provide to the investment banking syndicate, and the factors they believe influence allocations. We find that investor characteristics, in particular brokerage relationships with the bookrunner, are perceived to be the most important factors influencing allocations, which supports the view that IPO allocations are part of implicit quid pro quo deals with investment banks. The survey raises doubts as to the extent of information production or revelation.
Stabilisation is the bidding for and purchase of securities by an underwriter immediately after an offering for the purpose of preventing or retarding a fall in price. Stabilisation is price manipulation, but regulators allow it within strict limits – notably that stabilisation may not occur above the offer price. For legislators and market authorities, a false market is a price worth paying for an orderly market. This paper compares the rationale for regulators' allowing IPO stabilisation with its effects. It finds that stabilisation does have the intended effects, but that underwriters also seem to have other motives to stabilise, including favouring certain aftermarket sellers and enhancing their own reputation and profits. A puzzling aspect of stabilisation is why underwriters create ‘naked short’ positions which are loss-making to cover when, as is usual, the aftermarket price rises to a premium. We set up a model to show that the lead underwriter may profit from a naked short at the expense of the rest of the syndicate given the way commissions are apportioned between them. We argue that a naked short mitigates the misalignment of interests which stabilisation causes between issuer and lead underwriter, although it does so at the expense of the non-lead underwriters.
U.S. plan sponsors managing over $13 trillion rely on investment consultants for advice about which funds to invest in. Using survey data, we analyze what drives consultants’ recommendations of institutional funds, what impact these recommendations have on flows, and how much value they add to plan sponsors. We examine the aggregate recommendations of consultants with a share of over 90% of the U.S. consulting market. We find that consultants’ recommendations of funds are driven largely by soft factors, rather than the funds’ past performance, and that their recommendations have a very significant effect on fund flows, but we find no evidence that these recommendations add value to plan sponsors.
Using detailed information from a large sample of investment banks we test the determinants of IPO allocations. This research draws on data gathered by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, and covers 220 IPOs managed from the UK raising around $160bn. Detailed information on book-building is combined with data on revenues generated (from trading and other activities) by investment banks’ buy-side clients, and data on post-IPO trading. We find evidence that informative bids are rewarded. However, we also find strong evidence that most, but not all, of the major investment banks favor the buy-side clients that produce the most revenue.
This article uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The article also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.
A significant recent development has been the extension of market processes to activities which were previously provided by the public sector. A central feature of newly privatised markets is the emergence of widespread forms of contracting. Explicit contracting is used where in the past transactions had taken place internally within a public enterprise of a government department. The design of efficient forms of contracting has been an essential component of the development of new markets and quasi-markets such as those in defence and health. This paper examines evidence of the structure of contracts and the extent to which they contribute to or detract from the efficient operation of markets, discusses the role of contracts in some newly emerging markets, and evaluates contracts in utilities where regulation rather than competition policy is widespread.
Many organizations find themselves open to a hostile takeover bid and this book, with a comprehensive case study approach, offers an understanding of what can happen, why and how to manoeuvre from under a hostile takeover. "Hostile Takeovers" presents a case study analysis of this make or break issue, disclosing the strategies and outcomes of over 40 hostile takeovers. Through these cases, the authors offer both guidance and specific takeover strategies and how to overcome them. They also draw out general conclusions - bringing new ideas on, for example, how takeovers can affect the long-term success of an organization. The text looks at takeover bids on Bassett Foods, Marina Developments and Piccadilly Radio, among others.
Unlike in the U.S., the initial price range for European IPOs is seldom revised, although issues are often priced at the upper bound. We develop a model that explains this seemingly inefficient pricing behavior. As in Europe, but not in the U.S., underwriters in the model obtain information from investors before establishing the indicative price range. A commitment to stay within the range is necessary to extract private information from investors. Ours is therefore the first treatment in which the bookbuilding range has a clear economic role. The model has important implications for empirical research based on European primary market data.
As the regulation of public companies has tightened, many companies have switched to stock exchanges with lower regulatory requirements. We analyse the consequences for smaller quoted companies of switching between the two London markets, which differ in their regulatory regimes. Firms that switch to lighter regulation experience, on average, negative announcement returns of approximately 5%. However there is a longer-term upward drift in stock returns after the switch. We relate these financial returns to improvements in operating performance in the years following the switch, suggesting that for some companies, and their investors, a lighter regulatory environment may be appropriate.
How and when to exit portfolio company investments are critical choices facing private equity funds. In this paper we analyze 1,022 European private equity exits, using information on fund and portfolio company characteristics, and on conditions in capital markets. For over 43% of the exits, private equity funds sold to each other and we analyze why such secondary buyouts have gained in popularity relative to IPOs and sales to corporate acquirers. We find that the exit route depends on various portfolio company characteristics, and that conditions in the debt and equity markets have a strong influence on exit choice. The existing literature has tended to portray the IPO is the “preferred” exit route. However, our analysis suggests this is mistaken: private equity funds take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’, and the exit route that maximizes value varies with market conditions.
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) have raised around $22bn from investors since 2003, and comprised 20% of total funds raised in US IPOs in 2007. SPACs are interesting structures - allowing investors a risk-free option to invest in a future acquisition. However, we show that more than one-half of approved deals immediately destroy value. Investors, who can observe the market's view of the proposed deal, as well as that of the founders, should listen to the market, since the extreme incentives faced by the SPAC founders create corresponding conflicts of interest. We propose a simple, observable rule - based on market prices - which investors should heed.
The ultimate performance of private equity funds is only known once all investments have been sold, and the cash returned to investors. This typically takes over a decade. In the meantime, the reported performance depends on the valuation of the remaining portfolio companies. Private equity houses market their next fund on the basis of these interim valuations of their current fund. In this paper we analyze whether these valuations are fair, whether the extent of conservative or aggressive valuations differ during the life of the fund, and at what stage interim performance measures predict ultimate performance. This paper is the first to use the quarterly valuations and cash flows for the entire history of 761 fund investments made by Calpers – the largest U.S. investor in private equity. Our main findings are as follows. First, over the entire life of the fund we find evidence that fund valuations are conservative, and tend to be smoothed (relative to movements in public markets): valuations understate subsequent distributions by around 35% on average. We find a significant jump in valuations in the fourth-quarter, when funds are normally audited. Second, the exception to this general conservatism is the period when follow-on funds are being raised. We find that valuations, and reported returns, are inflated during fundraising, with a gradual reversal once the follow-on fund has been closed. Third, we find that the performance figures reported by funds during fund-raising have little power to predict ultimate returns. This is especially true when performance is measured by IRR. Using public market equivalent measures increases predictability significantly. Our results show that investors should be extremely wary of basing investment decisions on the returns - especially IRRs – of the current fund.
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and their firms’ risk characteristics. I show theoretically that, when CEOs cannot trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with firm's nonsystematic risk but is ambiguously affected by firm's systematic risk; when CEOs can trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with nonsystematic risk but is unaffected by systematic risk. Empirically I find support for these predictions. Furthermore, I find that incentives for CEOs likely facing binding short-selling constraints decrease with systematic as well as nonsystematic risk, as predicted by theory. Thus, compensation practice is consistent with predictions of theory.
I study whether the capital gains tax is an impediment to selling by some investors and if so, to what degree associated delayed selling affects stock prices. I find that selling decisions by institutions serving tax-sensitive clients are sensitive to cumulative capital gains, a pattern not observed for institutions with predominantly tax-exempt clients. Moreover, tax-related underselling impacts stock prices during large earnings surprises for stocks held primarily by tax-sensitive investors. The corresponding price reactions are less negative (more positive) with higher cumulative capital gains. This price pressure pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly.
We examine the effect of personal taxes on CEOs’ decisions to sell their equity, controlling for diversification, managerial overconfidence, and other determinants. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, the tax burden associated with the sale significantly deters them from selling equity even after controlling for other determinants like diversification. We also find that both taxable institutional investors and CEOs respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Our findings underscore the importance of taxes in corporate and managerial decisions and they have implications for executive compensation policies.
Purpose - To find out if the beta from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) accurately measures the systematic equity risk of a firm's pension funds.
Design/methodology/approach -Takes 4,453 observations of equity beta using the market model on weekly return data for up to one year from 1993 to 1998, adds firm risk (weighted average beta for equity and risk) and pension risk (pension asset risk minus pension liability risk) obtained from ERISA Form 5500. Tests results for robustness.
Findings - Finds that, in theory, following Merton (2002) the cost of capital is severely overvalued if pension assets and liabilities are ignored, or if the risk of the pension plan is ignored. However, in the market, shows that prices reflect the risk level of the pension funds.
Research limitations/implications - Points out that these findings predate the pension fund deficit crisis of the 2000s. Notes that the market does not differentiate between operational and pension fund risk, and that the distortions caused by this risk to the calculation of cost of capital need further research.
Practical implications - Indicates that project financing needs to be recalculated to reflect the pension fund risk; otherwise good projects may be rejected.
Originality/value - Presents the view that pension fund risk is detected by the markets, even if the data are not easily available, by means unknown.
Morck, Yeung and Yu show that R2 is higher in countries with less developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. We show how control rights and information affect the division of risk bearing between managers and investors. Lack of transparency increases R2 by shifting firm-specific risk to managers. Opaque stocks with high R2s are also more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Using stock returns from 40 stock markets from 1990 to 2001, we find strong positive relations between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. These measures also explain the frequency of crashes.
We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior is observed regardless of fund characteristics and is stronger when new managers are external hires. The tendency of continuing fund managers to hold on to losers could be consistent with either a behavior bias stemming from an inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance or a conscious desire to protect their careers by not admitting prior mistakes. Furthermore, we present evidence that selling off loser stocks helps improve fund performance.
This paper uses evidence from a data set of 27 European IPOs to analyze how investors bid and the factors that influence their allocations. We also make use of a unique ranking of investor quality, associated with the likelihood of flipping the IPO. We find that investors perceived to be long-term holders of the stock are consistently favored in allocation and in out-turn profits. In contrast to Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), we find little evidence that more informative bids receive larger allocations or higher profits. Our results cast doubt upon the extent of information production during the bookbuilding period.
Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These ‘competitive IPOs’ allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against ‘bait and switch.’ But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks’ active involvement in issues.
Using survey data we analyze institutional investors’ expectations about the future performance of fund managers and the impact of these expectations on asset allocation decisions. Past performance is a driver of both plan sponsors’ expectations of fund managers’ future performance and of the flows into (and out of) those fund managers, although it is not informative about their future performance. The non-performance attributes of funds drive expectations but do not drive flows, while investment consultants’ recommendations are critical to flows but have only a minor impact on expectations. Our findings suggest that, when plan sponsors allocate assets, they do not act fully on their expectations, but prefer to base their decisions on more defensible variables at their disposal.
In this paper, we show how the interaction between costly screening and competition in decentralized markets may prevent efficient matching. We examine this phenomenon in a simple dynamic model of a professional labor market, where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability. Inefficiencies arise when a firm decides not to interview potentially able candidates since it infers that sufficiently good candidates will be hired by more productive firms. This effect is robust to changes in the information structure of the market, but it can be mitigated by subsidizing screening costs.
The poor performance of credit ratings on structured finance products has prompted investigation into the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in designing and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model where a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold to different clienteles: unconstrained investors and investors constrained by minimum quality requirements. When quality requirements for constrained investors are higher, rating inflation increases. Rating inflation decreases if the quality of the asset pool is higher. Securities for both types of investors may have inflated ratings. The motivation for pooling assets derives from tailoring to clienteles and from reputational incentives.
We uncover a new channel through which shocks are transmitted across international markets. Investor flows to funds domiciled in developed markets force significant changes in their portfolio allocations to emerging markets. These forced trades affect equity prices, correlations between emerging markets, and the developed-market betas of emerging markets. These funding-driven fire sale effects are related to, but distinct from those arising purely from high fund holdings or high overlapping ownership of emerging markets in fund portfolios. A simple model and calibration exercise highlight the importance to these findings of 'push' effects from funds' domicile countries, and 'co-ownership spillover' between markets with overlapping fund ownership.
We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross-fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results indicate incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.
We provide evidence that open-end structures undermine asset managers’ incentives to attack long-term mispricing. First, we compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with high share restrictions, having a lower degree of open-ending, also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extent than other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.
What is the impact of greater publicity in the shorting market on informational efficiency? To answer this, we exploit rule amendments in U.S. securities markets which increased the frequency of public disclosure of short interest. Theoretically, greater public disclosure can improve or deteriorate informational efficiency. We find that with more frequent disclosure, short-sellers’ private information is incorporated into prices faster, improving informational efficiency. We also document significant market reactions to short interest announcements, suggesting investor learning, and furthermore, reductions in short-sellers’ horizon risk and holding periods.
Does trader leverage exacerbate the liquidity co-movement that we observe during crises? We exploit the threshold rules governing margin trading eligibility in India to identify a causal relationship between trader leverage and the extent to which a stock’s liquidity covaries with the liquidity of other stocks. We find that trader leverage causes sharp increases in comovement during severe market downturns. For our sample of stocks, the estimates suggest that the trader leverage channel explains about one third of the increase in liquidity commonality that we observe during crises. Consistent with downward price pressure due to the deleveraging of traders who rely on borrowing, we also find
that leverage causes stocks to exhibit large increases in return comovement during crises.
Does trader leverage drive equity market liquidity? We use the unique features of the margin trading system in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability to borrow and a stock’s market liquidity. To quantify the impact of trader leverage, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits threshold rules that determine a stock’s margin trading eligibility. We find that liquidity is higher when stocks become eligible for margin trading and that this liquidity enhancement is driven by margin traders’ contrarian strategies. Consistent with downward liquidity spirals due to deleveraging, we also find that this effect reverses during crises.
The drafting of macroprudential regulation is largely being driven by the need by policy makers to meet timetables that have been agreed. The legislative drive is taking place without any clear theoretical framework to organise the objectives. In this article we propose two principles that any satisfactory framework ought to respect and then describe one specific model that embodies these principles. We explain the insights from this approach for regulatory design.
For over three centuries and throughout the globe, people have enthusiastically bought savings products that incorporate lottery elements. In lieu of paying traditional interest to all investors proportional to their balances, these Prize Linked Savings (PLS) accounts distribute periodic sizeable payments to some investors using a lottery-like drawing where an investor’s chances of winning are proportional to one’s account balances. This paper describes these products, provides examples of their use, argues for their potential popularity in the United States —especially to low and moderate income non-savers—and discusses the laws and regulations in the United States that largely prohibit their issuance.
In the summer of 1999, Adecco SA, one of the world's leading staffing companies, was in the midst of attempting to acquire the staffing operations of Olsten Corp., a U.S. firm. This case analyzes the economics of the staffing industry, basic valuation, cross-border issues including tax arbitrage, valuation of minority interest, and the importance of financial health in merger negotiations.
We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply. A sudden increase in demand for IPO financing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. This results in reduced screening, encouraging sub-marginal firms to enter the IPO market, further fueling the demand for screening labor. The model's conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets, positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing, and with tipping points between hot and cold markets. Finally, the model makes sharp predictions relating the IPO market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns.
Is there another technology bubble in the making? This question has exercised the media and markets since the extraordinary post-IPO performance of LinkedIn, the social network for professionals. Social-sales aggregator Groupon has recently suggested that conventional valuation methods are obsolete and this has only reinforced parallels with the anything-goes internet IPOs of the early 2000s.
Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86 of the world fund industry in 2002. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.
Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corporate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators. Ours is the first empirical study of such legal cases that define the limits of acceptable behavior under financial distress. We examine the differences in behavior of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were taken into receivership between 2007–2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynamics in the three years prior to failure. These generally larger banks were faster growing, obtained riskier funding and were more “optimistic”. We find evidence that the behavior of bank boards adjusts in an out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does not only pursue “deep pockets”, but sets corporate governance standards for all banks by suing negligent directors and officers.
This paper tests competing theories of interbank lending using 43 quarters (2002-2012) of confifidential data on the German banking sector and interbank market. It shows that banks use the interbank market for liquidity co-insurance as traditionally assumed. However, the importance of the liquidity management function is higher for regionally-focused credit cooperatives and savings banks than for private commercial banks. A distinct effect for private banks is identified; for private banks, increases in interbank liabilities are shown to correlate with a proxy for the bailout probability of banks. The paper thus offers empirical support for an emerging literature on strategic behaviour in interbank markets and highlights the need to extend the traditional model of liquidity co-insurance.
We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining” market, and a “centralized” market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of “unraveling” in which relatively high value traders (buyers with a high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized markets more attractive until few opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace.
We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior.
This paper provides a quantitative metric for financial stability of Korean commercial banking system based on the Tsomocos (J Math Econ 39(5–6):619–655, 2003) model, for which we use market data as proxies for probabilities of default and equity valuation of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of the probability of default and the equity valuation of the banking sector on real output using a vector error correction model (VECM). In addition, we estimate the contributions of individual banks to systemic risk using CoVaR and MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall). CoVaR is estimated based on the methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), and MES is estimated based on Shapley value methodology which has been introduced by Tarashev et al. (2010)
To develop the next generation of risky products, ALZA, a mature and profitable biotechnology firm specializing in drug delivery systems, must raise $40 million. Organizational constraints and competitive concerns demand that the work be done inside the firm. However, accounting considerations and concerns about shareholders' reactions to the introduction of new risks to the firm lead the CEO to consider off-balance-sheet means to finance the new venture. To finance the new venture, the firm creates a new financing vehicle: a unit consisting of callable common stock plus warrants. This case examines the CEO's decision leading up to the issue of the units and the establishment of a new research and development subsidiary.
Supplements the (A) case. Describes the CEO's decision.
Supplements the (A) case. Describes the implementation of the CEO's decision.
Supplements the (A) case. Describes the aftermarket performance of the units.
Financial innovation has been both praised as the engine of growth of society and castigated for being the source of the weakness of the economy. In this article, we review the literature on financial innovation and highlight the similarities and differences between financial innovation and other forms of innovation. We also propose a research agenda to systematically address the social welfare implications of financial innovation. To complement existing empirical and theoretical methods, we propose that scholars examine case studies of systemic (widely adopted) innovations, explicitly considering counterfactual histories had the innovations never been invented or adopted.